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Recent Cases
ABA CODE OF PROFESSIONAL
RESPONSIBILITY: AN ATTORNEY'S RIGHT TO
SELF-DEFENSE
Meyerhoffer v. Empire Fire & Marine Insurance Co.1
Empire Fire & Marine Insurance Co. made a registered public
offering of 500,000 shares of its stock. When Empire filed a Form 10K with the Securities and Exchange Commission revealing that the
registration statement did not disclose features of the compensation
arrangements between Empire and its law firm, Sitomer,.the plaintiffs brought a class action suit alleging the registration statement
and the prospectus under which the Empire stock had been issued
were materially false and misleading. Included as defendants were
Empire, the three partners of the Sitomer law firm, and Stuart
Goldberg, a former member of the Sitomer firm.2
Goldberg had resigned from the Sitomer firm in January 1973,
when the Sitomer partners refused to make a full disclosure of allegedly excessive fees in the Empire registration statement. Upon resigning Goldberg immediately appeared before the Securities and
Exchange Commission and furnished information subsequently
embodied in an affidavit. 3 When he learned that he had been named
as a defendant in the civil suit, he asked the plaintiffs' attorney for
an opportunity to demonstrate that he had been unaware of the fee
arrangement. He met with the attorney and, after consulting his
own attorney and the Special Counsel with the Securities and Exchange Commission, gave plaintiffs' counsel a copy of the affidavit
he had given to the Commission. Thereupon, the plaintiffs dropped
Goldberg as a defendant and amended their complaint to include
more specific facts.'
1.

497 F.2d 1190 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 43 U.S.L.W. 3280 (Dec. 12, 1974).

2. Id. at 1192.
3.

Several writers have noted that when a securities attorney follows the SEC's position

that lawyers have a duty to report their clients' securities law violations, he faces the possibility that his action will be challenged as a violation of the Code of Professional Responsibility.
Goldberg, Ethical Dilemma: Attorney-Client Privilege v. The National Student Marketing
Doctrine, 1 SEc. REG. L.J. 297 (1974); Lipman, The SEC's Reluctant Police Force: A New
Role for Lawyers, 49 N.Y.U.L. REv. 437 (1974). The Meyerhoffer case does not discuss the

propriety of an attorney reporting his clients' securities laws violations to the SEC.
4.

497 F.2d at 1193.
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Two days after this amended complaint the remaining defendants moved pursuant to Canons 4 and 9 of the Code of Professional
Responsibility and the supervisory power of the court for an order
of disqualification. The district court ordered that the plaintiffs'
firm and Goldberg be barred from acting as counsel or participating
with counsel for plaintiffs in this or any future action against Empire involving the transactions placed in issue in 5this lawsuit and
from disclosing confidential information to others.
On appeal by the plaintiffs' attorneys and Goldberg as intervenor, the Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit noted that the
basis for the district court's decision to bar the plaintiffs' firm was
the premise that Goldberg had breached the relevant ethical canons
by revealing confidential information to plaintiffs' attorneys for use
in their suit against Empire.' The court reversed this portion of the
district court's opinion, holding that Goldberg had not violated the
Code of Professional Responsibility so there was no sound basis for
disqualifying the plaintiffs' firm. The court did affirm that portion
of the district court holding which enjoined Goldberg from acting as
counsel for the plaintiffs because of his prior representation of the
defendants.7
In reversing that portion of the district court's holding which
found violations of the Code of Professional Responsibility, the
court stated that DR 4-101(C) recognizes that a lawyer may reveal
confidences or secrets necessary to defend himself against "an accusation of wrongful conduct." 8 In its petition for certiorari, Empire
contended that the court of appeal decision would undermine "public confidence in the legal system."9 Empire further asserted that
under such a rule "an adverse party may effectively strip the client
of the protection of the attorney-client privilege and subject him to
unsupervised, disclosure of prejudicial information by the simple
device of naming the client's lawyer as co-defendant."' I
Under the old ABA Canons of Professional Ethics, which were
in effect in most states until September, 1969,11 the device of accusing an opponent's lawyer of wrongdoing to secure the disclosure of
previously privileged communications between the attorney and his
client was prohibited. Canon 37 addressed the question of when a
5. Id.
6.

Id. at 1194.

7. Id. at 1196.
8. Id. at 1194.95.
9. 273 BNA SEC. REG. & L. REP. A-8, A-9 (1974).
10. Id. at A-9.
11. R. WISE, LECAL ETHIcs at ix (2d ed. 1970).
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lawyer might reveal confidences or secrets of his client. It gave a
lawyer a limited right of disclosure: "If a lawyer is accused by his
client, he is not precluded from disclosing the truth in respect to the
accusation."'"
ABA Opinion 202 applied this canon to a fact situation similar
to that in Meyerhoffer. In the opinion the ethics committee decided
that an attorney could not initiate any proceeding to protect himself
which would involve a disclosure of confidential communications
without the consent of his client. 3 It is apparent from the language
of Canon 37 and ABA Opinion 202, as well as other opinions, 4 that
under the old Canons of Professional Ethics an attorney would only
be justified in revealing confidential communication to defend himself when the client or former client is the accuser. Consequently it
would appear that Goldberg would have violated the old canons
when he gave the plaintiffs' attorneys his affidavit" since the plaintiff, who had made the accusation of wrongful conduct, had never
been his client."6
Similarly, the court of appeals decision is likely wrong when
considered solely in light of the attorney-client privilege. 7 Canon 4

of the Code of Professional Responsibility states "[a] lawyer should
preserve the confidences and secrets of a client." The term "confidences" is defined as "information protected by the attorney-client
12. ABA Canons of Professional Ethics No. 37 (emphasis added).
13. ABA Comm. on Professional Ethics, Opinion No. 202 (1940).
14. See ABA Comm. on Professional Ethics, Opinions 250 (1943) and 19 (1930).
15. This is assuming that there are no other grounds, such as an intention of the client
to commit a crime, on which Goldberg would be justified in disclosing the confidential
communications. The court of appeals makes no mention of the possibility of any other
exceptions being applicable. But see text accompanying notes 26-27 infra.
16. See ABA Canons, supra note 12; ABA Opinions, supra note 13.
17. Wigmore states the evidentiary privilege as follows:
Where legal advice of any kind is sought from a professional legal advisor in his
capacity as such, the communications relating to that purpose, made in confidence
by the client, are at his instance permanently protected from disclosure by himself
or by the legal advisor except the protection be waived.
8 J. WIGMoRE, EvmENCE § 2292 (McNaughton rev. 1961).
ABA Code of Professional Responsibility [hereinafter cited as ABA Code] DR 4-101,
Preservation of Confidences and Secrets of a Client provides:
(A) "Confidence" refers to information protected by the attorney-client privilege
under applicable law, and "secret" refers to other information gained in the professional relationship that the client has requested be.held inviolate or the disclosure
of which would be embarrassing or would be likely to be detrimental to the client.
In EC 4-4 it is explained that:
the attorney-client privilege is more limited than the ethical obligation of a lawyer
to guard the confidences and secrets of his client. This ethical precept, unlike the
evidentiary privilege, exists without regard to the nature or source of information
or the fact that others share the knowledge.
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privilege under applicable law."'" The applicable law in the
Meyerhoffer case is that of New York which provides that only the
client may waive the attorney-client privilege. 9 Because of the privilege, the confidential communications between the client and his
attorneys could not be introduced into evidence in Meyerhoffer unless the client had waived the privilege or the court had ruled otherwise.2" If a client were to accuse his attorney of wrongful conduct
there would be a waiver of the .privilege,' but in a situation similar
to that in Meyerhoffer, where the attorney is accused by someone
other than his client, the client has done nothing to waive his
privilege.2" Neither the attorney nor the opposition can waive the
client's privilege for him. In Meyerhoffer the attorney was allowed
to reveal confidences and secrets of his client without a waiver of
the attorney-client privilege, and without any prior judicial supervision as to what might be revealed. The decision in this aspect goes
beyond both the attorney-client privileges and the old Canons of
Professional Ethics.s
In reaching its decision, the court of appeals relied solely on its
interpretation of DR 4-101(C) (4) of the Code of Professional Responsibility, the successor to the Canons of Professional Ethics.2" Under
18. Id.
19. Unless the client waives the privilege, an attorney or his employee, or any
person who obtains without the knowledge of the client evidence of a confidential
communication made between the attorney or his employee and the client in the
course of professional employment, shall not disclose, or be allowed to disclose such
communication ....
N.Y. Civ. PR~c. L. & RuLs § 4503(a) (1963).
20. See C. McCORMICK, LAW OF EVIDENCE §§ 87-91 (2d ed. 1972).
21. For a consideration of acts sufficient to constitute a waiver by the client see 8 J.
WIGMORE, EVIDENCE § 2328 (McNaughton rev. 1961).
22. Most of the reported cases where an attorney is accused of wrongful conduct involve
an accusation by the client himself. See, e.g., State v. Kruchten, 101 Ariz. 186, 417 P.2d 510
(1966); Olmstead v. Webb, 5 App. D.C. 38 (1894); Nave v. Baird, 12 Ind. 318 (1859); In re
Arnson Estate, 2 Mich. App. 473, 140 N.W.2d 546 (1966). In those few reported cases where
an attorney was accused of wrongdoing by someone other than his client, the attorney was
allowed to reveal confidences and secrets of his client only because the client acted in some
manner which waived his privilege or because the communication was not privileged. See,
e.g., Strickland v. Capital City Mills, 74 S.C. 16, 54 S.E. 220 (1906); Koeber v. Somers, 108
Wis. 497, 84 N.W. 991 (1901).
23. See 8 WciOa , supra note 21, at § 2321.
24. See text accompanying notes 19-23 supra.
25. See text accompanying notes 12-16 supra.
26. The Code of Professional Responsibility was adopted by the American Bar Association at its annual meeting on August 12, 1969, to replace the Canons which were first adopted
in 1908. The Missouri Supreme Court accepted the new Code, repealing its rule which
embodied the Canons and adopted the Code of Professional Responsibility as new Supreme
Court Rule 4, effective January 1, 1971.
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the Code of Professional Responsibility an attorney in the position
of Goldberg could rely on at least three Code sections as exceptions
to the general rule that an attorney should preserve the confidences
and secrets of his client: DR 4-101(C) (3),21 DR 4-101(C) (4),1s and DR
7-102(B)(1) .21Apparently, because of the difficulties of proving his
"former client's intention to commit a crime" or "that in the course
of the representation his client has perpetrated a fraud," ' Goldberg
and his attorneys chose to defend his action on the basis of DR 4101(C)(4). The court of appeals accepted the argument that this
section was applicable and reached what was probably the correct
result. Whether the means used to reach this result are correct is
questionable; it is doubtful that the authors of the Code of Professional Responsibility intended this section to be read so broadly as
to cover unsupervised disclosure of confidential communications by
an attorney accused of wrongful conduct by someone other than his
client.
Probably the most persuasive evidence of the intent of the authors can be found by examining the public policy basis of the
attorney-client privilege and of Canon 4 of the Code. 31 The policy
27. "A lawyer may reveal: . . .(3) The intention of his client to commit a crime and
the information necessary to prevent the crime."
28. "A lawyer may reveal: . . . (4) Confidences or secrets necessary to establish or
collect his fee or to defend himself or his employees or associates against an accusation of
wrongful conduct."
29. A lawyer who receives information clearly establishing that: . . . (1) His
client has, in the course of the representation, perpetrated a fraud upon a person
or tribunal shall promptly call upon his client to rectify the same, and if his client
refuses or is unable to do so, he shall reveal the fraud to the affected person or
tribunal.
A recent amendment adds the following language to DR 7-102 (B)(1): "except when the
information is protected as a privileged communication." ABA, SUMMARY OF ATnON AND
REPORTS TO THE HOUSE OF DELEGATES, 1974 MIDYER MEErING 3. One commentator has noted
that the continuous disclosure system embodied in the Exchange Act § 13, 15 U.S.C. § 78(m)
(1970), deprives this 1974 amendment to the Code of any major effect in securities matters.
Lipman, The SEC's ReluctantPolice Force:A New Role ForLawyers, 49 N.Y.U.L. REv. 437,
457 (1974). While it is clear from the language of DR-102(B)(1) that an attorney who receives
information clearly establishing that his client has perpetrated a fraud upon a person or
tribunal shall reveal the fraud to that affected person or tribunal, it is not clear from the
language of DR 4-101(C)(3) to whom an attorney may reveal the intent of his client to commit
a crime.
In Meyerhoffer, Goldberg revealed the alleged securties law violations to both the SEC
and the plaintiffs. If the purpose of DR 4-101(C)(3) is to permit disclosure to prevent the
commission of intended crimes, it may be questionable whether disclosure to the plaintiffs
could have served that purpose. However the language of DR 4-101(C)(3) does not seem so
restrictive. See note 38 infra for a further discussion of DR 4-101(C) (3).
30. See text accompanying notes 39-41 infra.
31. The ABA CODE OF PROFEssIoNAL REsPoNSmiLTY 2-3 (1969), Preliminary Statement
provides: "An enforcing agency, in applying the Disciplinary Rules, may find interpretive
guidance in the basic principles embodied in the Canons and in the objectives reflected in
the Ethical Considerations."
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basis behind the attorney-client privilege and old Canon 37 was
clear: The administration of justice is furthered if the client is encouraged to freely discuss whatever he wishes with his attorney; to
encourage such discussion the law must not allow an attorney, without the consent or waiver of his client, to reveal confidential communications.2 The Canons of Professional Ethics and previous case law
recognized that the privilege -was the client's and only he could
waive that privilege or consent to a disclosure of his confidences.33
A rule that permitted an attorney to reveal privileged information
would clearly run against the public policy behind the privilege.
If the authors of the Code of Professional Responsibility had
rejected the public policy on which old Canon 37 and the attorneyclient privilege were based, or if they had said that an attorney has
broader obligations to preserve confidences under the attorneyclient privilege than under Canon 4, the court of appeals' interpretation would be less open for criticism, but the opposite is true.34 In
EC 4-1 the public policy underlying Canon 4 is stated in terms very
similar to that underlying old Canon 37 and the attorney-client
privilege. A device which allows an attorney to reveal the confidences of his client without supervision of a court, simply because the
opposition has been astute enough to accuse both the client and the
attorney of wrongdoing, does not encourage clients to fully confide
in their attorneys. Indeed, this unsupervised and arbitrary practice
might have the tendency to discourage clients from fully confiding
in their attorneys. Such a device is not allowed under the attorneyclient privilege,35 was not allowed under the old canons,36 and if it
discourages clients from fully confiding in their attorneys, it is in
conflict with the ethical considerations of Canon 4.37
None of the other exceptions recognized by the Code of Professional Responsibility to the general rule that a lawyer should preserve the confidences of a client involve an arbitrary or unsupervised
disclosure of confidences, and they are all exceptions which were
recognized under both the old Canons of Professional Ethics and the
attorney-client privilege. Furthermore, none of the other exceptions conflict with the public policy of encouraging clients to fully
32. Compare MCCORMICK, supra note 20, with ABA Comm. on Professional Ethics,
Opinions, No. 250 (1943).
33. See text accompanying notes 14-23 supra.
34. ABA CODE OF PHOFEssiONAL REsPONsmrrry, EC 4-1 and EC 4-4 (1969).
35. See text accompanying notes 17-22 supra.
36. See text accompanying notes 11-16 supra.

37. See EC 4-1.
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confide in their attorneys." The court of appeals' interpretation of
DR 4-101(C)(4) breaks this pattern.
No doubt this court's interpretation of DR 4-101(C)(4) was influenced by the particular factual situation of Meyerhoffer. Goldberg had resigned from the Sitomer firm because he felt that the
firm's relations with Empire involved some illegal activity or misrepresentation." Because of the fraudulent nature of Empire's activities, Goldberg might have been able to defend himself against
accusations of violation of ethics under DR 4-101(C)(3) or DR 7102(B)(1), but Goldberg did not rely on either of these sections. A
securities attorney may hesitate to rely on either of these sections
"due to the almost insurmountable difficulty in establishing his
former client's 'intention to commit a crime' or that 'in the course
of the representation his client has perpetrated a fraud.' "40 This
38. DR 4-101(C)(1): a lawyer may reveal confidences if his client consents. This exception, recognized under the attorney-client privilege, MCCORMICK, supra note 20, was recognized under the old Canons of Professional Ethics. See Canon 37 and ABA Comm. on Professional Ethics, Opinions, No. 202 (1940). Since the client must consent before the attorney
can reveal confidences, the client is assured that those communications he wants to remain
confidential will remain so.
DR 4-101(C)(2): a lawyer may reveal confidences when required by law or court order.
This exception is recognized under the attorney-client privilege, McCoImucK, supra note 20,
and was recognized under the old Canons of Professional Ethics. See ABA Comm. on Professional Ethics, Opinions, No. 155 (1936). Since under this exception an attorney can not reveal
confidences unless a court so orders or the law so requires, the disclosure of confidences is
supervised and the client is protected against arbitrary disclosures.
DR 4-101(C)(3): a lawyer may reveal the intention of a client to commit a crime. This
exception is also recognized under the attorney-client privilege, McCoRMCK, supra note 20,
at § 95 and was recognized under the old Canons of Professional Ethics. See Canon 37 and
ABA Comm. on Professional Ethics, Opinions, No. 202 (1940). For this section to be invoked,
the client must have the intention of committing a crime and the facts in the attorney's
possession must indicate beyond a reasonable doubt that a crime will be committed. See ABA
Comm. on Professional Ethics, Opinions, No. 314 (1965).
DR 4-101(C)(4): an attorney can reveal confidences or secrets necessary to establish or
collect his fee. This portion of the section is recognized under the attorney-client privilege,
McCoRMICK, supra note 20, at § 91, and was recognized under the old Canons of Professional
Ethics. Cf. ABA Comm. on Professional Ethics, Opinions, No. 250 (1943). This exception is
most often based on the notion that the communication was not privileged because, between
attorney and client, the intention was to disclose rather than withhold the matters communicated. MCCORMICK, note 20 supra, at § 91. This exception might also be construed as a waiver
of the privilege by the client.
That portion of DR 4-101(C)(4) which provides that a lawyer may reveal confidences and
secrets necessary to defend himself against an accusation of wrongful conduct is an exception
recognized under the attorney-client privilege only to the extent the client waives his privilege
by personally accusing the attorney. Likewise it was allowed under the old Canons of Professional Ethics only when the client made the accusations. This follows from the assumption
that the privilege is the client's, and he is assured that his communications will remain
confidential if he knows that only he can waive this privilege.
39. 497 F.2d at 1193.
40. Goldberg, Ethical Dilemma: Attorney-Client Privilege v. The National Student
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difficulty of proof, which is most apparent in the securities field,4'
may have influenced this court to give DR 4-101(C)(4) a broad
interpretation to reach the same result the court might have reached
under DR 4-101(C)(3) or DR 7-102(B)(1).
The court, however, did not limit its holding to the securities
regulation field, nor did it limit its holding to the case where the
result is endorsed by other sections of the Code of Professional Responsibility. Conceivably a case might arise where an attorney is
guilty of wrongful conduct and the client is totally innocent, or
where both the client and attorney are innocent; under this court's
holding, if a plaintiff sues both the client and attorney, the attorney,
while he probably could not be compelled to reveal the confidences
and secrets of his client, might reveal them if necessary to defend
himself. Such a result does not encourage clients to fully confide in
their attorneys.
At best it is implicit in the court of appeals' holding that some
preliminary showing of what is to be revealed is required.4 2 For DR
4-101(C) (4) to be in accord with the ethical considerations of Canon
4 and the public policy of encouraging clients to fully confide in
their attorneys, courts should require a preliminary showing of what
is to be revealed. The decision of what is to be revealed should rest
with the court, not solely with an attorney. Courts should be hesitant to expand DR 4-101(C)(4) beyond its explicit limits; it is an
exception to the general obligations of Canon 4 and, as applied in
the Meyerhoffer case, it is in derogation of the primary purpose of
Canon 4, the public policy of encouraging clients to fully confide in
their attorneys.
CHARLES E. BRIDGES

Marketing Doctrine, 1 SEC. REG. L.J. 297, 307 (1974).
41. In the securities field, wholly apart from the attorney's problem of formulating an opinion regarding his client's intention to commit a crime or perpetrate a
fraud, is the attorney's practical inability to prove these elements without a pro-

tracted and costly litigation in which the attorney is a sure loser if for no other
reason than the cost, time and adverse publicity involved.
Goldberg, Policing Responsibilitiesof the Securities Bar, 19 N.Y.L.F. 221, 247 (1973).
42. The court of appeals emphasized the fact that Goldberg consulted with two attorneys and that the affidavit given to the plaintiff's attorney was written at an earlier date so
the story was not simply fabricated in response to plaintiff's complaint. 497 F.2d. at 1195.
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ALIMONY-FULL FAITH AND CREDITRECOGNITION OF RETROACTIVELY MODIFIABLE
FOREIGN ALIMONY DECREES DENIED
Overman v. Overman'
Husband and wife were divorced in Tennessee. The divorce
decree provided that the husband pay the wife alimony of $9,300
annually, payable in equal monthly installments. Subsequently, the
wife petitioned the Circuit Court of St. Louis County, Missouri to
register the Tennessee decree pursuant to the Missouri Uniform
Enforcement of Foreign Judgments Law.' In that petition, the wife
alleged that the husband was $8,000 in arrears in alimony payments. The court registered the decree, and ordered execution and
a writ of garnishment to issue. The husband moved to set aside the
registration and to stay or quash the execution and garnishment.
The motion was denied and the husband appealed. The Missouri
Court of Appeals, St. Louis District, first determined that, under
the relevant Tennessee statutes3 and cases,4 the alimony decree was
subject to retroactive modification of the accrued, unpaid installments. Since the Missouri Uniform Enforcement of Foreign
Judgments Law allows only registration of judgments that are entitled to full faith and credit,- the court faced the issue whether accrued, unpaid installments due under an alimony decree are entitled to full faith and credit if those installments are subject to retroactive modification in the state where the decree was rendered. The
court held that the decree was not entitled to full faith and credit
and, therefore, was not entitled to registration under the Missouri
Uniform Enforcement of Foreign Judgments Law.
The problem of applying the Full Faith and Credit Clause' to
modifiable alimony decrees was considered by the United States
Supreme Court in Sistare v. Sistare.7 In that case, an ex-wife sought
to enforce a New York alimony decree in Connecticut courts. The
1. 5174 S.W.2d 625 (Mo. App., D. St. L. 1974).
2. § 511.760, RSMo 1969; Mo. Sup. CT. R. 74.79.
3. TENN. CODE §§ 36-820, 36-828 (1955).
4. Daugherty v. Dixon, 41 Tenn. App. 623, 297 S.W.2d 944 (1956); Gossett v. Gossett,
34 Tenn. App. 654, 241 S.W.2d 934 (1951); Crane v. Crane, 26 Tenn. App. 227, 170 S.W.2d
663 (1942).
5. § 511.760(1)(1), RSMo 1969; Mo. SuP. CT. R. 74.79(a)(1).
6. U.S. CONST. art. IV, § 1.
7. 218 U.S. 1 (1910).
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Supreme Court interpreted the New York statute in question as not
authorizing retroactive modification, and held that the accrued,
unpaid installments were entitled to full faith and credit. In dicta,
the Court said that an alimony decree is entitled to full faith and
credit as to accrued, unpaid installments unless the court in the
rendering state can annul or modify the decree with respect to those
installments. This broad language has come to stand for the proposition that, unless an alimony decree is "final"-i.e. not subject to
modification, it is not entitled to full faith and credit. This concept
of finality as a prerequisite to interstate recognition of alimony decrees under the Full Faith and Credit Clause has been criticized by
several members of the Court8 and by scholars,9 but has, nonetheless, been adhered to in most state court decisions." However, two
recent decisions have rejected this finality doctrine. In Hill v. Hill"
the West Virginia Supreme Court held that a retroactively modifia8.

In Barber v. Barber,323 U.S. 77 (1944), Justice Jackson said:
Neither the full faith and credit clause of the Constitution nor the Act of
Congress implementing it says anything about final judgments or, for that matter,
about any judgments. Both require that full faith and credit be given to "judicial
proceedings" without limitation as to finality. Upon recognition of the broad meaning of that term much may some day depend.
Id. at 87 (concurring opinion). In New York ex rel. Halvey v. Halvey, 330 U.S. 610 (1947)
Justice Frankfurter said:
Conflicts arising out of family relations raise problems and involve considerations
very different from controversies to which debtor-creditor relations give rise. Such
cardinal differences in life are properly reflected in law. And so, the use of the same
legal words and phrases in enforcing full faith and credit for judgments involving
the two types of relations ought not to obliterate the great difference between the
interests affected by them, and should not lead to an irrelevant identity in result.
[I]n judgments affecting domestic relations technical questions of "finality" as to alimony and custody seem to me irrelevant in deciding the respect to be
accorded by a State to a valid prior judgment touching custody and alimony rendered by another State.
Id. at 616-617 (concurring opinion).
9. See, e.g., Ehrenzweig, InterstateRecognition of Support Duties, 42 CAL. L. REv. 382
(1954); Note, Recognition of Foreign Modifiable Alimony Decrees, 72 W. VA. L. REv. 291
(1970).
10. See, e.g., McGregor v. McGregor, 52 Colo. 292, 122 P. 390 (1912) (dictum); Lechner
v. Lechner, 154 Fla. 114, 16 So. 2d 816 (1944); Cureton v. Cureton, 132 Ga. 745, 65 S.E. 65
(1909); Getz v. Getz, 30 Hawaii 637 (1928), overruled on othergrounds, 41 Hawaii 397, 416
(1953); Lape v. Miller, 203 Ky. 742, 263 S.W. 22 (1924); Weston v. Weston, 177 La. 305, 148
So. 241 (1933); Wilson v. Wilson, 143 Me. 113, 56 A.2d 453 (1947); Gallant v. Gallant, 154
Miss. 832, 123 So. 883 (1929); Espeland v. Espeland, 111 Mont. 365, 109 P.2d 792 (1941);
Coumans v. Albaugh, 36 N.J. Super. 308, 115 A.2d 641 (Juv. & Dom. Rel. Ct. 1955); Bentley
v. Calabrese, 155 Misc. 843, 280 N.Y.S. 454 (1935); Collard v. Collard, 7 Ohio App. 53 (1915);
Levine v. Levine, 95 Ore. 94, 187 P. 609 (1920); Hewett v. Hewett, 44 R.I. 308, 116 A. 883
(1922).
11. 168 S.E.2d 803 (W. Va. 1969).
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ble Pennsylvania child support decree12 was entitled to full faith and
credit, so long as no actual modification has been made. The court,
emphasizing that the underlying purpose of the Full Faith and
Credit Caluse was to facilitate interstate recognition of judicial proceedings,'1 based its decision expressly on public policy considerations. In Light v. Light," the Illinois Supreme Court went even
farther, holding that a Missouri alimony decree was entitled to fall
faith and credit and registration under the Illinois Uniform Enforcement of Foreign Judgments Law,' 5 as to installments yet to fall due,
even though the Missouri courts had the power to modify the installments to be due in the future. Since the Illinois court held that
prospectively modifiable installments are entitled to the full faith
and credit, it would logically follow that retroactively modifiable
16
decrees should also be entitled to full faith and credit.
As the above discussion suggests, the unique nature of decrees
ordering the periodic payment of alimony makes it very difficult to
fit such decrees into the theoretical framework of the Full Faith and
Credit Clause, and renders the Uniform Enforcement of Foreign
Judgments Law an ineffective method of enforcing modifiable alimony decrees. Perhaps the most desirable solution to this problem
would be to state openly that overriding considerations of public
policy in the area of family support decrees should render such
decrees sui generis and entitle them to more protection under the
Full Faith and Credit Clause.'7 Unfortunately, the Overman court
did not choose this alternative. Indeed, the court did not even refer
to the serious policy implications of the case. Instead, in a single
sentence and without citation or analysis, it held that retroactively
modifiable alimony decrees are not entitled to full faith and credit."
This decision undoubtedly will have a significant impact, because
more than one-fourth of the states presently allow retroactive modification of alimony decrees. 9
12. With respect to full faith and credit problems, alimony decrees and child support
decrees involve the same considerations. See Annot., 157 A.L.R. 170, 171 (1945).
13. Accord, Milwaukee County v. M.E. White Co., 296 U.S. 268 (1935).
14. 12 Ill.2d 502, 147 N.E.2d 34 (1957).
15. ILL. RaV. STAT., ch. 77, 88 § 1(a) (1969).
16. However, the Light court said in dictum that a retroactively modifiable alimony
decree would not be entitled to full faith and credit. This statement is logically inconsistent
with the main thrust of the opinion, which is a rejection of the finality doctrine and an
emphasis on the social need for effective enforcement of support orders. Furthermore, the
court inexplicably cited Sistare as authority for its dictum.
17. See the concurring opinion of Justice Frankfurter in New York ex rel. Halvey v.
Halvey, 330 U.S. 610, 616-17 (1946), quoted note 8 supra.
18. 514 S.W.2d 625, 633 (Mo. App., D. St. L. 1974).
19. Scudder v. Scudder, 11 Alaska 303 (1947); Wilson v. Wilson, 143 Me. 113, 56 A.2d
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The Overman decision does not, however, completely preclude
recognition and enforcement of retroactively modifiable alimony
decrees in Missouri. There are at least three alternative methods of
recognition and enforcement of such decrees. The first, and least
satisfactory, method is the traditional process of bringing suit for
the arrearages of alimony in the state where the decree was rendered, obtaining a judgment for money due and owing, and then
suing in the forum state to enforce that judgment. Obviously, this
method is expensive, time-consuming, and necessitates repetitive
litigation. Moreover, there is the initial problem of obtaining jurisdiction over the obligor spouse in the state where the decree was
originally rendered."0 Assuming personal jurisdiction is obtained,
the obligor spouse can move for modification of the decree. Even if
the obligee spouse obtains a judgment and brings suit to enforce the
judgment in the forum state, the forum state may deny certain
statutory remedies available to enforce a local decree for alimony
rendered in conjunction with a divorce, such as contempt,
sequestation, or receivership, since the action is not one for divorce,
but one to enforce a foreign judgment for money due and owing. 1
The second method of recognition and enforcement of a retro453 (1947); Winkel v. Winkel, 178 Md. 489, 15 A.2d 914 (1940); Knapp v. Knapp, 134 Mass.
353 (1883); Beyerlein v. Ashburn, 334 Mich. 13, 53 N.W.2d 666 (1952); Conklin v. Conklin,
223 Minn. 449, 27 N.W.2d 275 (1947); Welser v. Welser, 54 N.J. Super. 555, 149 A.2d 814
(1959); Renkoff v. Renkoff, 285 App. Div. 876, 137 N.Y.S.2d 428 (1955); Mather v. Mather,
143 Pa. Super. 608, 18 A.2d 492 (1941); Ex parte Jeter, 193 S.C. 278, 8 S.E.2d 490 (1940);
Eggers v. Eggers, 82 S.D. 675, 153 N.W.2d 187 (1967); Crane v. Crane, 26 Tenn. App. 227,
170 S.W.2d 663 (1942); Ashby v. Ashby, 174 Wis. 549, 183 N.W. 965 (1921). English law also
allows retroactive modification. Herczog v. Herczog, 186 Cal. App.2d 318, 9 Cal. Rptr. 5
(1960)(applying English law). In Ohio, the rule is in doubt. McPherson v. McPherson, 153
Ohio St. 82, 90 N.E.2d 675 (Sup. Ct. 1950); Martin v. Martin, 49 Ohio L. Abs. 488,76 N.E.2d
99 (Ct. App. 1947); Pace v. Pace, 41 Ohio App. 130, 180 N.E. 81 (1931); Meister v. Day, 20
Ohio App. 224, 151 N.E. 786 (1925); Wolfe v. Wolfe, 55 Ohio Op. 465, 124 N.E.2d 485 (C.P.
1954). See Annot., 6 A.L.R.2d 1277 (1949).
Missouri does not allow retroactive modification of alimony decrees. Nelson v. Nelson,
282 Mo. 412, 221 S.W. 1066 (1920). But cf. Maxey v. Maxey, 212 S.W.2d 810 (1948)(court
will not order payment of arrearages where wife has assented to or acquiesced in reduced
payments by husband).
20. Unless the obligor spouse has property subject to attachment in the rendering state,
obtaining personal jurisdiction may be difficult. This problem has been rendered less severe
by the recent development of comprehensive long-arm statutes and the "continuing jurisdiction" over divorce actions.
21. Harrington v. Harrington, 233 Mo. App. 390, 121 S.W.2d 291 (1938). In states that
have statutory provisions authorizing enforcement of decrees for alimony by equitable remedies, some courts hold that such statutes do not apply in a local action to collect arrears of
alimony due under a foreign judgment, since the judgment which is enforced locally is not
one for alimony, but is one for a debt due under a foreign judgment. See generally 24 AM.
Juu.2d Divorce and Separation §§ 985-988 (1966); Annot., 18 A.L.R.2d 892 (1951).
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actively modifiable foreign alimony decree is based on the principle

of interstate comity.2 2 The Overman court expressly refused to rule

on the comity issue, because it was not argued on appeal.23 The
majority of states allow recognition and enforcement of foreign alimony decrees on the basis of comity. 4 The primary problem with
the comity method is that it is purely discretionary.25 A decree that
does not conform to the state's public policy will not be enforced by
comity. 21 Moreover, due process requires that the obligor spouse be

allowed to present such defenses as he could have presented in the
state where the decree was rendered and also that the obligor spouse
be allowed to seek modification.27 There is also a suggestion that
certain remedies available in the state where the decree was rendered might not be available in the forum state, especially if the
forum state's public policy or statutes do not make such remedies
available. 21
The final, and most promising, method of recognition and enforcement of retroactively modifiable foreign alimony decrees is to
petition for registration of the decree pursuant to the Uniform Reciprocal Enforcement of Support Law.29 One of the most attractive
features of this statute is that decrees need not be entitled to full
faith and credit to be entitled to registration." After the decree is
22. A state court, in conformity with state policy, may by comity give a remedy which
the Full Faith and Credit Clause does not compel. Milwaukee County v. M.E. White Co.,
296 U.S. 268 (1935).
23. 514 S.W.2d 625, at 633-34 (Mo. App., D. St. L. 1974).
24. Hollinrake v. Hollinrake, 40 Hawaii 397 (1953); Rule v. Rule, 313 Ill. App. 108, 39
N.E.2d 379 (1942) ("equity and justice" require enforcement); Franchier v. Gammill, 148
Miss. 723, 114 So. 813 (1927); Bolton v. Bolton, 86 N.J.L. 69, 89 A. 1014 (1914), aff'd on other
grounds, 86 N.J.L. 622, 92 A. 389, (Ct. Err. & App. 1914); Sorenson v. Spence, 65 S.D. 134,
272 N.W. 179 (1937) (child support payments); Thones v. Thones, 185 Tenn. 124, 203 S.W.2d
597 (1947). Contra, Cureton v. Cureton, 132 Ga. 745, 65 S.E. 65 (1909); Lape v. Miller, 203
Ky. 742, 263 S.W. 22 (1924); Levine v. Levine, 95 Ore. 94, 187 P. 609 (1920). See Annot., 132
A.L.R. 1272 (1941).
25. "[C]omity is a courtesy, the granting of a privilege ....
" Elliot v. Johnston, 365
Mo. 881, 886, 292 S.W.2d 589, 593 (1956).
26. Ferneau v. Armour & Company, 303 S.W.2d 161, 169 (St. L. Mo. App. 1957); Carey
v. Schmeltz, 221 Mo. 132, 136, 119 S.W. 946, 947 (1909).
27. Griffin v. Griffin, 327 U.S. 220, 233-34 (1946). See Scoles, Enforcement of Foreign
"Non-Final"Alimony and Support Orders, 53 COLUmn. L. REv. 817, 823-25 (1953).
28. "[Ihe rule of comity extends to substantive rights and does not in general apply
to remedies." Neve v. Reliance Ins. Co., 357 S.W.2d 247, 250 (K.C.Mo. App. 1962)(dictum).
See note 26 and accompanying text supra.
29. §§ 454.010-.360, RSMo 1969.
30. Section 454.010 allows an obligee spouse to register a foreign "support order." Section 454.020(14) defines a "support order" as "any judgment, decree or order of support
whether temporary or final, whether subject to modification, revocation or remission regardless of the kind of action in which it was rendered."
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registered by either the obligee spouse or by the prosecuting attorney on behalf of the spouse, a hearing is held. The statute does not
define the nature of the hearing. However, the statutory purpose of
facilitating interstate enforcement of support orders compels the
conclusion that the hearing should be expedited, 3' so long as the
obligor spouse's due process rights are not infringed. The decree is
confirmed if the obligor spouse defaults or if the obligee spouse
prevails on the issues of the existence and amount of the support
obligation in a contested hearing. 3 As confirmed, the decree "shall
have the same effect and may be enforced as if originally entered

in the court of this state.

3 3 Although

there is no Missouri case law

applying this statute to the problem of retroactively modifiable for34
eign alimony decrees, the leading case of Worthley v. Worthley
held that such a decree is entitled to registration under the equivalent California statute." This well-reasoned opinion provides a comprehensive plan for enforcing retroactively modifiable foreign
alimony decrees under the Uniform Reciprocal Enforcement of Support Law,3 and such plan should be influential in Missouri courts,
because of its inherent logic and the desirability of uniform interpre31, An expedited hearing is one that is docketed as early as possible and one in which
procedural and evidentiary requirements are relaxed.
32. § 454.330, RSMo 1969.
33. § 454.340, RSMo 1969. In Mangold v. Mangold, 294 S.W.2d 368, 369 (K.C. Mo.
App. 1956), similar language of the Uniform Enforcement of Foreign Judgments Law ("the
registered judgment shall become a final personal judgment of the court in which it was
registered") was said to make the full panoply of stautory remedies available to enforce the
registered judgment. This avoids the possible problems posed by Harringtonv. Harrington,
233 Mo. App. 390, 121 S.W.2d 291 (1938), discussed at note 21 and accompanying text supra.
34. 44 Cal. 2d 465, 283 P.2d 19 (1955) (opinion by Judge Traynor).
35. Although Worthley allowed registration, it required that the obligor spouse be allowed to litigate the issue of modification in the confirmation hearing. The statute itself
merely provides that the obligor spouse "may assert any defense available to a defendant in
an action on a foreign judgment." § 454.330, RSMo 1969. But since the confirmed decree has
the same effect as a local decree, a later action for modification by either party would be
allowed. Thus, to save time and money, either spouse should be allowed to raise the issue of
modification in the confirmation hearing. McLarney, Uniform Reciprocal Enforcement of
Support Act in Missouri, 27 Mo. L. REv. 481, 501 (1962); Kelso, Reciprocal Enforcement of
Support: 1958 Dimensions, 43 MiNN. L. REV. 875, 885 (1959). The latter commentator also
suggests that retroactive modification be allowed. Kelso, supra at 886.
36. The Worthley plan requires that the issue of modification be litigated in the confirmation hearing if it is raised by the parties. See note 35 supra. The grounds for, and limits
on, modification should be governed by the law of the state where the decree was first
rendered. Where the registering state has determined the issue of retroactive modification of
accrued, unpaid installments, the judgment for a liquidated sum is final and entitled to full
faith and credit in other states. Finally, issues determined with respect to prospective modification will be res judicata so long as the circumstances remain unchanged. See Comment,
According Full Faithand Credit to Foreign Modifiable Alimony Decrees, 26 U. Cm. L. Rlv.
136, 143 (1958).
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tation of the statute.3 7

In conclusion, although Overman was correctly decided based
on the weight of authority in other jurisdictions, the court's failure
to consider the policy issues involved in the case is a serious shortcoming. The effect of the decision is to deny to obligee spouses the
expedited, inexpensive procedures that are a practical necessity to
enforce support obligations created in other states. Fortunately, the
Missouri Uniform Reciprocal Enforcement of Support Law provides
a relatively satisfactory method for enforcing such obligations. Because of the absence of any full faith and credit requirement, the
binding nature of the confirmed decree, and the availability of the
full panoply of remedies to enforce it, Missouri attorneys would be
well-advised to consider using the uniform law when confronted
with modifiable alimony decrees from other states.R. J. ROBERTSON, JR.
37. § 454.350, RSMo 1969.
38. At least one commentator believes that, at the time of divorce, the obligee spouse
should have the alimony decree registered in every state where the obligor spouse resides or
has property, and that this should be a routine step in every divorce proceeding. Kelso,
Enforcement of Support: 1958 Dimensions, 43 MINN. L. REv. 875, 883 (1959).
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CONSTITUTIONAL LAW-AN UNQUALIFIED
POLICY ON PUBLIC AID TO NON-PUBLIC SCHOOLS
Pasterv. Tussey'
Parents of students in the St. Louis County public schools filed
a declaratory judgment action to challenge the constitutionality of
sections 170.051 and 170.055, RSMo 1973 (Supplement), which provided that the state would purchase and gratuitously lend school
textbooks to pupils and teachers in non-public, as well as public,
schools.' The trial court upheld the constitutionality of the statutes
as applied to students, but not as to teachers. On appeal, the Supreme Court of Missouri reversed the judgment as to pupils, deciding that article IX, section 8 of the Missouri constitution prohibits
the lending of school textbooks to non-public school pupils.3 The
decision has important legal, social, economic, political, and human
implications for state aid to non-public schools and thereby the
future of non-public education in Missouri.
Litigation over public aid to non-public schools centers on the
issue of church-state relationship. Aid to non-public schools essentially amounts to giving aid to institutions associated with religions,
since approximately 93 percent of all children enrolled in non-public
schools are in religious schools.4 Any proposal for increased state aid
must satisfy the constitution of the state in which it will operate and
the United States Constitution.' The Missouri constitution contains
a Bill of Rights with provisions for the free exercise of religion6 and
1.

512 S.W.2d 97 (Mo. En Banc 1974), cert. denied, 43 U.S. L.W. 3389 (U.S. Jan. 14,

1975).
2. §170.051 RSMo 1973 Supp., provided in part:
1. As used in this section, .

.

. (1) "School" means any elementary or secondary

school, public or non-public, nonprofit, within this state ....
2. Each public school board shall purchase and loan free all textbooks for all
children who reside in the district and attend an elementary or secondary school
in this state.
3.

Textbooks shall be loaned to all pupils residing in the district on an equitable

basis and without discrimination on the grounds of race, creed, color, national
origin, or school attended.
4.

[Textbooks . . . shall be loaned free to pupils and teachers upon their re-

quest.
3. 512 S.W.2d at 105. The court also found the lending of school textbooks to non-public
school teachers to be prohibited by article I, section 6 of the Missouri constitution.
4. THE PRESIDENT'S COMMISSION ON SCHOOL FINANCE, SCHOOLS, PEOPLE, & MONEY-THE
NEED FOR EDUCATIONAL REFORM 53 (1972).

5. A good discussion on this subject is contained in C.
BURKE, RELIGION UNDER THE STATE CONSTrUrTIONS (1965).

ANTIEAU,

P.

CARROLL,

& T.

6. Mo. CONsT. art. I, § 5:
[A]IIl men have a natural and indefeasible right to worship Almightly God according to the dictates of their consciences; . . . no human authority can control or

https://scholarship.law.missouri.edu/mlr/vol40/iss2/5

16

et al.: Recent Cases

RECENT CASES

19751

against the establishment of religion.7 At least five other constitutional sections are also relevant to the issue here considered: the
General Assembly's duty to establish and maintain free public
schools;8 the creation of a "public school fund;" 9 prohibition on
governmental aid to "any religious creed, church or sectarian purpose;"" ° and taxing for "public purposes only."" The existence of the
latter provisions partially derives from the belief held at the time
of the creation of the public educational process 12 that constitutional
amendments and revisions were needed to apply the principle of
church-state separation, already existent with regard to governmental matters, specifically to education.' 3 Even Missouri's most recent
constitutional convention in 1943-1944 included the explicit decision that such "double coverage" should be given. 4
interfere with the rights of conscience; .. .no person shall, on account of his
religious persuasion or belief, . .

.

be molested in his person or estate ....

This section was not considered in Paster.
7. Mo. CONST. art. I, § 6:
That no person can be compelled to erect, support or attend any place or system
of worship, or to maintain or support any priest, minister, preacher or teacher of
any sect, church, creed or denomination of religion; but if any person shall voluntarily make a contract for any such object, he shall be held to the performance of the
same.
Mo. CONST. art. I,

§ 7:

That no money shall ever be taken from the public treasury, directly or indirectly,
in aid of any church, sect or denomination of religion, or in aid of any priest,
preacher, minister or teacher thereof, as such; and that no preference shall be given
to nor any discrimination made against any church, sect or creed of religion, or any
form of religious faith or worship.
8. Mo. CONsT. art. IX, § 1(a).
9. Mo. CONST. art. IX, § 5: "[The annual income of [the 'public school fund'] shall
be faithfully appropriated for establishing and maintaining free public schools, and for no
other uses or purposes whatsoever."
10. Mo. CONST. art, IX, § 8:
Neither the general assembly, nor any county, city, town, township, school district
or other municipal corporation, shall ever make an appropriation or pay from any
public fund whatever, anything in aid of any religious creed, church or sectarian
purpose, or to help to support or sustain any private or public school, academy,
seminary, college, university, or other institution of learning controlled by any
religious creed, church or sectarian denomination whatever ....
11. Mo. CONST. art. X, §§ 1, 3.
12. The need for a public school system was not recognized throughout the United
States until the middle of the 19th Century. 1 C. BEARD, THE RISE OF AMERICAN CIVILIZATION
809-18 (1927).
13. This belief is reflected in the historical development of constitutional amendments
and revisions in Missouri. See THE STATE HISTORICAL SOC'Y OF Mo., JOURNAL, MO. CONSTITUTIONAL CONVENTION OF 1875

(1921). The debates at the 1943-44 constitutional convention are
contained in typewritten copy which is the property of the Law Library Association of St.
Louis. Tockman, The Constitutionalityof FurnishingPublicly Financed Transportationto
Private and ParochialSchool Students in Missouri, 1963 WASH. U.L.Q. 455, 474 n.52.
14. Tockman, The Constitutionalityof FurnishingPubliclyFinancedTransportationto
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The Missouri courts, not called upon to construe the churchstate provisions for many years, began to formulate a definite approach with the decision in Harfst v. Hoegen:15
The constitutional policy of our State has decreed the absolute
separation of church and state, not only in governmental matters,
but in educational ones as well. Public money, coming from taxpayers of every denomination, may not be used for the help of any
religious sect in education or otherwise. 6
Missouri thus created a policy of "absolute separation" with strong
and unambiguous words. After a mild reaffirmation of this approach
7 the court strengthened it even further
in McVey v. Hawkins,"
in
Berghorn v. Reorganized School Dist. No. 8:18
[I]t is the unqualified policy of the State of Missouri that no
public funds or properties, either directly or indirectly, be used to
support or sustain any school affected by religious influences or
teachings or by any sectarian or religious beliefs or conducted in
such a manner as to influence or predispose a school child towards
the acceptance of any particular religion or religious beliefs .... 19
Thus, the "absolute separation of church and state" in the educational realm became the unqualified policy of the State of Missouri. "
The Missouri constitution is the basis of the Paster decision,
but the United States Constitution remains in point as the source
from which many of the case's concepts are derived. The most significant limitations imposed by the United States Constitution
upon any proposed governmental aid to non-public education are
the Establishment of Religion and Free Exercise Clauses of the first
amendment: "Congress shall make no law respecting an establishment of religion, or prohibiting the free exercise thereof .... -2,
In
Private and ParochialSchool Students in Missouri, 1963 WASH. U.L.Q. 455, 473-74 n.52.
15. 349 Mo. 808, 163 S.W.2d 609 (En Banc 1942); see Annot., 141 A.L.R. 1136 (1942).
16. 349 Mo. at 817, 163 S.W.2d at 614.
17. 364 Mo. 44, 258 S.W.2d 927 (En Banc 1953).
18. 364 Mo. 121, 260 S.W.2d 573 (1953).
19. Id. at 138, 260 S.W.2d at 582-83.
20. The position was reaffirmed in Special Dist. for Educ. & Training of Handicapped
Children v. Wheeler, 408 S.W.2d 60 (Mo. En Banc 1966). See also McDonough v. Aylward,
500 S.W.2d 721 (Mo. 1973).
21. The first amendment's limitations were originally applied only to Congress and not
to the states. Permoli v. First Municipality, 44 U.S. (3 How.) 561 (1844). They have, however,
been applied to the states through the fourteenth amendment in more recent decisions.
Cantwell v. Connecticut, 310 U.S. 296 (1940); Hamilton v. Regents of the Univ. of Calif., 293
U.S. 245 (1934).
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1802, Thomas Jefferson stated that the American people's declaration in the first amendment had built "a wall of separation between
church and State."2 Mr. Jefferson's "wall" was granted judicial
recognition in Reynolds v. United States when Mr. Chief Justice
Waite announced that, "[Ilt may be accepted almost as an authoritative declaration of the scope and effect of the amendment thus
23

secured."

The history of the Supreme Court decisions on government aid
to parochial schools, however, demonstrates that any "wall" which
perhaps once existed has long since been altered by countless
breaches. In Everson v. Board of Education,24 the Court recognized
this fact in its first substantial interpretation of the Establishment
Clause. Although Mr. Justice Black declared that clause stood for
the proposition that, "[n]o tax in any amount, large or small, can
be levied to support any religious activities or institutions,"' he
sustained the constitutionality of government payments for parochial students' bus fares by employing the "child benefit theory.""
He said that the children-not the religious activities or institutions-were the recipients of the benefit. The applicability of this
distinction has been involved in almost every subsequent federal
and state court decision on public aid to non-public education."
The twenty-four years immediately succeeding Everson included many important decisions by the Court, each one offering
greater comfort to those desiring increased public aid.28 To avoid the
22. Moehlman, The Wall of Separation:The Law and the Facts,38 A.B.A.J. 281, 284
(1952).
23. 98 U.S. 145, 164 (1878). Other discussions of the Establishment Clause's historical
background, including its pre-judicial history, may be found in Mr. Justice Black's opinion
and Mr. Justice Rutledge's dissent in Everson v. Board of Educ., 330 U.S. 1 (1947), and in
Sky, The Establishment Clause, The Congress and the Schools: An HistoricalPerspective,
52 VA. L. Rxv. 1395 (1966).
24. 330 U.S. 1 (1947).
25. Id. at 16.
26. The "child benefit theory" first appeared in Borden v. Louisiana State Bd. of Educ.,
168 La. 1005, 123 So. 655 (1929), and was adopted in Cochran v. Louisiana State Bd. of Educ.,
281 U.S. 370 (1930).
27. Mr. Justice Jackson's dissent in Everson was the first indication that many legal
minds would not be able to accept coexistence of the Establishment Clause and the "child
benefit theory". He wrote of Mr. Justice Black's opinion that "[tihe case which irresistibly
comes to mind as the most fitting precedent is that of Julia who, according to Byron's reports,
'whispering "I will ne'er consent,"-consented.'" Everson v. United States, 330 U.S. 1, 19
(1947).
28. Zorach v. Clauson, 343 U.S. 306 (1952), rejecting Everson's strict "no-aid" dicta was
followed by School Dist. v. Schempp, 374 U.S. 203 (1963), creating a test of constitutional
neutrality. See text accompanying notes 29-30 infra. This test was first applied in Board of
Educ. v. Allen, 392 U.S. 236 (1968), where a New York statute permitting textbook loans to
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Establishment Clause prohibition, legislation must meet three
recognized criteria: (1) the statute must have a secular legislative
purpose,29 (2) the principal or primary effect must be one that neither advances nor inhibits religion,3" and (3) the statute must not
foster an excessive government entanglement with religion. 31 These
criteria, however, do not provide clear-cut results. The central idea
emerging from all the litigation is that the United States Constitution permits the giving of some, but not too much, public assistance
to non-public schools-a construction still considerably less strict
than that which has been given to the Missouri constitution.
The Missouri court's decision in Paster is an understandable
extension of its prior interpretations of the state constitution. The
court cited with approval "the absolute separation of church and
state doctrine evidenced throughout the Missouri Constitution
....

,,32
It specifically said that the portion of the textbook'loan

statute requiring public school boards to provide textbooks to teachers in private schools "upon their request"33 is violative of article I,
section 6 of the Missouri constitution which the court cited as "prohibiting the 'support' of any 'teacher of any sect.' ,,31
The section
regarding support of teachers indeed seems to fit the facts of the
principal case so well that this portion of the court's finding was
inevitable. As a result, this point was the single one of agreement
between the trial court and the supreme court 35 and received relatively little attention in the dissenting opinion."
The truly controversial part of the opinion is the decision that
the portions of the textbook loan law "requiring public boards to
provide textbooks to pupils attending private schools. . . 7 violate
article IX, section 8 of the Missouri constitution prohibiting governmental appropriations "from any public fund whatever [for] anything in aid of any religious creed, church or sectarian purpose
parochial school children was held constitutional. These cases all evidenced a growing concern for parochial institutions and a trend toward increased public aid, with Allen effectively
replacing Everson as the main precedent in this area of constitutional law.
29. School Dist. v. Schempp, 374 U.S. 203, 222 (1963).
30. Id.
31. Walz v. Tax Comm'n, 397 U.S. 664, 670 (1970).
32. 512 S.W.2d at 104.
33. § 170.051(4) RSMo 1973 Supp.
34. 512 S.W.2d at 104. The constitution actually prohibits not the support, but the
compulsion of support from a person. See note 7 supra.The result is the same, however, since

it is tax funds that are involved.
35.

512 S.W.2d at 97-98, 105.

36. Id. at 110.
37. Id. at 104.
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,,31 The court's discussion on this point is rather obviously

designed to show that the elsewhere fecund39 "child benefit theory"
will bear no fruit in Missouri. Without acknowledging that concept's
legitimacy, the court posed the question, "Is the expenditure of
funds to the pupil [or] parent in aid of a sectarian purpose?" In
answer, the court stated that, by attending a school established to
promote a sectarian objective, students help promote that objective. " Article IX, section 8 does not allow the expenditure of any
public funds to aid these students in promoting the school's sectarian purpose. The court would thus seem to be laying to rest, as
regards state litigation in Missouri, both the idea that the "child
benefit theory" will ever be accepted and the concept that parochial
schools can perform secular functions for which public aid might be
allowable.
The reasoning of the Missouri Supreme Court and the United
States Supreme Court here becomes diametrically opposed on two
central issues. The United States Supreme Court's careful acceptance of the "child benefit theory" from Everson to Allen and beyond
was apparently deemed inapplicable to the Missouri situation by
the Paster court. This can be explained on the basis of Missouri's
stricter church-state policies; but the court's implied denial of the
possibility of secular functions in private education is more difficult
to explain in view of the Supreme Court's recognition of that very
possibility.4 ' Certainly, differences of opinion may be expected on
such a perplexing question, and legal scholars can be found on both
sides of the issue. 42 The legal reasoning in Paster, however, estab38. See note 10 supra.
39. The "child benefit theory" has been widely accepted. See Matthews v. Quinton, 362
P.2d 932 (Alaska 1961); Borden v. Louisiana State Bd. of Educ., 168 La. 1005, 123 So. 655
(1929); Zellers v. Huff, 55 N.M. 501, 236 P.2d 949 (1951); Gurney v. Ferguson, 190 Okla. 254,
122 P.2d 1002 (1941); Mitchell v. Consolidated School Dist., 17 Wash. 2d 61, 135 P.2d 79
(1943).
40. 512 S.W.2d at 104-05.
41. The United States Supreme Court first distinguished secular purposes as separable
from religiously oriented activities of an institution administered by a religious group in
Bradfield v. Roberts, 175 U.S. 291 (1899). The Court acknowledged in Allen that,
"[P]arochial schools are performing, in addition to their sectarial function, the task of
secular education," and refused to agree that, "[a]ll teaching in a sectarian school is religious or that the processes of secular and religious training are so intertwined that secular
textbooks furnished to the students by the public are in fact instrumental in the teaching of
religion." 392 U.S. 236, 248 (1968).
42. Professor Freund seems to argue for a constitutional presumption that all education
in church-related schools amounts to sectarian activity. Freund, Public Aid to Parochial
Schools, 82 HARV. L. REv. 1680 (1969). Professors Valente and Stanmeyer have countered with
arguments for the premise that secular and nonsecular functions of parochial schools may be
constitutionally distinguished for purposes of analysis and state involvement. Valente &
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lishes Missouri as a state which has rejected some constitutional
reasoning accepted by the United States Supreme Court and a state

with one of the most unqualified and absolute positions on the sub-

43
ject of church-state separation in the educational field.
The Missouri textbook loan law under review" is almost identical with the textbook loan law of New York" which the United
States Supreme Court approved in Board of Education v. Allen" on
the "child benefit theory." Paster,however, includes only the most
cursory attention to Allen and related Supreme Court cases before

concluding that, "[D]isposition of the instant case is not controlled
by federal law . . ."I' It was left for Judge Bardgett's dissenting
opinion to demonstrate that a first amendment case against the law
would be extremely difficult, if not impossible, to make, since Allen
had indeed upheld the constitutionality (under the first amendment) of a New York statute which is substantially the same as the

Missouri law.4" Furthermore, the most recent Court decisions include specific dicta on the continued constitutional acceptability of
textbook loans" and general statements on the constitutionality of
Stanmeyer, PublicAid to ParochialSchools-A Reply to ProfessorFreund, 59 GEo. L.J. 59
(1970).
43. The dissent in Pasterpointed out that the majority opinion puts Missouri at loggerheads with Louisiana, Mississippi, and other states which have recognized the possibility of
valid secular purposes in non-public schools and therefore upheld public aid. 512 S.W.2d at
108-10.
44. See note 2 supra.
45. See Board of Educ. v. Allen, 20 N.Y.2d 109, 228 N.E.2d 791, 281 N.Y.S.2d 799
(1967), for the New York Court of Appeals' discussion of its own statute.
46. 392 U.S. 236 (1968).
47. 512 S.W.2d at 104.
48. Id. at 105. The following excerpt from the New York statute, N.Y. Educ. Law § 701
(McKinney 1969), demonstrates its similarity with the Missouri statute, § 170.051, RSMo
1973 Supp. (see note 2 supra):
[B]oards of education. . . shall have the power and duty to purchase and to loan
upon individual request, to all children . . . enrolled in . . .a public or private
school which complies with the compulsory education law, textbooks.
N.Y. Educ. Law § 701 (McKinney 1969). The dissent furthermore clarified the Supreme
Court's decision in Norwood v. Harrison, 413 U.S. 455 (1973). The Pastermajority opinion
noted appellants' contention that Norwood placed a limitation on prior Supreme Court theories by holding against a textbook lending program. 512 S.W.2d at 103. The dissent hastens
to explain that Norwood was an equal protection case, a federal case finding no first amendment violation but rather a racial discrimination violation of the fourteenth amendment, and
therefore that it signals no change in the Supreme Court's tendency to uphold textbook loan
laws. Id. at 106.
49. Lemon v. Kurtzman, 403 U.S. 602, 616-17 (1971). The single contrary indication
came when the Court affirmed without opinion a United States District Court ruling that a
New Jersey statute on the provision of textbooks to private schools violates the Establishment
Clause. However, the statute in question also allowed for the provision of auxiliary services
to private schools through public school personnel. This latter element is most likely the
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states' assisting church-related schools in performing their secular
functions."0
The Paster majority did find support to conclude that federal
constitutional law was not controlling. In Luetkemeyer v.
Kaufmann,51 it was asserted that Missouri's determination "to enforce a more strict policy of church and state separation than that
required by the First Amendment does not present any substantial
federal constitutional question."52 Still, the very next sentence in
Luetkemeyer, not cited by the Paster court, implies that a state's
ability to be more strict in this area has at least some boundaries,
though they probably remain undefined:
The Supreme Court has clearly indicated that there is an area of
activity which falls between the Establishment Clause and the
Free Exercise Clause in which action by a State will not violate the
former nor inaction, the latter. 3
The Supreme Court has gone even further, in Walz v. Tax
Commission,54 to admonish explicitly that there are federal constitutional boundaries which cannot be exceeded: "[T]he Court has
struggled to find a neutral course between the two Religion Clauses,
both of which are cast in absolute terms, and either of which, if
expanded to a logical extreme, would tend to clash with the other."5
The Court, in Committee for Public Education v. Nyquist,5 added
constitutionally objectionable component of the statute. In any event, the absence of an
opinion makes the case of little precedential value. Marburger v. Pub. Funds for Pub.
Schools, aff'd mem., 42 U.S.L.W. 3690 (U.S. June 18, 1974). The Court's 1974-75 docket
contains a similar textbook-auxiliary services case. Meek v. Pittenger, appeal docketed, 42

U.S.L.W. 3706 (U.S. June 24, 1974).
50. Committee for Pub. Educ. v. Nyquist, 413 U.S. 756, 774-75 (1973); Levitt v. Committee for Pub. Educ., 413 U.S. 472, 481 (1973).
51. 364 F. Supp. 376 (W.D. Mo. 1973), aff'd mem., 43 U.S.L.W. 3230 (U.S. Oct. 22,

1974).
52. Id. at 386; cited in 512 S.W.2d at 104. Judge Bardgett, dissenting in Paster,stated
that he disagreed "with the suggestion in the principal opinion that the establishment clause
of the U.S. Constitution, as construed by the U. S. Supreme Court, is less restrictive than
the provisions of the Missouri Constitution." 512 S.W.2d at 108. However, he made no
attempt to justify his disagreement. There is support available for his position, for the Supreme Court of Missouri is on record as stating the polar opposite of what is asserted in
Paster: "[T]he First Amendment is a stronger constitutional provision than that in our
constitution concerning public schools .

. . ."

Congregation Temple Israel v. City of Creve

Coeur, 320 S.W.2d 451, 454 (Mo. 1959). This statement was made in the court's finding that
both constitutions prohibited a state zoning act from being interpreted as granting authority
to cities to prohibit building either churches or schools in residential districts.
53. 364 F. Supp. at 386 (emphasis added).

54. 397 U.S. 664 (1970).
55. Id. at 668-69.
56. 413 U.S. 756 (1973) (dictum).
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that "[ilt has never been thought either possible or desirable to
enforce a regime of total separation.

'5

This all tends to indicate

that Missouri's "unqualified policy" of "absolute separation" may
not be as far from conflicting with federal constitutional principles
as one reading Paster might conclude.
Free exercise of religion,58 as well as freedom of association, 9
have been declared to be fundamental constitutional rights. Governmental classifications affecting such previously declared rights
are subject to the strictest scrutiny; and equal protection is violated
unless there is a "compelling" state interest to justify them and the
state has no alternative means to attain its end which do not burden
rights." The state may not invidiously discriminate in classifying
persons for participation in a public program. 1 Missouri's textbook
loan law declared that all children should be treated "on an equitable basis and without discrimination on the grounds of race, creed,
color, national origin, or school attended."6 The Pastercourt eliminated one class of children, those attending church-related schools,
solely on the basis of their exercise of their religion and their association with certain educational institutions. An argument could
clearly be made that there is no compelling state interest to justify
the exclusion or denial of legislated benefits to a child merely because of an incidental benefit which may accrue not to a church but
to a parochial educational institution. 3 The predicted clash between taking the anti-establishment reasoning to its "logical extreme" and the integrity of the first amendment freedoms has al57. Id. at 760.
58. Wisconsin v. Yoder, 406 U.S. 205 (1972); Sherbert v. Verner, 374 U.S. 398 (1963).
59. N.A.A.C.P. v. Alabama ex rel. Patterson, 357 U.S. 449 (1958); N.A.A.C.P. v. Button, 371 U.S. 415 (1963).
60. Shapiro v. Thompson, 394 U.S. 618 (1969); West Virginia State Bd. of Educ. v.
Barnette, 319 U.S. 624 (1943).
61. Id.
62. § 170.051(3), RSMo 1975 Supp.
63. The Attorney General of Missouri has made a similar argument for the logic of the
equal protection approach:
[W]e believe that to exclude private school children . . . from receiving shared
time instruction in an area vocational school for the sole reason that such children
choose to attend a private school for the basic school curriculum amounts to a
denial of equal protection in violation of Article I, Section 2, Missouri Constitution
and the Fourteenth Amendment to the United States Constitution. The right of the
pupil to attend a public school in Missouri is one founded upon our state constitution. Having offered a public education to all children, the state must make it
available on non-discriminatory terms.
28 Mo. A7T'y GEN. Op. No. 133 at 10 (Oct. 28, 1971). The only mention of the fourteenth
amendment in Pasteris the assertion in the first sentence of the opinion that it was a question
involved in the appeal. Neither the majority nor the dissent return to it thereafter.
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ready surfaced once in Brusca v. State of Missouri ex rel. State
Board of Education.4 Although no relief was granted therein, Missouri's continued strengthening of its "wall" by stricter interpretations at least enhances the chance that some Missouri plaintiff may
in the future have a bona fide federal case of equal protection infringement.
The Paster decision, as it stands, means that Missouri's absolute separation policy has reached a new peak which will effectively
prevent almost all state aid to non-public education. The court's
definite refusal to have any of its prior decisions or this decision
limited to their facts provides notice that broad anti-establishment
of religion "guidelines" now exist in Missouri.65 Non-public schools
will likely suffer greater hardships due to restrictions against public
aid, with the prospect of their virtual disappearance from the Missouri educational scene at least plausible.6 The tragedy of deteriorating quality in non-public education is compounded when it is
realized that the children involved are primarily located in the areas
where educational needs are the very greatest-the general metro64. 332 F. Supp. 275 (E.D.Mo. 1971), affd mem., 405 U.S. 1050 (1972). Brusca held
that provisions of the Missouri constitution and implementing statutes, which establish and
provide for funding of a free public school system and which prohibit the use of public funds
to aid directly or indirectly religious or sectarian schools, do not violate either the Free
Exercise Clause or the Equal Protection Clause. Id. at 280.
65. "[Tlhat none of [the previous decisions] involved providing textbooks . . . is
certainly true, but, even though such cases may be distinguished factually it does not follow
that they do not provide guidelines for construing the constitution of this state in resolving
the instant case." 512 S.W.2d at 102.
66. Enrollment losses in the private schools during a period when public school enrollment has grown indicate the hardships being experienced by non-public schools in Missouri
even prior to Paster:
(Mo.) Enrollment in Elementary and Second Schools, 1965 & 1971
Non-Public Schools
Public Schools

Fall 1965
176,273
964,351

Fall 1971
163,100
1,038,000

NATIONAL CENTER FOR ED. STATISTICS, U.S. DEPT. OF HEALTH, EDUC., & WELFARE, DIGEST OF
ED. STATsTrcs-1971 EDITION Tables 27 at 24, 39 at 33, and 40 at 34 (1972).
NATIONAL CENTER FOR ED. STATISTICS, U.S. DEPT. OF HEALTH, EDUC., & WELFARE, DIGEST OF
ED. STATIsTics-1966 EDITION Table 26 at 22 (1966).
67.

THE PRESIDENT'S COMMISSION ON SCHOOL FINANCE, SCHOOLS, PEOPLE, & MONEY-THE

NEED FOR EDUCATIONAL REFORM 54 (1972):
One of every 10 American children attends a nonpublic school; the proportion is
much higher in urban areas where the nonpublic school is a much more significant
part of American education than it is in the Nation as a whole. Roughly 83 percent
of all nonpublic school children are found in. . . Standard Metropolitan Statistical
Areas . . . and nearly half (47.5 percent) of all nonpublic children attend schools
in center cities. Of the total elementary and secondary school enrollment in our 10
largest cities, 24.6 percent is found in nonpublic schools.
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politan areas and the inner cities. 7 Political implications 68 could

include agitation by constituents, the disappointment of state legislators in the invalidation of their textbook loan statute, and a resultant review of any possible remaining avenues of approach to public
aid, including a movement to amend the Missouri constitution as
the only means of establishing the legitimacy of state aid to non-

public schools."
The United States Supreme Court has, since Everson, attempted to consider the social realities of non-public education and
its relationship to the general welfare in deciding the legal issues of
important Establishment Clause cases.7" The decisions of the Missouri Supreme Court, on other hand, have been confined almost

without exception to legal and historical precedent with little or no
attention paid to possible shifts in public policy. 7' Paster is no exception to this trend. Unless the court reconsiders its position, it
seems rather certain that Missouri's unqualified policy of absolute
separation will continue to withstand all attacks in the Missouri
68. It is worthy of note in the discussion of political implications that Missouri has what
the Supreme Court of the United States has termed a "rather fundamental intrastate legal
rift" in the area of public aid to non-public schools. Wheeler v. Barrera, - U.S. --- , 94
S.Ct. 2274, 2282 n.9 (1974). This has occurred because the Attorney General of Missouri has
repeatedly issued opinions advising in favor of various forms of such public aid. E.g., 28 Mo.
ATr'Y GEN. Op. No. 133 (Oct. 28, 1971); 28 Mo. ATr'Y GEN. Op. No. 156 (May 3, 1971); 27
Mo. ATT'Y GEN. Op. No. 56 (Feb. 4, 1970); 27 Mo. Avr'Y GEN. Op. No. 26 (Jan. 29, 1970).
69. The Court in Pasterincluded such a hint for those aggrieved by the decision, saying
that the court "is bound in the resolution of legal conflicts. . . to follow the dictates of the
Missouri Constitution as now written." 512 S.W.2d at 105. Indeed, the first steps toward a
constitutional amendment have already been taken in the Missouri General Assembly.
Kansas City Times, Feb. 27, 1975, at 9D, col. 1 (state ed.).
70. E.g., Board of Educ., v. Allen, 392 U.S. 236, 247 (1968):
Underlying these cases, and underlying also the legislative judgments that have
preceded the court decisions, has been a recognition that private education has
played and is playing a significant and valuable role in raising national levels of
knowledge, competence, and experience. Americans care about the quality of secular education available to their children.
Furthermore, the federal judiciary has openly expressed its concern for the children in noting
the unhappy situation in Missouri. The Supreme Court in Wheeler v. Barrera, - U.S.
94 S.Ct. 2274 (1974), recognizing Missouri's extraordinarily strict policy of church-state separation, lamented what may yet come to pass-this state's resultant nonparticipation in the
federal Elementary and Secondary Education Act programs. Id. at -,
94 S.Ct. at 2287.
The dissent in Luetkemeyer v. Kaufmann, 364 F. Supp. 376 (W.D.Mo. 1973) (Gibson, J.,
dissenting), said that the denial of health and safety measures to parochial school students
because of Missouri's policy "appears narrow and insensitive of the welfare of nonpublic
school attendees." Id. at 387.
71. One Missouri case, however, did contain some consideration of public policy,
though limited somewhat to its particular facts (i.e., taking a .Catholic parish school into a
public school system). Harfst v. Hoegen, 349 Mo. 808, 817, 163 S.W.2d 609, 614 (En Banc
1942).
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courts. Furthermore, the federal courts will continue to yield to the
state court's interpretation of the state constitution-at least up to
the point where some other federal constitutional limitation is violated. Anomalies and injustices will probably become more visible
if the present policy goes unaltered." If the review of legal doctrine
and public policy cannot achieve an amicable solution, then the
"logical extreme" may have finally been reached where resort may
be had to the Free Exercise and Equal Protection Clauses of the
United States Constitution.
The magnitude of the controversy was not unexpected. The
Supreme Court has deemed public schools to be "perhaps the most
important function of state and local governments."73 Likewise,
many would say that religion is the most important activity in
America's private sector. In Paster, as in so many previous cases,
those two forces came together. The Supreme Court of Missouri has
therein written an opinion on an issue which will undoubtedly return for further review in future cases. If the injustices have occured
by then and the federal courts have not intervened, the Missouri
court should consider whether the Missouri constitution actually
demands an "unqualified policy" of "absolute separation" any more
than does the United States Constitution, and whether enlightened
public policy may indeed demand something less.
JOHN KURTZ

72. An anomaly may be perceived in Missouri's newly enacted "financial assistance
program" providing state funds for tuition payments of students at-"public or private
institution[s] of higher education . . . ." § 173.200, RSMo 1975 Supp. An injustice may
arise concerning Missouri's ndw "special educational services" for "all handicapped and
severely handicapped children . . . ." (emphasis added). § 162.670, RSMo 1975 Supp. Will
the "unqualified policy" of "absolute separation" work the seeming injustice of denying
needed services (e.g., diagnostic) to a parochial school child? Speech therapy was denied to
parochial students in Special Dist. for Educ. & Training of Handicapped v. Wheeler, 408
S.W.2d 60 (Mo. En Banc 1966). That case will hopefully not foreclose the issue under the
new, much expanded statute. § 162.670, RSMo 1975 Supp.
73. Brown v. Board of Educ., 347 U.S. 483, 493 (1954).
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CRIMINAL CONTEMPT-RIGHT TO JURY TRIAL
FOR DIRECT CONTEMPT AND AGGREGATED
SENTENCES
Codispoti v. Pennsylvania1
At the conclusion of their criminal trial, petitioners Dominick

Codispoti and Herbert Langnes were given sentences for each of
numerous contempt charges against them arising out of their con-

duct during the trial.' Petitioners were subsequently granted a new
trial on the contempt charges, 3 but their accompanying demand for
a jury trial was refused. At the new trial, the judge found them

guilty on each charge, imposing sentences which were to be served
consecutively. The sentences aggregated to three years, three

months for Codispoti and two years, eight months for Langnes.
The United States Supreme Court granted certiorari limited to
consideration of petitioners' contention that they were denied their
right to a jury trial. The Court reversed the convictions, 4 holding
that when the trial judge waits until after the trial to convict and
sentence the accused for various acts of contempt committed during
trial, a jury trial is required if the sentences aggregate more than six
months, even though no sentence for one contemptuous act alone
was for more than six months.' The decision also gives an accused

contemnor the right to a jury trial even when all of his contemptuous conduct has occurred in open court.
Codispoti continues the relatively recent movement toward
abandonment of traditional procedures for adjudicating criminal
contempts. Historically, a jury trial had never been required or
1. U.S.
, 94 S.Ct. 2687 (1974).
2. Codispoti and Langnes were sentenced for each of seven and six contempts respectively. The Supreme Court of Pennsylvania affirmed. Commonwealth v. Mayberry, 453 Pa.
619, 306 A.2d 294 (1973).
3. The United States Supreme Court had vacated a codefendant's contempt conviction
on the grounds that he was entitled to a public trial before a judge other than the one who
was reviled by the contemnor's conduct. Mayberry v. Pennsylvania, 400 U.S. 455, 466 (1971).
Since Codispoti and Langnes were sentenced under the same circumstances, they were also
granted a new trial before a different judge, even though they were not parties to Mayberry.
4. Mr. Justice White delivered the opinion of the Court, joined by Mr. Justice Douglas,
Mr. Justice Brennan, and Mr. Justice Powell. Mr. Justice Marshall filed a concurring opinion
in which he joined in Parts I and HI of the opinion of the Court, but not Part II. Basically,
Marshall thought the right to jury trial extended to situations where multiple sentences
resulting from summary punishment aggregated to six months or more in length. Mr. Justice
Blackmun dissented, joined by the Chief Justice, Mr. Justice Stewart, and Mr. Justice
Rehnquist. Rehnquist filed a separate dissenting opinion, which was joined by the Chief
Justice.
5. 94 S.Ct. at 2693.
6. The right to jury trial does not exist at all in "civil contempt" cases. This distinction
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even used in criminal contempt proceedings.' The right to jury trial
for serious offenses in criminal contempt cases in the federal courts
was first recognized by the Supreme Court in 1966.1 A "serious"
criminal contempt was determined to be one for which imprisonment of more than six months is authorized or, in the absence of an
authorized maximum penalty, one for which an imprisonment of
greater than six months is actually imposed After the sixth amendment's right to jury trial was held to be binding on the states,'" the
Court held in Bloom v. Illinois" that there is a right to jury trial in
state court proceedings involving serious criminal contempts. The
Court in Bloom reasoned that since convictions for criminal contempt are indistinguishable from ordinary criminal convictions, the
fundamental right to jury trial should extend to criminal contempt

cases. 12
The Court in Codispotifaced two major questions. The first was
whether there is a right to jury trial in cases of post-trial convictions
for direct" serious criminal contempt, that is, in cases where the
contemptuous conduct occurred in the presence of the court and was
not dealt with by way of summary punishment. 4 The second
question was whether there is a right to jury trial where multiple
petty contempt convictions result in an aggregated sentence of more
than six months.
has been drawn because of the differences in the nature of the proceedings and of the sentences imposed in civil, as opposed to criminal, contempt actions. Civil contempt proceedings
are remedial and coercive in nature and result in sentences which are not definite in term.
Thus, there is no determinable length of sentence upon which to base the jury trial right. The
classification of contempts as civil or criminal can very often be difficult, and the distinction
between them concerning procedural safeguards has been criticized. See Veselich,
ConstitutionalLaw-Jury Trial For Contempt, 32 Mo. L. REv. 586 (1967).
7. See, e.g., 4 W. BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES 286-87 (1802); 3 W. HOLDSWORTH, A
HISTORY OF ENGLISH LAW 391-94 (5th ed. 1942).
8. Cheff v. Schnackenberg, 384 U.S. 373 (1966).
9. Baldwin v. New York, 399 U.S. 66 (1970); Frank v. United States, 395 U.S. 147
(1969).
10. Duncan v. Louisiana, 391 U.S. 145 (1968).
11. 391 U.S. 194 (1968).
12. Id. at 207-08.
13. The classification of criminal contempts as direct or indirect has existed for some
time. The basic distinction between the two types is that direct contempts occur in the
presence of the court, while indirect contempts do not. Not all contempts, though, are easily
classified. For a discussion of the direct-indirect test, see Dobbs, Contempt of Court: A
Survey, 56 CORN. L. REv. 183, 224-27 (1971).
14. FED. R. CRIM. P. 42(a) provides for summary punishment of criminal contempt at
the time of its occurence if the judge certifies that he saw or heard the conduct constituting
contempt. The majority of the states also have statutory or judicial provisions regulating
summary proceedings in contempt cases. Allen, Summary Proceedings in Direct Contempt
Cases, 15 VAND. L. REv. 241, 251 (1961).
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With regard to the first question, the Court in Codispoti made
it clear that there is a right to jury trial for all serious criminal
contempts, whether direct or indirect, when conviction and sentencing are delayed until after trial. The opinion of the Court relied
heavily on Bloom v. Illinois. The contempt involved in Bloom was
the willful petitioning by an attorney to admit to probate a falsely
prepared and executed will. 5 The contemptuous acts were committed out of the courtroom and hence constituted an indirect contempt. The Court in Bloom, nevertheless, did discuss direct criminal contempts, concluding that there was no reason to distinguish
them from indirect contempts as concerns the right to jury trial."6
The courts have generally followed this dictum, 7 but they have done
so despite the argument that Bloom on its facts should apply only
to indirect criminal contempts. Codispoti is a classic instance of
direct contempt. The conduct for which Codispoti and Langnes
were charged all took place in open court, with every detail of their
actions entered in the trial record.'8 Since the language in the Bloom
opinion concerning direct contempts extended beyond the factual
situation presented there, the Court could easily have rejected its
prior stance on courtroom contempts without overruling its holding
in Bloom." By holding that the petitioners in Codispoti were entitled to a jury trial, the Court has now solidified the Bloom dictum.
The principal argument against the right to jury trial for direct
contempts is that a jury would be of no value when all the contemptuous conduct takes place in the presence of the court because there
would be no questions of fact for a jury to resolve." When the jury
brings in a guilty verdict based upon the undisputed facts, the judge
would still determine the length of the sentence. Therefore, a jury
could in no way lessen the harshness of the punishment imposed
upon the accused.2 ' This analysis, however, ignores the argument
that the jury's role in contempt proceedings goes beyond resolving
factual disputes. The mere presence of a jury operates as a moderating influence between the judiciary and the accused, resulting in
greater public confidence in our criminal justice system. The Court
15, 391 U.S. at 195.
16. Id. at 209.10.
17. See, e.g., United States v. Seale, 461 F.2d 345 (7th Cir. 1972); Baker v. Eisenstadt,
456 F.2d 382 (lst Cir.), cert. denied, 409 U.S. 846 (1972). Butseeln re De Saulnier, 279 N.E.2d
287 (Mass. 1971).
18. 94 S. Ct. at 2689-90 nn. 1 & 2.
19. Cf. Kastigar v. United States, 406 U.S. 441, 454-55 (1972); Cohens v. Virginia, 19
U.S. (6 Wheat.) 82, 97 (1821).
20. 94 S.Ct. at 2696 (Blackmun, J., dissenting).
21. 94 S.Ct. at 2713 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting).
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has stated that "the primary purpose of the jury is to prevent the
possibility of oppression by the Government."22 Furthermore, the
jury may also need to determine whether the facts before them,
disputed or not, actually constitute a contempt.
Another concern of those who oppose the right to jury trial for
direct contempts is that a jury may decide for acquittal in a case of
demonstrated guilt. This is not an unlikely possibility in that many
contemptuous acts are not criminal in the classic sense, and therefore may not be associated with criminal guilt by the average juror.
The risk of unwarranted acquittals is present in all criminal trials,
however, and should not be a factor in determining an accused's
right to be tried before a jury. Such a risk can be lessened, as in
other crimes, by the use of proper instructions.
Those opposed to the right to jury trial for direct contempts
may further argue that practical problems will arise from the decision. Contemptuous acts, unlike those which constitute ordinary
crimes, are very often performed in view of a large number of witnesses, especially if there is a large courtroom audience. Should
either side desire to call upon all available witnesses, the trial could
become exceedingly cumbersome. Where there are multiple contemnors in a single trial, separate proceedings may be necessary for
each defendant, creating an even greater burden for the courts and
the others involved. However, such valid factors affecting judicial
efficiency and economy have often been rejected in favor of procedural safeguards for the individual, particularly those involving constitutional rights.2 3 To have different standards for direct and indirect contempts would itself create procedural difficulties. It is not
always clear what exactly constitutes direct, as opposed to indirect,
contempt. 24 If a separate judicial determination of the directness of
the contempt were required because of a distinction concerning the
right to jury trial, then another procedural step would have to be
created to make this determination.
The second question answered by the Codispoti decision is
whether petty contempt sentences are to be aggregated in determining the right to a jury trial. This question has previously produced
conflict among both courts2 and commentators. 21 In holding that
22. Baldwin v. New York, 399 U.S. 66, 72 (1970).
23. See, e.g., Bloom v. Illinois, 391 U.S. 194, 209 (1968).
24. See Dobbs, supra note 13, at 225.
25. Compare United States v. Seale, 461 F.2d 345 (7th Cir. 1972) with Commonwealth
v. Snyder, 443 Pa. 433, 275 A.2d 312 (1971) and In re Puerto Rico Newspaper Guild Local
225, 476 F.2d 856 (1st Cir. 1973). The Seale case, a product of the Chicago conspiracy trial
before Judge Hoffman, held that punishments for in-court contempts tried together at the
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there is a right to jury trial when such sentences aggregate to more
than six months, the Court differentiates between summary punishment for acts of contempt committed during the trial and postponement of conviction and punishment for such acts until after the
trial. The power of the trial judge to summarily convict and punish
under Rule 42(a) and similar state provisions2 is unaffected by the
decision. An unlimited number of six-month-or-less sentences can
be imposed consecutively without a jury trial, provided the judge
convicts and sentences upon the occurrence of each contemptuous
act.
The Court essentially applied a balancing approach to this
matter, weighing the trial court's interest in maintaining order in
the courtroom against the contemnor's constitutional right to a jury
trial. Since there is no "overriding necessity for instant action to
preserve order"28 when conviction and punishment are postponed
until after trial, the contemnor's right to jury trial prevails as the
dominant interest. According to the Court, when a defendant is
punished at the end of trial for a series of contemptuous acts during
the trial, the contempts are to be treated as one serious offense. This
rationale has been referred to as the "continuing contempt"
theory.2" However, when the trial judge convicts and punishes summarily, the preservation of courtroom order is the overriding interest. Each contempt in this situation is considered a "discrete and
separate matter."3 Thus, when conviction and sentencing are delayed, the series of contempts are aggregated and treated as a single
offense, but when the contempts are summarily punished they are
considered to be separate offenses:This apparent contradiction can
only be explained by the Court's interest in preserving the trial
judge's traditional summary powers. Perhaps there is the fear that
total application of the aggregation rule would cause the summary
conclusion of the trial must be aggregated for purposes of determining the right to a jury trial.
To rule otherwise, the court reasoned, would permit a judge to single out and punish discrete
instances of contempt, none serious enough individually to require a jury trial, resulting in a
theoretically unlimited term of punishment. 416 F.2d at 353.
26. Compare Dibble, Contempt of Court: Go Directly to Jail. Do Not PassGo. Do Not
Collect Your Constitutional Rights, 7 SuF. L. REV. 517, 535-37 (1973) with Thompson &
Stackman, Multiple Petty Contempts and the Guaranteeof Trial by Jury, 61 GEO. L. J. 621,
637 (1973).
27. See note 14 supra.
28. 94 S.Ct. at 2692.
29. See, e.g., Yates v. United States, 355 U.S. 66, 73-74 (1957) (repeated refusals by a
witness to answer questions on the same subject considered to be one contempt of a continuing nature).
30. 94 S.Ct. at 2692.
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procedure to lose some of its deterrent effect. If such aggregation
were allowed, a person who has been summarily sentenced for six
months or less would be tempted to commit further contemptuous
acts in order to have enough aggregate punishment to assure himself
of the right to a jury trial. Similarly, a contemnor may be inclined
to continue his disruptive behavior once his cumulative summary
punishment has passed the six-month barrier, because he could
then rely on having a separate proceeding where a possibly more
lenient jury would determine his fate.
The primary objection to having this distinction between summary and delayed punishment is that trial judges will be encouraged to convict and punish summarily in order to avoid the jury trial
requirement.3 ' The Court responded to this argument by pointing
out that appellate review will discourage unwarranted summary
punishment.2 Prior decisions which narrowly restrict the class of
misbehavior subject to summary disposition substantiate this
33
point.
The Court's acceptance of the aggregation rule, limited though
it may be, seems well founded in light of the stated purpose behind
the constitutional limitations imposed by Bloom, the restriction of
abuse of the contempt power. 3 4 A contrary holding would allow trial
judges to circumvent the right to jury trial by handing out multiple
sentences for petty offenses. Evaluating the rule from the standpoint of the individual contemnor, ten convictions for six months
each, to be served consecutively, would certainly seem as "serious"
as would one conviction for five years. Furthermore, other procedural rights based upon constitutional law and criminal procedure
are determined by the aggregation of sentences. 5
The relatively recent shift away from the sui generis approach
to criminal contempts in favor of the expansion of basic procedural
rights" has nearly reached the limit in regard to the right to jury
trial. The Codispoti decision assures that a contemnor will now
31. 94 S.Ct. at 2694-95 (Marshall, J., concurring); 94 S.Ct. at 2714 (Rehnquist, J.,
dissenting).
32. 94 S.Ct. at 2694.
33. In re Oliver, 333 U.S. 257 (1948); Harris v. United States, 382 U.S. 162 (1965). In
Harris, the Court declared that summary punishment should be used only when necessary
to achieve a speedy recovery of the court's dignity. Id. at 164.
34. 391 U.S. at 202-07.
35. James v. Headley, 410 F.2d 325 (5th Cir. 1969) (aggregate punishments authorized
by statute determine constitutional right to counsel); Chambers v. District of Columbia, 194
F.2d 336 (D.C. Cir. 1952) (right to appeal based on aggregation of sentences).
36. The other rights besides jury trial that have been focused on are the rights to a
hearing, an impartial judge, and appellate review. See generally Dibble, supra note 26.
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receive a jury trial in all cases where his conduct results in a posttrial sentence of more than six months imprisonment.3 7 Neither the

length of individual multiple contempt sentences nor the nature of
the contemptuous acts will affect this right. One possible further
step in this area would be application of the six-month rule to the
reduction of a sentence for serious contempt to one for petty contempt by a trial or appellate court." The only other significant
remaining step would appear to be extension of the aggregation rule,
3
and consequent right to jury trial, to multiple summary sentences,
which would effectively do away with the summary procedure.
Such further extensions of the jury trial right may not seem

probable for the near future, but they cannot be discounted. The
summary punishment procedure itself has been increasingly restricted in recent years and has been attacked for its very existence. 0 Short of doing away with summary disposition entirely,
perhaps the suggested alternatives of binding and gagging or re-

moval from the courtroom"' will be adopted by the courts in order
to obviate the need for repetitive summary punishment. However

this problem may be resolved in the future, the right to jury trial
for criminal contempt has, for the present, been given well-defined
parameters.
THoMAs B. BECKER
37. The use of the six-month dividing line to distinguish between petty and serious
offenses was reinforced in Taylor v. Hayes, - U.S.
, 94 S.Ct. 2697 (1974), a companion
case to Codispoti. The Court in Taylor reversed petitioner's contempt conviction on grounds
of due process and failure to have a new judge adjudicate the contempt charges. But, significant to the issues discussed in this note, it rejected his contention that he was entitled to a
jury trial. Despite the fact that petitioner was given sentences for his contempts which
aggregated to well over 6 months imprisonment, it was held that they constituted mere petty
offenses because the appellate court ruled that the sentences were to be served concurrently.
The Court reaffirmed its commitment to the basic vroposition in Bloom v. Illinois that there
is no inherent right to jury trial in all criminal contempt proceedings.
The Supreme Court has therefore given approval to the practice of reducing sentences
after conviction to imprisonment for six months or less in order to eliminate the requirement
for a jury trial. The consequences of having this dividing line, however, are tempered by the
fact that many states have provided maximum sentences of less than six months for criminal
contempts. Schneider, Criminal Law - Criminal Contempt-Judge'sDilemma, 21 DEPAUL
L. REv. 1123, 1126 n.19 (1972). Furthermore, those jurisdictions which have no statutory
maximum actually impose serious sentences in only a small minority of cases. The Court's
determination on the right to jury trial in Taylor follows logically from its holding in Frank
v. United States, 395 U.S. 147 (1969), where it decided that a three-year sentence reduced to
probation did not entitle the accused to a jury trial.
38. See 94 S.Ct. at 2706 (Marshall, J., dissenting).
39. See 94 S.Ct. at 2694 (Marshall, J., concurring).
40. See, e.g., Allen, supra note 14; Johnson, The Contemptuous Attorney and Problems
Concerning His Summary Punishment Under Rule 42(a) of the FederalRules of Criminal
Procedure, 4 J. MARSH J. 74 (1970).
41. Illinois v. Allen, 397 U.S. 337, 343-44 (1970).
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CRIMINAL LAW-MENTAL DISEASE OR DEFECT
REDUCING THE DEGREE OF CRIME-MISSOURI
CHANGES THE RULE
State v. Anderson'
The defendant, Richard Anderson, was charged with first degree murder. At trial, both a psychiatrist and a psychologist testified that the defendant had a severe depression which was characterized as a mental disease or defect. In their opinion, as a result of
such defect, defendant was unable to premeditate, which in Missouri means that defendant was unable to form the intent to kill or
do grievous bodily harm. The trial court instructed the jury on both
first degree and second degree murder. 2 The defendant asked for an
instruction on manslaughter,3 but the court refused to instruct on
manslaughter on the basis that such defect or disease could not
affect the degree of homicide. The defendant was convicted.
On appeal,4 the defendant argued that in adopting section
552.030(3)(1), RSMo 1969,1 Missouri adopted the doctrine of "diminished responsibility." The defendant argued that there was evidence presented at trial that he was not capable of premeditating
and that he did not premeditate. The defendant contended that on
the basis of that evidence, the jury could have found him guilty of
manslaughter since he lacked the state of mind necessary for both
1. 515 S.W.2d 534 (Mo. En Banc 1974).
2. Murder in the first degree in Missouri is defined by § 559.010, RSMo 1969:
Every murder which shall be committed by means of poison, or by lying in wait,
or by any other kind of willful, deliberate and premeditated killing, and every
homicide which shall be committed in the perpetration or attempt to perpetrate
any arson, rape, robbery, burglary or mayhem, shall be deemed murder in the first
degree.
Murder in the second degree in Missouri is defined by § 559.020, RSMo 1969:
All other kinds of murder at common law, not herein declared to be manslaughter
or justifiable or excusable homicide, shall be deemed murder in the second degree.
3. Manslaughter in Missouri is defined by § 559.070, RSMo 1969:
Every killing of a human being by the act, procurement or culpable negligence of
another, not herein declared to be murder or excusable or justifiable homicide, shall
be deemed manslaughter.
4. The St. Louis District of the Missouri Court of Appeals reversed and remanded for
a new trial, but subsequently sustained defendant's motion to transfer to the Missouri Supreme Court. The motion to transfer was sustained because of the general interest and
importance of questions involved in the case. See Mo. Sup. CT. R. 83.02; Mo. CONST. art. V,

§ 10.
5. Section 552.030(3)(1) provides as follows:
Evidence that the defendant did or did not suffer from a mental disease or defect
shall be admissible (1) To prove that the defendant did or did not have a state of
mind which is an element of the offense. . ..
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first degree and second degree murder in Missouri.6 The Missouri
Supreme Court accepted the defendant's argument and reversed the
conviction and remanded, holding that in adopting section
552.030(3) (1), Missouri adopted the doctrine of "diminished responsibility." Thus, the trial court erred in refusing to instruct on manslaughter.'
Under the so-called "diminished or partial responsibility" doctrine,8 evidence of mental disease or defect, even though not sufficient to acquit the defendant,9 can be sufficient to show the absence
of a state of mind which is an element of the offense charged, and
thus reduce the degree of crime for which the defendant is responsible.1° If the jury finds that the defendant is too disordered to deliberate, he cannot be convicted of first degree murder, but only of sec6. The state of mind elements for murder in the first degree in Missouri are deliberation, premeditation and malice. Murder in the second degree is defined as all kinds of murder
at common law which are not defined by § 559.010, RSMo 1969, as first degree murder. There
are five types: (1) intent-to-kill murder; (2) intent to do grievous bodily harm murder; (3)
depraved-heart murder; (4) felony murder, where the felony in question is not listed under
first degree murder; and (5) intent to oppose by force a law enforcement officer acting in the
execution of his duties. In Anderson the type of second degree murder in question is intentto-kill murder. Missouri courts have used the term premeditation to mean both intent to kill
and intent to do grievous bodily harm. Therefore, the state of mind elements for intent-tokill murder in the second degree are premeditation and malice without deliberation. Manslaughter is any other killing (not justifiable or excusable), which necessarily is without
premeditation or malice. State v. Anderson, 515 S.W.2d 534, 537 (Mo. En Banc 1974); State
v. Ayers, 470 S.W.2d 534 (Mo. En Banc 1971); State v. Williams, 442 S.W.2d 61 (Mo. En
Banc 1968); State v. Washington, 368 S.W.2d 439 (Mo. 1963); State v. Chamineak, 343
S.W.2d 153 (Mo. 1961).
7. 515 S.W.2d at 539, 542. Judge Henley dissented on the ground that there was not
sufficient evidence to require the giving of a manslaughter instruction. Id. at 543.
8. This doctrine, often referred to as diminished or partial responsibility, is actually a
misnomer. The phrase is misleading because it suggests that a defendant is partially responsible for the commission of some offense. However, the true meaning of the doctrine is that
there is not reduced responsibility for the greater crime but no responsibility for the greater
crime and full responsibility for the lesser crime. The doctrine will be hereinafter referred to
as "diminished responsibility." State v. Anderson, 515 S.W.2d 534 (Mo. En Banc 1974); State
v. Padilla, 66 N.M. 289, 347 P.2d 312 (1959); F. LINDMAN & D. McINTmYR, JR., THE: MENTALLY
DiSABLED AN) THE LAW 355 (1961); W. LAFAvE &A. Scorr, CRIMINAL LAW § 42 (1972); Annot.,
22 A.L.R.3d 1228, 1238 (1968); Player, The Mentally Ill in Missouri Criminal Cases, 30 Mo.
L. REV. 514, 523 (1965); Richardson, Reardon & Simeone, A Symposium: An Analysis of the
Law, 19 J. Mo. B. 677, 712-13 (1963); Taylor, PartialInsanity as Affecting the Degree of
Crime-A Commentary on Fisherv. United States, 34 CAL, L. REy. 625, 630 n.17 (1946).
9. Section 552.030(1), RSMo 1969 provides for the defense of not guilty by reason of
mental disease or defect excluding responsibility as follows:
A person is not responsible for criminal conduct if at the time of such conduct as a
result of mental disease or defect he did not know or appreciate the nature, quality
or wrongfulness of his conduct or was incapable of conforming his conduct to the
requirements of law.
10. See notes 37-40 and accompanying text infra.
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ond degree. If the jury finds that the defendant is too disordered to
premeditate or lacks malice, he cannot be convicted of second degree murder, but only of manslaughter."1
Prior to State v. Anderson, the Missouri rule was that a mental
disease or defect is either a complete defense or is not a defense at
all. 2 This approach is based on the assumption that a defendant
who fails to establish a complete defense of insanity must thereby
have possessed the requisite mental state for the crime charged.'3
The leading case'4 demonstrating this "all or nothing" approach is
State v. Holloway." The rule in Holloway was subsequently followed by Missouri courts.'6
In 1963 the Missouri legislature adopted the Mental Responsibility Act. 7 Section 552.030(3)(1) of the Act was taken from the
11.

See note 6 supra. In Anderson the court is not clear whether the mental disease or

defect must negate premeditation, malice or both premeditation and malice. The court seems
to be saying that if the jury finds that defendant lacks either premeditation or malice, then
he cannot be convicted of second degree murder, but only of manslaughter. Furthermore, the
court is not clear whether the defendant or the state has the burden of persuasion on the issue
of diminished responsibility. Some language would indicate that the defendant has the burden of persuasion. 515 S.W.2d at 537, 539, 542. However, the prosecutor normally has the
burden of persuading the jury beyond a reasonable doubt that the required state of mind for
an offense exists. Therefore, a strong argument can be made that the defendant should have
the burden of injecting the issue, but the state should have the burden of persuasion. See
Mo. PROP. CRIM. CODE §§ 1.100, 1.110, 7.140 (1973).
12. See State v. Sturdivan, 497 S.W.2d 139 (Mo. 1973); State v. Glenn, 429 S.W.2d 225
(Mo. En Banc 1968); State v. Garrett, 391 S.W.2d 235 (Mo. 1965); State v. Pinski, 163 S.W.2d
785 (Mo. 1942); State v. Barbata, 80 S.W.2d 865, 868 (Mo. 1935); State v. Paulsgrove, 203
Mo. 193, 101 S.W. 27 (1907); State v. Speyer, 182 Mo. 77, 81 S.W. 430 (1904); State v.
Holloway, 156 Mo. 222, 56 S.W. 734 (1900); State v. Kotovsky, 74 Mo. 247, af'g, 11 Mo. App.
584 (1882); State v. Huting, 21 Mo. 464 (1855); Baldwin v. State, 12 Mo. 223 (1848).
13. See State v. Holloway, 156 Mo. 222, 56 S.W. 734 (1900); State v. Flint, 142 W.Va.
509, 96 S.E.2d 677 (1957); W. LAFAvE & A. ScoTT, CRIMINAL LAW § 42 (1972).
14. A few cases prior to Holloway also indicated that Missouri followed the "all or
nothing" approach. See State v. Kotovsky, 74 Mo. 247, aft'g, 11 Mo. App. 584 (1882); State
v. Huting, 21 Mo. 464 (1855); Baldwin v. State, 12 Mo. 223 (1848).
15. 156 Mo. 222, 56 S.W. 734 (1900). In Holloway, defendant was charged with murder
in the first degree and his defense was insanity. The Missouri Supreme Court held that:
If sane, defendant was indubitably guilty of murder in the first degree; if insane,
of nothing. No halfway house exists, in a case of this sort, between murder in the
first degree and any minor degree of that crime.
Id. at 231, 56 S.W. at 737.
16. See State v. Pinski, 163 S.W.2d 785 (Mo. 1942); State v. Barbata, 80 S.W.2d 865
(Mo. 1935); State v. Paulsgrove, 203 Mo. 193, 101 S.W. 27 (1907); State v. Speyer, 182 Mo.
77, 81 S.W. 430 (1904).
17. This Act deals with the effect of a mental disease or defect on the outcome of a
criminal prosecution under the laws of Missouri. It is contained in Chapter 552, RSMo 1969.
For an analysis of the Act, see generally Clapper, Mental Responsibility and the Criminal
Law in Missouri, 35 Mo. L. Rsv. 516 (1970); Player, The Mentally Ill in Missouri Criminal
Cases, 30 Mo. L. REv. 514 (1965); Richardson, Reardon & Simeone, A Symposium: An
Analysis of the Law, 19 J. Mo. B. 677 (1963).
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Model Penal Code, section 4.02(1). 11 In the comment to section
4.02(1), the drafters of the Code explained that psychiatric evidence
should be admissible when relevant to prove or disprove the existence of a state of mind, such as premeditation or deliberation, to
the same extent as any other relevant evidence. 9 However, Missouri
courts construed section 552.030(3)(1) as not changing the "all or

nothing" approach of Holloway.2 1 In Anderson, the Missouri Supreme Court reversed directions and held that in adopting section

552.030(3)(1), Missouri had adopted the doctrine of "diminished
responsibility." In so holding, the court relied on the comment to
the Model Penal Code section. The court reasoned that when a
legislature enacts into law a statute taken from a model or uniform

code, it adopts the interpretation placed thereon by the drafters of
the model code. 2 ' In placing this interpretation on section
18. 515 S.W.2d at 538-39; see Clapper, Mental Responsibility and the CriminalLaw in
Missouri, 35 Mo. L. REv. 516, 522 (1970); Beck, Mental Disordernot Amounting to Insanity
as Affecting CriminalResponsibility in Missouri,32 Mo. L. REv. 274, 275-76 (1967); Richardson, Reardon & Simeone, A Symposium: An Analysis of the Law, 19 J. Mo. B. 677, 696 n.
26, 712-13 (1963). Section 552.030(3)(1), RSMo 1969, is taken from the MODEL PENAL CODE §
4.02(1) (1962) which provides:
(1) Evidence that the defendant suffered from mental disease or defect is
admissible whenever it is relevant to prove that the defendant did or did not have
a state of mind which is an element of the offense.
Compare § 552.030(3)(1), RSMo 1969, quoted note 5 supra.
19. MODEL PENAL CODE § 4.02(1), comment (Tent. Draft No. 4, 1955). This comment
was incorporated by reference in the proposed official draft. See MODEL PENAL CODE § 4.02(1)
(Official Draft, 1962).
20. See State v. Sturdivan, 497 S.W.2d 139 (Mo. 1973); State v. Glenn, 429 S.W.2d 225
(Mo, En Banc 1968); State v. Garrett, 391 S.W.2d 235 (Mo. 1965); Clapper, Mental Responsibility and the Criminal Law in Missouri, 35 Mo. L. REv. 516, 518-22 (1970); Beck, Mental
Disordernot Amounting to Insanity as Affecting CriminalResponsibility in Missouri,32 Mo.
L. REv. 274 (1967).
21. The court first reasoned that when a legislature enacts into law a statute taken from
another jurisdiction, this is strong evidence that it adopts the interpretation placed thereon
by the courts of that jurisdiction. 515 S.W.2d at 539. This rule of construction of statutes
adopted from other states has been generally followed by the Missouri courts. See General
Box Co. v. Missouri Util. Co., 331 Mo. 845, 55 S.W.2d 442 (1932); Schott v. Continental Auto
Ins. Underwriters, 326 Mo. 92, 31 S.W.2d 7 (1930); State ex rel. Nichols v. Fuller, 449 S.W.2d
11 (St. L. Mo. App. 1969); Ball v. Mercantile Trust Co., 220 Mo. App. 1165, 297 S.W. 415
(St. L. Mo. App. 1916). Other Missouri cases have held that the construction placed upon
the statute by courts of the state from which it is adopted is persuasive but not necessarily
controlling. See In re Rosing's Estate, 337 Mo. 544, 85 S.W.2d 495 (1935); Northcutt v. Eager,
132 Mo. 265, 33 S.W. 1125 (1896); Mid-Continent Aerial Sprayers, Inc. v. Industrial Comm'n,
420 S.W.2d 354 (Spr. Mo. App. 1967); Ziervogel v. Royal Packing Co., 225 S.W.2d 798 (St.
L. Mo. App. 1949); Mc Kenzie v. Stables, 225 Mo. App. 64, 34 S.W.2d 136 (1930); Stephan
v. Metzger, 95 Mo. App. 609, 69 S.W. 625 (1902).
The court in Anderson extended this rule to the situation where the statute enacted is a
model or uniform code rather than a statute taken from another jurisdiction. The only difference is that the interpretation adopted is the explanation of the drafters rather than that of
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552.030(3)(1), the court distinguished or overruled several cases
where it had interpreted section 552.030(3)(1) differently."
American jurisdictions are split on whether mental disease or
defect insufficient to satisfy the tests of criminal irresponsibility can
be used to reduce the degree of crime.2e Proponents24 of "diminished
respon ibility" argue that since certain crimes by definition require
particular mental states, any evidence which is relevant, including
evidence of mental disease or defect not sufficient to constitute legal
insanity, should be admitted to negate the existence of that mental
state.15
Opponents do not quarrel with the theory behind the doctrine,
the courts of the other jurisdiction. Although this extension is a matter of first impression in

Missouri, the weight of authority in the United States is consistent with the Anderson court's
application of the rule. See Layne-Minnesota Co. v. Regents of Univ. of Minn., 266 Minn.
284, 123 N.W.2d 371, 376 (1963); Tinney v. Crosby, 112 Vt. 95, 22 A.2d 145, 147 (1941);
People's Savings & Trust Co. v. Munsert, 212 Wis. 449, 249 N.W. 527, 531 (1933); School
District No. 46 v. Del Bianco, 68 Ill. App. 2d 145, 215 N.E.2d 25 (1966); Neil B. McGinnis
Equip. Co. v. Henson, 2 Ariz. App. 59, 406 P.2d 409, 411 (1965).
22. 515 S.W.2d at 540-42. The Anderson court correctly disapproved the dicta in State
v. Garrett, 391 S.W.2d 235 (Mo. 1965) (defendant did not argue for the doctrine of diminished
responsibility) and State v. Sturdivan, 497 S.W.2d 139 (Mo. 1973) (insufficient evidence of a
mental disease or defect). The court distinguished State v. Glenn, 429 S.W.2d 225 (Mo. En
Banc 1968), a felony murder case, as not being "analogous" to Anderson. 515 S.W.2d at 541.
This perhaps implies that "diminished responsibility" should not be applied to felony murder
cases in Missouri. This view would be correct to the extent that no state of mind is required
for the murder under felony murder. But the concept of "diminished responsibility" should
be applied to negate the state of mind required for the underlying felony. See text accompanying note 40 infra.
23. A negative answer has been given to the question by Arizona, Arkansas, District of
Columbia, Florida, Maryland, Massachusetts, Nevada, Texas, West Virginia and Wisconsin.
However, a growing number of jurisdictions have reached the opposite conclusion: California,
Colorado, Connecticut, Indiana, Iowa, Kentucky, Nebraska, New Jersey, New Mexico, Ohio,
Oregon, Pennsylvania, Rhode Island, Tennessee, Utah, Virginia, Washington, and Wyoming.
For a collection of cases, see Annot., 22 A.L.R.3d 1228 (1968); Note, 43 CORN. L.Q. 283 (1957).
The United States Supreme Court in Fisher v. United States, 328 U.S. 463 (1946), refused to
reject or adopt "diminished responsibility" and, thus, continued its policy of not interfering
with the local law of the District of Columbia except in extreme cases.
24. For an excellent summary of arguments both pro and con, see F. LIN MAN & D.
MCINTYRE, JR., THE MENTALLY DisABLED AND THE LAw 355-57 (1961).

25. Proponents argue that if such evidence was not admitted, then "major crimes
specifically requiring a certain bad state of mind would, in effect, be strict liability offenses
as applied to abnormal defendants." W. LAFAVE & A. ScOTTr, CRIMINAL LAw § 42 (1972).
Furthermore, proponents argue that if voluntary intoxication can negate a required state of
mind, as most states hold, then mental disease or defect should be allowed to negate a
required state of mind and thus reduce the degree of the offense. State v. Noel, 102 N.J.L.
659. 133 A. 274 (1926); R. PERKINS, CimINAL LAW 882-83 (2d ed. 1969); Note, 18 WASH. &
LEE L. REV. 118, 122-23 (1961). However, Missouri follows the minority rule that voluntary
intoxication cannot be a factor reducing the grade of offense. See State v. Shipman, 354 Mo.
265, 189 S.W.2d 273, 274 (1945); Hunvald, CriminalLaw in Missouri - The Need for Revision,
28 Mo. L. REv. 521, 537-38 (1963).

Published by University of Missouri School of Law Scholarship Repository, 1975

39

Missouri Law Review, Vol. 40, Iss. 2 [1975], Art. 5
MISSOURI LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 40

but rather they question its practicality." First, opponents claim
that juries are incapable of recognizing that a mental defect may not
be severe enough to justify a conviction of first degree murder, but
would justify a conviction of second degree murder or manslaughter. 27 Proponents respond that juries make line-drawing decisions in
the application of many legal doctrines," and, if the decision is
especially difficult in this case, it is the fault of legislatures who
have failed to make a clear distinction between the degrees of homicide.2"
Second, opponents claim that the doctrine would result in compromise verdicts. It is claimed that when a jury is divided on the
issue of legal insanity, it will decide to reduce the degree of the crime
rather than to convict or acquit the defendant." Proponents respond
that many opportunities exist already for compromise verdicts" and
that they are not necessarily harmful.32 Furthermore, it is argued
that the doctrine would prevent the situation where a sympathetic
jury, having only the option to acquit or convict, acquits the defendant rather than convict him for a crime for which the jury does not
feel the defendant is totally responsible.3
Third, opponents claim that the doctrine would result in less
protection to society because criminals with a mental disease or
defect not amounting to legal insanity are released from prison
sooner than a criminal who does not have a similar disease or defect. 4 Proponents argue that the solution is proper recognition of the
mental condition of the accused, and treatment as well as punishment. 3 In addition, it is argued that if the jury cannot reduce the
26. See W. LAFAVE & A. Scort, CmRdiuv LAW § 42 (1972); F. LINDMAN & D.
JR., THE MENTALLY DISABLED AND THE LAW 356 (1961).

MCINTYRE,

27. Id. See Commonwealth v. Hollinger, 190 Pa. 155, 42 A. 548, 549 (1899); State v. Van
Vlack, 57 Idaho 316, 65 P.2d 736 (1937); Note, 43 CORN. L.Q. 283, 284-85 (1957).
28. Note, 18 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 118, 123 n.41 (1961).
29. See note 26 supra; Weihofen & Overholser, Mental Disease Affecting the Degree of
a Crime, 56 YALE L.J. 959, 974 (1947).
30. See note 26 supra; Note, 43 ConN. L.Q. 283 (1957).
31. See note 26 supra; Player, The Mentally Ill in Missouri Criminal Cases, 30 Mo.
L. REV. 514, 524 (1965).
32. See W. LAFAvE & A. ScoTr, supra note 26.
33. See Fisher v. United States, 328 U.S. 463, 492 (1946) (dissent); F. LINDMAN & D.
MCINTYRE, JR., supra note 26; Weihofen & Overholzer, supra note 29; Note, 20 S. CAL. L. REV.
95, 97 (1946); Note, 22 LA. L. REV. 664, 667 (1962).
34. Fox v. State, 73 Nev. 241, 316 P.2d 924 (1957); Commonwealth v. Scott, 14 Pa.
D. & C. 191 (1930), rev'd on other grounds, 102 Pa. Super. 53, 156 A. 584 (1931). See I.
GOLDSTEIN, THE INSANITY DEFENSE 195-96, 202 (1967); Note, 43 CORN. L.Q. 283 (1957); Comment, CriminalLaw-PartialInsanity-EvidentiaryRelevance Defined, 16 RuTGERS L. REV.
174, 178 (1961); Note, WASH. & LEE L. REV. 118, 123 (1961). See also note 26 supra.
35. See Weihofen & OverhoIzer, supra note 29; Comment, Criminal Law-PartialIn-
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degree of crime, it will tend to acquit rather than convict and, thus,

38
turn criminals loose.

The majority of jurisdictions which have adopted the doctrine
of "diminished responsibility" have allowed evidence of mental disease or defect to reduce first degree murder to second degree murder. 7 Fewer courts have allowed such evidence to reduce murder to
manslaughter.38 In a very few instances, courts have indicated that
the "diminished responsibility" doctrine might be extended to nonhomicide cases."
Anderson clearly indicates that evidence of mental disease or
defect can reduce murder to manslaughter in Missouri. It would
seem that if murder can be reduced to manslaughter in Missouri,
then a fortiori first degree murder can be reduced to second degree.
The Missouri position on whether "diminished responsibility" can
be extended to nonhomicide cases is unclear."0 In order to bd logically consistent, the Missouri courts should extend the doctrine to
non-homicide crimes which are divided into degrees and which
require a particular mental state for each degree. Any evidence
which is relevant, including evidence of mental disease or defect
sanity-EvidentiaryRelevance Defined, 16 RUTGERS L. REv. 174, 180 (1961); Note, 22 LA. L.
REv. 664 (1962); Note, 18 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 118 (1961). See also note 26 supra.
36. See Comment, Insanity as a Defense in Criminal Law and Semi-Responsibility, 25
TEx. L. REv. 295, 301 (1947). See note 33 supra.
37. See, e.g., People v. Nicolaus, 65 Cal. 2d 866, 423 P.2d 787, 56 Cal. Rptr. 635 (1967);
Becksted v. People, 133 Colo. 72, 292 P.2d 189 (1956); State v. Donahue, 141 Conn. 656, 109
A.2d 364, cert. denied, 349 U.S. 926 (1954); State v. Gramenz, 256 Iowa 134, 126 N.W.2d 285
(1964); Starkweather v. State, 167 Neb. 477, 93 N.W.2d 619 (1958); State v. Di Paolo, 34 N.J.
279, 168 A.2d 401, cert. denied, 368 U.S. 880 (1961); State v. Padilla, 66 N.M. 289, 347 P.2d
312 (1959); State v. Adin, 7 Ohio Dec. Reprint 25, 1 SL Bull. 38 (1876); State v. Schleigh,
210 Ore. 155, 310 P.2d 341 (1957); State v. Fenik, 45 R.I. 309, 121 A. 218 (1923); State v.
Green, 78 Utah 580, 6 P.2d 177 (1931); Dejarnette v. Commonwealth, 75 Va. 867 (1881); State
v. Pressler, 16 Wyo. 214, 92 P. 806 (1907); W. LAFAVE & A. ScoTr, CRIMINAL LAW § 42 (1972);
Annot., 22 A.L.R.3d 1228 (1968).
38. See, e.g., People v. Wells, 33 Cal. 2d 330, 202 P.2d 53, cert. denied, 338 U.S. 836
(1949); State v. Anderson, 515 S.W.2d 534 (Mo. En Banc 1974); State v. Nichols, 3 Ohio App.
2d 271, 209 N.E.2d 750 (1965); State v. Schleigh, 210 Ore. 155, 310 P.2d 341 (1957); State v.
Green, 78 Utah 580, 6 P.2d 177 (1931); W. LAFAvE & A. ScoTT, CRIMn~AL LAW § 42 (1972);
Annot., 22 A.L.R.3d 1228 (1968).
39. See People v. Wilson, 261 Cal. App. 2d 12, 67 Cal. Rptr. 678 (1968); People v.
Chapman, 261 Cal. App. 2d 149, 67 Cal. Rptr. 601 (1968); People v. Taylor, 220 Cal. App. 2d
212, 33 Cal. Rptr. 654 (1963); Schwickrath v. People, 159 Colo. 390, 411 P.2d 961 (1966);
People v. Colavecchio, 11 App. Div. 2d 161, 202 N.Y.S.2d 119 (1960); W. LAFAvE & A. ScoTr,
CRIMINAL LAw § 42 (1972); Annot., 22 A.L.R.3d 1228 (1968).
40. It could be argued that since the Anderson court did not distinguish State v. Garrett, 391 S.W.2d 235 (Mo. 1965), on the basis that it involved robbery and not homicide, then
at least the Anderson court did not preclude the extending of "diminished responsibility" to
nonhomicide cases. See note 22 supra.
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not sufficient to constitute legal insanity, should be admitted to
negate the existence of a particular mental state.
Anderson represents a rejection of the Missouri courts' strained
"all or nothing" interpretation of section 552.030(3)(1). The Missouri Proposed Criminal Code, if adopted, would not change the rule
in Anderson because the proposed code incorporates Chapter 552,
RSMo 1969 by reference.4' Modem psychiatry and psychology have
long recognized that there is no clearcut distinction between the
sane and the insane, but rather varying degrees of mental aberration. " Anderson is consonant with this modem view and adopts the
better reasoned rule.
MARK E. JOHNSON
41. Mo. PROP. CRIM. CODE § 7.160 (1973).
42. See, e.g., Taylor, PartialInsanity as Affecting the Degree of Crime-A Commentary on Fisherv. United States, 34 CAL. L. REv. 625, 629, 632 (1946); Note, 18 WASH. & LEE
L. REv. 118, 123 (1961).
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INEFFECTIVENESS OF COUNSEL - THE DUTY TO

MAKE A REASONABLE PRETRIAL INVESTIGATION
McQueen v. Swenson'
On October 2, 1964, Roger Lee McQueen was found guilty of
second-degree murder by a jury and sentenced to life imprisonment.
After appealing unsuccessfully, 2 McQueen filed a motion under
Missouri Supreme Court Rule 27.26 collaterally attacking his conviction on the ground that he had been denied effective assistance
of counsel. 3 After an evidentiary hearing, the circuit court denied
relief and this was affirmed by the Missouri Supreme Court.4
McQueen then petitioned the United States District Court for the
Eastern District of Missouri for a writ of habeas corpus under 28
U.S.C. section 2254.1 On appeal from a denial of relief, the Eighth
Circuit Court of Appeals reversed and held that where it appeared
that defense counsel's sole preparation for trial was an interview
with McQueen, and that the counsel did not investigate any witnesses endorsed by the state, McQueen had met the burden of proving a violation of his constitutional right to effective assistance of
counsel. The court remanded the case to the district court to allow
McQueen the opportunity to establish prejudice which would justify
further relief.6
After the Supreme Court assured indigent defendants the right
to "effective" or "adequate" representation of counsel in federal
criminal prosecutions 7 and extended the sixth amendment right to
1. 498 F.2d 207 (8th Cir. 1974).
2. State v. McQueen, 399 S.W.2d 3 (Mo. 1966). Because McQueen was indigent and
not furnished counsel on appeal, the decision was set aside and counsel was appointed. Upon
resubmission to the Missouri Supreme Court, the judgment was again affirmed. State v.
McQueen, 431 S.W.2d 445 (Mo. 1968).
3. The charge of ineffectiveness of counsel is usually raised collaterally in Missouri
pursuant to Mo. Sup. CT. R. 27.26, but on occasion has been raised on direct appeal. See State
v. Cluck, 451 S.W.2d 103 (Mo. 1970); State v. Wilkenson, 423 S.W.2d 693 (Mo. 1968). For a
general discussion of theories and methods of obtaining post-conviction relief, see Bines,
Remedying Ineffective Representationin Criminal Cases: Departuresfrom Habeas Corpus,
59 VA. L. REV. 927 (1973); Waltz, Inadequacy of Trial Defense Representationas a Ground
for Post-ConvictionRelief in Criminal Cases, 59 Nw. U.L. Rav. 289 (1964).
4. McQueen v. State, 475 S.W.2d 111 (Mo. En Bane 1971). Justices Donnelly and Seiler
dissented.
5. McQueen v. Swenson, 357 F. Supp. 557 (E.D. Mo. 1973).
6. McQueen v. Swenson, 498 F.2d 207, 220 (8th Cir. 1974).
7. Powell v. Alabama, 287 U.S. 45 (1932). It is generally accepted that the assistance
of counsel referred to in Powell means "effective" or "adequate" assistance. See Reece v.
Georgia, 350 U.S. 85 (1955); White v. Ragen, 324 U.S. 760 (1945); Glasser v. United States,
315 U.S. 60 (1942); Avery v. Alabama, 308 U.S. 444 (1940). In order to meet constitutional
standards, the "counsel" must be a duly licensed attorney, and not an attorney-in-fact or a
layman. People v. Cox, 12 Ill. 2d 265, 146 N.E.2d 19 (1957); Higgins v. Parker, 191 S.W.2d
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counsel to state defendants through the due process clause of the
fourteenth amendment,8 courts sought an objective standard to determine when representation by counsel would satisfy the level of
effectiveness required by the Constitution. Eventually, the "mockery of justice" standard became the acceptable criterion.
Under the mockery of justice standard a criminal defendant
can obtain post-conviction relief on the ground that ineffective assistance of counsel "made the proceedings a farce and a mockery of
justice, shocking to the conscience of the court."' Criticized for its
stringent requirement,'0 the mockery of justice standard has been
replaced in a minority of jurisdictions by a standard of "reasonableness." 11 Other courts and writers have realized that whatever objec668, cert. denied, 327 U.S. 801 (1945). See also Derringer v. United States, 441 F.2d 1140 (8th
Cir. 1971) (refusal to admit defense counsel licensed in the state bar to the bar of the federal
district court where the trial was held did not constitute ineffective assistance of counsel);
People v. Sardo, 178 N.Y.S. 2d 691, 15 Misc. 2d 69, cert. denied, 363 U.S. 816 (1967) (ineffectiveness of counsel not established merely because defense counsel, although a licensed attorney, was not admitted to the state bar where the trial was held). Defense counsel must act
in the role of an advocate, and not perform merely as amicus curiae. See, e.g., Goodwin v.
Swenson, 287 F. Supp. 166 (W.D. Mo. 1968).
8. Gideon v. Wainwright, 372 U.S. 335 (1963). It is not clear whether the right to
effective assistance of counsel is required by the sixth or fourteenth amendments in state
proceedings. See note 53 infra.
9. Cardarella v. United States, 375 F.2d 222, 230 (8th Cir. 1967). More recently, the
same court couched the principle in other terms:
.. . [Defendant] must show actions of his lawyer which would constitute such
conscious conduct as to render pretextual the attorney's legal obligation to fairly
represent the appellant and circumstances which demonstrate that which amounts
to a lawyer's deliberate abdication of his ethical duty to his client.
Brown v. Swenson, 487 F.2d 1236, 1240 (8th Cir. 1973). See also Scalf v. Bennet, 408 F.2d
325, 327.28 (8th Cir. 1969) (when "the purported representation was only perfunctory, in bad
faith, a sham, a pretense, or without adequate opportunity for conference and preparation");
United States ex rel. Feeley v. Ragen, 166 F.2d 976 (7th Cir. 1948)(where the test is "virtually
no representation"); State v. Benson, 247 Iowa 406, 72 N.W.2d 438 (1955)("so ineffective as
to amount to no counsel at all"); State v. Caffey, 457 S.W.2d 657, 662 (Mo. 1970)("so woefully
inadequate as to shock the conscience"); Holbert v. State, 439 S.W.2d 507, 509 (Mo. 1969)
(must be a "breach of his legal duty faithfully to represent his client").
10. See Bines, Remedying Ineffective Representation in Criminal Cases: Departures
from Habeas Corpus, 59 VA. L. REv. 927 (1973). Another critic asserts that the vagueness of
the standard makes its application difficult. Finer, Ineffective Assistance of Counsel, 58
CoRN. L. REV. 1077 (1973). Still others argue that any attempt to formulate an absolute,
objective rule that would be determinative of effectiveness of counsel for any given case is
unrealistic. See Foster v. State, 502 S.W.2d 436 (Mo. App., D. St. L. 1973); McQueen v.
State, 475 S.W.2d 111 (Mo. En Banc 1971)(Judge Donnelly dissenting); Grano, The Right to
Counsel: CollateralIssues Affecting Due Process, 54 MINN. L. REv. 1175 (1970).
11. Moore v. United States, 432 F.2d 730, 736 (3d Cir. 1970) (defense counsel should
exhibit the "customary degree of skill possessed by attorneys who are reasonably knowledgeable of criminal law"); Coles v. Peyton, 389 F.2d 224 (4th Cir. 1968) (mockery of justice
standard replaced by specific requirements counsel obliged to follow); MacKenna v. Ellis, 280
F.2d 592, 599 (5th Cir. 1960) ("reasonably effective assistance"); United States v. DeCoster,
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tive test is employed to measure counsel effectiveness, the ultimate
question is whether the defendant received a "fair trial." 2
The courts have long viewed motions for post-conviction relief

on grounds of ineffective assistance of counsel with suspicion and
distaste. 3 Judges are reluctant to disturb criminal convictions in
collateral proceedings,'" and find displeasure in the task of evaluating the performance of another member of the bar." Many such
motions are termed "frivolous" and summarily dismissed."6 Even if
the court permits a hearing on the motion, relief is seldom granted.',
487 F.2d 1197, 1202 (D.C. Cir. 1973) (adoption of guidlines to insure defendant of "reasonably
competent assistance"). One critic suggests that to insure effectiveness the test should be the
reasonable effectiveness and ordinary skill and care of a competent criminal lawyer. Bines,
Remedying Ineffective Representationin Criminal Cases: Departuresfrom Habeas Corpus,
59 VA. L. REV. 927, 939 (1973).
12. Harried v. United States, 389 F.2d 281 (D.C. Cir. 1967); McCarthy v. State, 502
S.W.2d 397 (Mo. 1973). See also Grano, The Right to Counsel: CollateralIssues Affecting Due
Process, 54 MINN. L. REV. 1175, 1242 (1970); Anderson, Post-Conviction Relief in Missouri-Five Years Under Amended Rule 27.26, 38 Mo. L. REV. 1 (1973). It is representation
that affords the criminal defendant a fair trial that satisfies the constitutional requirements.
See, e.g., Betts v. Brady, 316 U.S. 455, 473 (1942) ("the fourteenth amendment prohibits
the conviction and incarceration of one whose trial is offensive to the common and fundamental idea of fairness and right").
13. With the development of due process over the past 30 years, the number of postconviction motions based on ineffectiveness of counsel has greatly increased. REPORT OF THE
ATTORNEY GENERAL'S COMMITTEE ON POVERTY AND THE ADMINISTRATION OF FEDERAL CRIMINAL

JUSTICE 52 (1963). Courts are cognizant that prisoners have discovered the ease of drafting
habeas corpus petitions, and thus view them with skepticism. See Diggs v. Welch, 148 F.2d
667, 669-70 (D.C. Cir.), cert. denied, 325 U.S. 889 (1945); United States v. Culbert, 215
F.Supp. 333, 335 (W.D. Mo. 1963). See also Waltz, Inadequacy of TrialDefense Representation as a Ground for Post-ConvictionRelief in Criminal Cases, 59 Nw. U.L. REv. 289 (1964).
14. See Bines, Remedying Ineffective Representation in Criminal Cases: Departures
from Habeas Corpus, 59 VA. L. REv. 927 (1973):
The mockery of justice standard simply reflects the view that the policy of finality
in criminal cases so outweighs the consequences of inferior defense work that only
the most serious errors and omissions by counsel deprive the defendant of a fair
trial.
Id. at 929.
15. See Commonwealth ex rel. Washington v. Maroney, 427 Pa. 599, 601, 235 A.2d 349,
352 (1967). A hearing based on a post-conviction motion claiming ineffectiveness of counsel
has been characterized as a "trial" of the defense counsel. State v. Benson, 247 Iowa 406, 410,
72 N.W.2d 438, 441 (1955).
16. Most of the 6000 habeas corpus petitions filed in federal district court in the decade
of 1949-1959 were deemed to be "patently frivolous" and summarily dismissed. REPORT Or
THE ATTORNEY GENERAL'S COMMITTEE ON POVERTY AND THE ADMINISTRATION OF FEDERAL CRIMI-

JuSTIcE 52 (1963). The Missouri Supreme Court granted no major relief on this ground
in the 130 appeals from 1968-1973, and ordered evidentiary hearings in only two cases. Out
of 20 cases filed in the federal courts in Missouri, 16 were summarily dismissed and one case
was granted only minor relief. Anderson, Post-Conviction Relief in Missouri-Five Years
Under Amended Rule 2726, 38 Mo. L. REv. 1 (1973).
17. Anderson, Post-Conviction Relief in Missouri-Five Years Under Amended Rule
27.26, 38 Mo. L. REV. 1 (1973).
NAL
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The court must evaluate a post-conviction claim of ineffective
assistance of counsel with respect to the overall concept of fundamental fairness. If the petitioner did not receive a fair trial, a new
trial must be granted.18 Thus, the court must scrutinize the conduct
of defense counsel to determine whether his performance was so
deficient as to deny the petitioner his constitutional right to a fair

trial.
The petitioner has the burden of proving the inadequacy of
counsel. The defense counsel is initially presumed adequate.2" Effec-

tive assistance does not require successful, 21 errorless 22 assistance, or
assistance that measures up to petitioner's notions of ability or competency. 23 Indigent defendants are not entitled to the appointment
of the best counsel available24 or to any particular attorney. 5 Criminal defendants are only entitled to assistance of counsel which is
"adequate" to insure a fair trial. Whether this constitutional right
of fairness is violated must be determined on a case by case basis.26
According to the court in McQueen, the conduct of counsel
must be viewed at two separate stages in the trial process: first, pre-

trial preparation; second, performance at the trial itself.
18. See, e.g., Kramer v. Alvis, 103 Ohio App. 324, 141 N.E.2d 489 (1956).
19. See Mitchell v. United States, 259 F.2d 787, 793 (D.C. Cir.), cert. denied, 358 U.S.
850 (1958); State v. Gleeman, 170 Minn. 197, 205, 212 N.W. 203, 207 (1927).
20. See, e.g., Farr v. United States, 314 F.Supp. 1125, adopted, 436 F.2d 975 (8th Cir.),
cert. denied, 402 U.S. 947 (1970).
21. See, e.g., United States v. Hammonds, 425 F.2d 597 (D.C. Cir. 1970). The mere fact
that defendant received the maximum sentence does not demonstrate ineffectiveness of counsel. State v. Caffey, 365 S.W.2d 607 (Mo. 1963). Counsel has the duty to insure defendant a
fair trial, and not necessarily to secure acquittal. Mitchell v. United States, 259 F.2d 787
(D.C. Cir. 1958), cert. denied, 358 U.S. 850 (1958).
22. See, e.g., State v. Caffey, 457 S.W.2d 657 (Mo. 1970). Where it was charged that
defense counsel was mistaken as to the maximum sentence defendant would receive by
pleading guilty, the court held there was no ineffectiveness of counsel. Pauley v. State, 487
S.W.2d 565 (Mo. 1972).
23. Conley v. Cox, 138 F.2d 786 (8th Cir. 1943). The courts do not inquire whether the
advice received was right or wrong, but seek to determine whether the advice was given
"within the range of competence demanded of attorneys in criminal cases." McMann v.
Richardson, 397 U.S. 759, 771 (1970).
24. State v. Caffey, 457 S.W.2d 657 (Mo. 1970).
25. State v. Williams, 419 S.W.2d 49 (Mo. 1967).
26. See Hodge v. State, 477 S.W.2d 126 (Mo. 1972):
It is impossible to enumerate what counsel in any given case should do to furnish
his client with effective assistance. In each case, the required activities will vary
depending on the offense, the facts, the client, and the lawyer.
Id. at 128. It is generally accepted, however, that if defense counsel operated under a conflict
of interest, ineffectiveness has been demonstrated and specific prejudice is not required to
be shown. See Lebron v. United States, 229 F.2d 16 (D.C. Cir. 1955), cert. denied, 351 U.S.
974 (1956); Craig v. United States, 217 F.2d 355 (6th Cir. 1954); Commonwealth v. Russell,
406 Pa. 45, 176 A.2d 641 (1962).
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The most crucial stage of the trial process begins after the indictment and ends prior to the trial; this is the period allotted
defense counsel for the preparation of the defense.27 It is during this
stage that counsel must conduct thorough investigations into the
factual and legal matters presented by the case in order to provide
the accused all available defenses. Without adequate investigation,
defense counsel cannot make the necessary informed judgments regarding defendant's initial plea and trial strategy" and thus the
representation may be rendered meaningless.29
Courts require a "reasonable" standard of conduct by defense
counsel during the pretrial stage of the proceedings. 5 The trial re27. To be effective, defense counsel must not limit his representation to the appearance
in the courtroom. Goodwin v. Swenson, 287 F. Supp. 166 (W.D. Mo. 1968). See also Powell
v. Alabama, 287 U.S. 45, 57 (1932) (finding ineffectiveness of counsel when defendants received virtually no legal assistance "during perhaps the most critical period of the proceedings
• . . that is to say, from the time of their arraignment until the beginning of their trial, when
consultation, thorough investigation and preparation were vitally important. . ."). Information counsel obtains during preparation for trial may influence counsel's decisions at the trial
itself. See Moore v. United States, 432 F.2d 730, 735 (3d Cir. 1970). See also AMIRIcAN BAR
ASSOCIATION PROJECT ON STANDARDS FOR CRIMINAL JUSTICE, STANDARDS RELATING TO THE PROSE-

CUTION FUNCTION AND THE DEFENSE FUNCTION, Comment to § 4.1, at 227-28 (Hereinafter, ABA
STANDARDS).

28. Any judgment of trial strategy defense counsel makes must necessarily be based
upon the facts of each case and the applicable law to be competent. See ABA STANDARDS,
supra note 27, Comment to § 4.1. See also, Smotherman v. Beto, 276 F.Supp. 579 (N.D. Tex.
1967).
Defense counsel has a duty to make reasonable investigations into the facts and applicable law to determine when a plea of guilty is advisable and to insure that a guilty plea is
voluntarily and intelligently made. See ABA STANDARDS, supra note 27, § 4.1: "The duty to
investigate exists regardless of the accused's admissions or statements to the lawyer of facts
constituting guilt or his stated desire to plead guilty." See Matthews v. State, 501 S.W.2d
44 (Mo. 1973)(adequacy of legal representation immaterial where pleas of guilty entered
unless counsel incompetent so as to affect issues of voluntariness and understanding); Roberts
v. State, 476 S.W.2d 490 (Mo. 1972)(plea of guilty based on desire to avoid the death penalty
held knowingly and intelligently made); Hall v. State, 496 S.W.2d 300 (Mo. App., D. St. L.
1973) (attorney merely performing as agent in plea bargaining process and not advising client
regarding law and facts of case held ineffective assistance of counsel).
Absent a reason to believe otherwise, counsel has no duty to conduct independent investigation into the mental condition of defendant. Chapman v. State, 506 S.W.2d 393 (Mo. 1974).
But when there is reason to suspect a possible mental defect in defendant, failure to adduce
proof of mental condition has been held to deny effective assistance of counsel. Owsley v.
Peyton, 368 F.2d 1002 (4th Cir. 1966).
29. See, e.g., Jones v. Cunningham, 297 F.2d 851 (4th Cir. 1962).
30. Goodwin v. Swenson, 287 F. Supp. 166 (W.D. Mo. 1968); Jackson v. State, 465
S.W.2d 642 (Mo. 1971). The court in McQueen clarified its holding in Cross v. United States,
392 F.2d 360 (8th Cir. 1968), by reiterating that "the failure to make a reasonable investigation may amount to ineffective assistance of counsel" under the mockery of justice standard.

498 F.2d at 217. The AMERICAN

BAR ASSOCIATION PROJECT ON STANDARDS FOR CRIMINAL JUSTICE,
STANDARDS RELATING TO THE PROSECUTION FUNCTION AND THE DEFENSE FUNCTION (Approved

Draft, 1971) cited with approval by the court, states the duty to investigate as follows:
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cord will not always reflect whether the investigation was reasonable, so courts have found it necessary to look beyond the record in
order to evaluate the performance of counsel. 31 The amount of time
counsel spends in preparation is relevant, but not conclusive;" the
circumstances of each case must still be evaluated in order to determine if counsel's investigation was reasonable.3
An individual is not denied effective assistance of counsel
merely because of what, in retrospect, appear to be errors of judgment in the handling of the defense.34 Nevertheless, there must be
a true exercise of counsel judgment and not an "abdication" of it.
It was an abdication of the duty to make a reasonable investigation
It is the duty of the lawyer to conduct a prompt investigation of the circumstances
of the case and explore all avenues leading to facts relevant to guilt and degree of
guilt or penalty. The investigation should always include efforts to secure information in the possession of the prosecution and law enforcement authorities.
Id. § 4.1. The fourth circuit specifically includes the duty to investigate in its list of requirements that overturned the mockery of justice standard:
Counsel must conduct appropriate investigations, both factual and legal, to determine if matters of defense can be developed, and to allow himself enough time for
reflection and preparation for trial.
Coles v. Peyton, 389 F.2d 224, 226 (4th Cir. 1968). Similarly, the District of Columbia circuit
includes the duty to investigate in its third guideline for the defense counsel:
(3) Counsel must conduct appropriate investigations, both factual and legal, to
determine what matters of defense can be developed .

.

. . This means that in

most cases a defense attorney, or his agent, should interview not only his own
witnesses but also those that the government intends to call, when they are accessible.
United States v. DeCoster, 487 F.2d 1197, 1204 (D.C. Cir. 1973). See also the CriminalJustice
Act, 18 U.S.C. § 3006A(a): "Representation under each plan shall include counsel and investigative expert and other services necessary to an adequate defense."
31. Moore v. United States, 432 F.2d 730 (3d Cir. 1970); United States v. Lett, 143 F.
Supp. 694 (S.D. Ohio 1955), aff'd, 236 F.2d 417 (6th Cir. 1956).
32. See, e.g.,United States v. Wight, 176 F.2d 376 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 338 U.S. 950
(1949):
Certainly the amount of time and effort of preparation required to provide effective
representation will vary with the nature of the charge, counsel's familiarity with
the law applicable, and the facts.
Id. at 379. It has been held that a total failure to consult with defendant did not amount to
ineffectiveness of counsel. Penn v. Smythe, 188 Va. 367, 49 S.E.2d 600 (1948). See also Fields
v. Peyton, 375 F.2d 624 (4th Cir. 1967) (ineffectiveness of counsel established when defendant
entered plea of guilty after short consultation with attorney in rear of the courtroom); Miller
v. State, 1 Md. App. 653, 232 A.2d 548 (1967) (single interview with defendant held adequate
representation without a showing of prejudice).
33. One writer has suggested that defense counsel should prepare and submit to the
trial judge a confidential worksheet showing the time spent in consultation and other investigation, the witnesses interviewed, and other pretrial preparation. While this may not totally
eliminate later claims of ineffective representation, he suggests this might abrogate frivolous
claims. Grano, The Right to Counsel: CollateralIssues Affecting Due Process, 54 MINN. L.
Rav. 1175 (1970).
34. See, e.g., Cardarella v. United States, 375 F.2d 222 (8th Cir. 1967); State v. Wilkerson, 423 S.W.2d 693 (Mo. 1968).
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that denied petitioner his right to effective assistance of counsel in
McQueen. 5 It is thus apparent that even under the mockery of
justice standard, counsel must make an adequate pretrial investigation in order to achieve effective assistance." Whether an investigation was "adequate" to guarantee defendant his constitutional right
to a fair trial must be determined by what was reasonable under the
37
circumstances.

In conducting the defense at trial, counsel is allowed wide discretion. Judgment of counsel regarding trial methods and strategy
will not be considered in retrospect as grounds for a finding of ineffective assistance.38 Similarly, it has been held that a mere showing
35. The Missouri Supreme Court has held that the failure of defense counsel to interview any of the prosecution's witnesses and investigate the scene of the crime did not prevent
the defendant from obtaining a fair trial. Because the defense was self-defense, the defendant
had been the only eyewitness and thus "consultation with the defendant. . . was basically
what was required in order to make proper and adequate presentation of the defense."
McQueen v. State, 475 S.W.2d 111, 114 (Mo. En Banc 1971). The federal court of appeals
disagreed and held that it was in precisely circumstances as these, where the defendant was
the only eyewitness, that outside investigation is "absolutely crucial" and supplies the only
means to corroborate defendant's factual assertions. 498 F.2d at 217. The court labeled
defense counsel's policy of never interviewing witnesses of the prosecution "absurd and dangerous," and not a mere exercise of counsel judgment, but an abdication of it. 498 F.2d at
216. See also Cross v. United States, 392 F.2d 360 (8th Cir. 1968) (ineffectiveness of counsel
established when counsel did not develop defendant's case because of his practice in not
representing a criminal defendant unless paid in advance).
36. The duty of defense counsel to make a reasonable investigation includes a good faith
effort to contact potential witnesses for the defense. Foster v. State, 502 S.W.2d 436 (Mo.
App., D. St. L. 1973). Failure to locate the witnesses after a good faith effort does not
constitute ineffectiveness of counsel. State v. Davis, 505 S.W.2d 115 (Mo. 1973); Colthorp v.
State, 466 S.W.2d 689 (Mo. 1971); State v. Woolbright, 449 S.W.2d 602 (Mo. 1970).
37. It has been held that the failure to make an investigation is not always a dereliction
of duty. State v. Turley, 443 F.2d 1313, 1317 (8th Cir. 1971). Nevertheless, the growing
number of cases that have resulted in a holding of ineffectiveness of counsel based on a lack
of pretrial investigation suggests that when the omission results in prejudice in the presentation of the defense, the omission was not reasonable, and a new trial must be granted. See
Brizendine v. Swenson, 302 F., Supp. 1011(W.D. Mo. 1969)(counsel ignorant of law of defendant's right to independent psychological examination); Goodwin v. Swenson, 287 F. Supp.
166 (W.D. Mo. 1968)(lack of investigation resulted in nondisclosure of medical diagnosis of
psychosis on the same day defendant gave oral statement to police); Smotherman v. Beto,
276 F. Supp. 579 (N.D. Tex. 1967) (with defense of insanity, counsel did not seek or obtain
copy of a medical report); People v. Ibarra, 386 P.2d 487, 34 Cal. Rptr. 863 (1963) (lack of
preparation resulted in the loss of a crucial defense); People v. Morris, 3 Ill. 2d 437, 121
N.E.2d 810 (1954) (public defender unaware of basic criminal procedure statute); Hillman v.
State, 234 Ind. 27, 123 N.E.2d 180 (1954)(defense counsel failed to interview witnesses);
Abraham v. State, 228 Ind. 179, 91 N.E.2d 358 (1950) (defense counsel failed to consult with
defendant prior to trial and conducted no investigation).
38. See, e.g., Cardarella v. United States, 375 F.2d 222 (8th Cir. 1967); Huff v. State,
267 Ala. 282, 100 So.2d 769 (1958); Newton v. Commonwealth, 333 Mass. 523, 131 N.E.2d
749 (1956).
39. State v. Dean, 400 S.W.2d 413 (Mo. 1966); State v. Howard, 383 S.W.2d 701 (Mo.
1964). Courts often describe alleged counsel omissions or errors as within the realm of judg-
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of mistakes, omissions, lack of experience, or other subjective deficiencies does not establish inadequacy of counsel." It is only when
there has been an abdication of the defense function,4 1 a breach of
ment and thus not conduct reviewable as a basis for finding ineffectiveness of counsel. See
Tanner v. United States, 401 F.2d 281, 284 (8th Cir.), cert. denied, 393 U.S. 1109 (1968)
(counsel's failure to object resulted from his considered exercise of judgment); Wilson v.
State, 268 Ala. 86, 105 So. 2d 66 (1958)(within counsel's discretion to have no witnesses testify
for defendant and fail to cross-examine prosecutrix of rape case); Coney v. State, 491 S.W.2d
501, 510 (Mo. 1973)(it was "not outside the realm of reason" to conclude that avoidance of
the death penalty was the best possible result and therefore failure to make motion for new
trial was not ineffectiveness of counsel).
40. See, e.g., Edwards v. United States, 256 F.2d 707, (D.C. Cir.), cert. denied, 358 U.S.
857 (1958):
Mere improvident strategy, bad tactics, mistake, carelessness or inexperience do
not necessarily amount to ineffective assistance of counsel, unless taken as a whole
the trial was a 'mockery of justice.'
Id, at 708. Thus the following omissions have not been grounds for relief on a claim of
ineffectiveness of counsel: (1) failure to make objections. United States ex rel. Gist v. Rundle,
371 F.2d 407 (3d Cir. 1967); State v. Harris, 425 S.W.2d 148 (Mo. 1968); (2) failure to make
opening and closing statements. Harroald v. State, 438 S.W.2d 202 (Mo. 1969); (3) failure to
attack the indictment. Hall v. United States, 410 F.2d 653 (4th Cir.), cert. denied, 396 U.S.
970 (1969); (4) failure to move for a new trial. White v. State, 430 S.W.2d 144 (Mo. 1968);
(5) failure to move for a change of venue. Brown v. State, 465 S.W.2d 563 (Mo. 1971); (6)
failure to request instructions. Mason v. State, 468 S.W.2d 617 (Mo. 1971); (7) failure to
challenge the jury on voir dire. State v. Franklin, 379 S.W.2d 526 (Mo. 1964); (8) failure to
discuss jury waiver with defendant. Brown v. State, 465 S.W.2d 563 (Mo. 1971); (9) failure
to appeal. Patrick v. United States, 310 F. Supp. 1267 (E.D. Mo. 1970). If, however, the
omission is a result of an abdication of the role of defense counsel, or a breach of a legal duty
owing defendant, ineffectiveness has sometimes been demonstrated. See note 41 and accompanying text infra. Courts have demonstrated great reluctance to find ineffectiveness of
counsel for failing to suppress evidence allegedly acquired in violation of constitutional rights.
See, e.g., Redus v. Swenson, 339 F. Supp. 571 (E.D. Mo.), aff'd, 468 F.2d 606 (8th Cir.), cert.
denied, 411 U.S. 933 (1972). See also Edwards v. United States, 256 F.2d 707 (D.C. Cir. 1958):
Appellant does not try to say he did not do the act charged. He pleads only that,
unknown to him, he might have been able to suppress the truth as to certain
evidence of his crime, and thus, perhaps defeat justice.
Id. at 710 (court's emphasis). The amount of counsel's legal experience is not in itself an
indication of the effectiveness of counsel. The question is the performance of counsel in the
particular case being challenged. Cardarella v. United States, 375 F.2d 222 (8th Cir. 1967);
State v. Schaffer, 454 S.W. 2d 60 (Mo. 1970). Basing a claim of ineffectiveness on the physical
condition of counsel has been successful. Michel v. Louisiana, 350 U.S. 91 (1953) (age); Hanye
v. State, 99 Ga. 212, 25 S.E. 307 (1896)(iliness); O'Brien v. Commonwealth, 115 Ky. 608, 74
S.W. 666 (1903)(intoxication). It seems clear, however, that if the physical condition of
counsel results in a denial of a fair trial, ineffectiveness has been demonstrated. Waltz,
Inadequacy of TrialDefense Representationas a Groundfor Post-ConvictionRelief in Criminal Cases, 59 Nw. U.L. REv. 289 (1964). See also State v. Keller, 223 N.W. 698 (1929) (ineffectiveness demonstrated when defense counsel was so drunk that he failed to introduce any
evidence, submitted no instructions, and made no argument to the jury).
41. See Johns v. Smyth, 176 F. Supp. 949 (E.D. Va. 1959)(defense counsel's failure to
give closing argument held ineffectiveness of counsel because such failure was based on
counsel's conscience and belief that defendant was lying). But see Wilson v. State, 268 Ala.
86, 105 So. 2d 66 (1958)(ineffectiveness was not demonstrated although counsel called no
witnesses and failed to cross-examine any witnesses presented by the prosecution).
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a legal duty owing defendant,42 or when defense counsel's performance at trial demonstrates "gross incompetence,"4 that defendant
has been denied a fair trial and post-conviction relief should be
granted.
Careful scrutiny of the trial record is necessary to establish
inadequacy of counsel at the trial stage." Frequently the level of
performance will be apparent on the face of the record. In some
cases, however, omissions or mistakes that appear to be the result
of faulty trial strategy may in fact be the consequence of inadequate
preparation.4 5 Thus, the evaluation of counsel's trial conduct may
also require a search beyond the record to ascertain whether the
performance at trial was ineffective or inadequate."
According to the court in McQueen, when a conviction is attacked on the ground of ineffective assistance of counsel, the court
should employ a two-step method of analysis to determine whether
relief must be granted.4 7 First, the court must consider the stage of
42. Failure to investigate specific witnesses when requested to do so by defendant is a
breach of a legal duty owed defendant and thus constitutes ineffectiveness of counsel. Jones
v. State, 491 S.W.2d 233 (Mo. 1973). Ineffectiveness of counsel is also demonstrated when
counsel fails to advise defendant of his right to appeal or fails to file appeal when requested
to do so. Williams v. United States, 402 F.2d 548 (8th Cir. 1968). See also Roper v. Territory,
7 N.M. 255, 33 P. 1014 (1893) (public intimidation caused counsel not to request a change in
venue).
43. See People v. Nitti, 312 Ill. 73, 143 N.E. 448 (1924)(gross incompetence demonstrated after court reprimanded defense counsel several times and had to explain numerous
points of law to him); People v. Gardiner, 303 Ill. 204, 135 N.E. 422 (1922)(where defense
counsel let in large amounts of irrelevant evidence, made improper argument,and was patently unfamiliar with the rules of evidence it was held that defendant was denied a fair trial);
Wilson v. State, 222 Ind. 63, 51 N.E.2d 848 (1943)(court found that the representation rendered was worse than no representation whatsoever when defense counsel acquiesced in a
witness's refusal to comply with a subpoena, criticized the defendant before the jury, and
failed to object when the judge cast doubt on the credibility of the defendant); Sanchez v.
State, 199 Ind. 235, 157 N.E. 1 (1927) (in murder trial, attorney failed to subpoena material
witnesses and failed to object to the use of an interpreter who was a friend of the deceased).
But when incompetence of defense counsel is patent at trial, the court and the prosecution have a duty to intervene and protect the rights of the defendant. United States ex rel.
Darcy v. Handy, 203 F.2d 407 (3d Cir. 1953); Brizendine v. Swenson, 302 F. Supp. 1011 (W.D.
Mo. 1969)(the trial judge should take judicial notice of the incompetence of defendant to
stand trial); United States ex rel. Hall v. Ragen, 60 F. Supp. 820, 823-24 (N.D. Ill.
1945) (prosecution "should not have permitted the farce to go farther"); FED. R. CRim. P. 52(b) Plain
Error:"Plain errors or defects affecting substantial rights may be noticed although they were
not brought to the attention of the court."
44. See ExparteKramer, 61 Nev.174, 122 P.2d 862, 877, appeal dism'd, 316 U.S. 646
(1947).
45. Not every mistake or omission is the result of intelligent, strategic weighing of
alternatives. Some mistakes stem from deficiencies in the skill, experience, or in the amount
of investigation and preparation. See Craig, The Right to Adequate Representationin the
Criminal Process: Some Observations, 22 Sw. L.J. 260 (1968).
46. See note 31 supra.
47. 498 F.2d at 218.
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the trial process at which the alleged error occurred. Measured
against the appropriate level of performance required for that stage,
the court must determine whether there has been a failure to perform some essential duty owed by the defense attorney to his client.
Second, if such a failure has occurred, a hearing must be conducted
to ascertain whether the failure resulted in prejudice to the criminal
defendant." The court in McQueen held that prejudice resulting
from inadequate pretrial investigation is established by petitioner
showing that a reasonable investigation could have uncovered admissible evidence which "would have proved helpful" to the defendant either on cross-examination or in his case-in-chief at the original trial." If petitioner cannot so demonstrate, he must be permitted to show changed circumstances beyond his control which make
it impossible to produce such evidence. Upon such a showing, the
burden is shifted to the state to prove any error was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt."0
While holding that criminal defendants are entitled to reasonable pretrial investigations, the court in McQueen did not decide
whether the right to effective assistance of counsel is derived from
the due process clause of the fourteenth amendment or from the
more demanding "right to counsel" provision of the sixth amendment." Furthermore, the court did not decide whether different
standards of performance need be applied when counsel is retained
48. The finding of prejudice is essential before relief may be granted because of the
"harmless error" rule enunciated in Chapman v. California, 386 U.S. 18 (1967). Judge Seiler,
in his dissenting opinion in the Missouri Supreme Court decision, would not require a showing
of prejudice in cases where defendant had no counsel at all. 475 S.W.2d at 123. According to
the court in McQueen, however, there is an "important and obvious difference" between
having ineffective counsel and having no counsel. 498 F.2d at 218.
49. 498 F.2d at 220. The court in McQueen appears to have lessened petitioner's burden
of proof in showing the harm caused by the ineffectiveness of counsel. See People v. Morris,
3 111. 2d 437, 121 N.E.2d 810 (1954) (petitioner must show substantial prejudice, without which
the outcome would probably have been different); Barker v. State, 505 S.W.2d 448 (Mo. App.,
D. Spr. 1974) (defendant deprived of substantial rights); Monteer v. State, 506 S.W.2d 25
(Mo. App., D.K.C. 1974) (failure to investigate deprived defendant of evidence of substance).
50. 498 F.2d at 220.
51. It appears that invoking the sixth amendment's more demanding standards often
abrogates the mockery of justice standard. See, e.g., United States v. Hammonds, 425 F.2d
597 (D.C. Cir. 1970); Moore v. United States, 432 F.2d 730 (3d Cir. 1970). See generally,
Bines, Remedying Ineffective Representationin Criminal Cases: Departuresfrom Habeas
Corpus, 59 VA. L. Rav. 927 (1973); Waltz, Inadequacy of Trial Defense Representationas a
Ground for Post.ConvictionRelief in Criminal Cases, 59 Nw. U.L. REv. 289 (1964). There is
an indication that Missouri courts favor the invocation of the stricter standards of the sixth
amendment. See, e.g., Goodwin v. State, 502 S.W.2d 269 (Mo. 1973); Knight v. State, 491
S.W.2d 282 (Mo. 1973); Anderson v. State, 487 S.W.2d 455 (Mo. 1972); Gaitan v. State, 464
S.W.2d 33 (Mo. 1971).
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rather than appointed, 2 or when the attack on the conviction is
direct, rather than in a collateral proceeding.13 Nevertheless, because the question is whether petitioner was denied his right to a
fair trial, the standard of performance should be the same regardless
of the procedural setting of the attack or how counsel became associated with the case.
Whether the standard for effectiveness of counsel is phrased in
terms of "mockery of justice" or of "reasonableness," the ultimate
determination should be whether a criminal defendant has received
a fair trial. Although counsel is allowed much discretion and a wide
margin of error in the conduct of the defense, it is apparent from
McQueen that defense counsel must not abdicate his responsibilities and must conduct reasonable pretrial investigations. Without
a reasonable pretrial investigation, the representation becomes perfunctory, and the criminal defendant may be denied his constitutional right to a fair trial.
DAviD L. BAYLARD
52. Under older case law, defendant was bound by the actions of his retained attorney
on two possible theories. The first was an agency theory based on the defendant having
selected the attorney. Under the second theory a privately retained attorney did not involve
state action which was considered necessary to invoke the protection of the fourteenth amendment. The trend is clearly away from the older thinking. Waltz, Inadequacy of Trial Defense
Representationas a Ground for Post-ConvictionRelief in Criminal Cases, 59 Nw. U.L. REV.
289 (1964). The fifth, sixth, and ninth circuits have found the same constitutional standard
applies whether defense counsel has been retained or appointed. See Porter v. United States,
298 F.2d 461 (5th Cir. 1962), rehearingen banc granted, Sept. 5, 1973; Goodwin v. Cardwell,
432 F.2d 521 (6th Cir. 1970). The Missouri Supreme Court has indicated that the same
standard is applicable whether defense counsel is appointed or retained. See, e.g., State v.
Woolbright, 449 S.W.2d 602 (Mo. 1970); Holbert v. State, 439 S.W.2d 507 (Mo. 1969).
53. Following McQueen, the court had an opportunity to answer this question, but
declined because the issue had not been briefed. Garton v. Swenson, F.2d (8th Cir.
1974). The court did indicate, however, that petitioner would bear a heavier burden of proving
ineffectiveness of counsel in a collateral proceeding than he would on direct appeal because
of the impact of time and its effect on the memories of witnesses. See also United States v.
DeCoster, 487 F.2d 1197 (D.C. Cir. 1973); Bruce v. United States, 379 F.2d 113 (D.C. Cir.
1967).
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PREADOPTIVE PARENTS-RIGHT TO DUE
PROCESS HEARING PRIOR TO CUSTODY
TERMINATION
In re Bestel
Tammy Louise Beste was an illegitimate child. The rights of
her natural mother had been terminated and custody of the child
transferred to Family Services, St. Louis County Welfare Office, for
foster care and placement in an adoptive home. On September 2,
1971, at the request of Family Services, the juvenile court approved
the transfer of custody of the child to Barry and Marjorie Shapiro
as prospective adoptive parents. While Mr. and Mrs. Shapiro had
preadoptive custody of the child, they experienced marital difficulties which eventually came to the attention of Family Services. As
a result of these difficulties, on May 17, 1972, physical custody of
the child was taken away from Mr. and Mrs. Shapiro. On May 30,
1972, upon its own motion and without a hearing, the court transferred legal custody of the child from Mr. and Mrs. Shapiro back
to Family Services.'
Mr. Shapiro subsequently moved to have the transfer of custody order of May 30 set aside on the grounds that it was inserted
in the record without a hearing or notice and in violation of the due
process clause.' This motion was denied. However, after a conference between Mr. Shapiro's attorney and the court, the court advised him that in its opinion the Shapiros were entitled to a hearing
on the right of the court to remove the child from their custody.4 A
full-blown hearing was held without further pleadings, after which
the court affirmed its prior order transferring custody back to Family Services. Mr. Shapiro appealed the action of the trial court' on
the grounds that the court order transferring legal custody was made
without a hearing in violation of the due process clause and that the
subsequent hearing improperly shifted the burden of proof to him.
The Missouri Supreme Court refused to decide the merits of
his contentions and dismissed the appeal on the grounds that his
appeal was not properly taken. The court said that his appeal was
not authorized by the Juvenile Code7 because under its provisions,8
1. 515 S.W.2d 530 (Mo. 1974).
2. Id. at 531-32.
3. Id. at 532.

4. Id.
5. The Missouri Supreme Court was unable to determine which order Shapiro was
appealing from, but the disposition of the case makes that determination unnecessary. Id. at

533.
6. Id. at 533.
7.

Ch. 211, RSMo 1969.

8.

§§211.261, 211.021(5), RSMo 1969.
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only a natural parent or an adoptive parent whose adoption has
been finalized may appeal. The court also held that the appeal was
not authorized under the Adoption Code' because it was "premature.""0 The court suggested that the proper procedural remedy
would be for Shapiro to file a petition for adoption and then appeal
after the petition is denied."
Beste raises two basic questions. The first is whether prospective adoptive parents, who have had legal custody of a child transferred to them by court order, have a right to notice and a hearing
before their legal custody of the child may be terminated. If this
question is answered in the affirmative, then the second question is
how such prospective parents can assert this right.
Whether prospective adoptive parents have a due process right
to notice and a hearing before their legal custody of the child may
be terminated has never been litigated in Missouri. Missouri cases,
however, clearly support the proposition that a natural parent has
these rights.'"
The United States Supreme Court has also given the parental
status procedural due process protection.'3 For example, in Stanley
v. Illinois,'4 the Supreme Court held that, pursuant to due process,
an unwed father was entitled to a hearing on his fitness as a parent
before his child could be taken from him.' 5 The Court reached its
conclusion by balancing the father's interest in having a hearing
against the state's interest in summary disposition. The unwed father's interests, those of a father in his child,'" were found to warrant
protection. 7 The state's interests were found to be the protection of
the welfare of children primarily,'" and also the avoidance of admin9. Ch. 453, RSMo 1969.
10. 515 S.W.2d at 533.
11. Id. at 533-34.
12. See, e.g., In re Lipschitz, 466 S.W.2d 183 (St. L. Mo. App. 1971); Fernbaugh v.
Clark, 163 S.W.2d 999 (K.C. Mo. App. 1942).
13. See, e.g., Stanley v. Illinois, 405 U.S. 645 (1972); Armstrong v. Manzo, 380 U.S. 545
(1965).
14. 405 U.S. 645 (1972).
15. Id. at 649.
16. The Court describes the father's interest in retaining custody as being "cognizable
and substantial." Id. at 652.
17. "The private interest here, that of a man in the children he has sired and raised,
undeniably warrants deference and, absent a powerful countervailing interest, protection."
Id. at 651.
18. The Court said:
For its part, the State has made its interest quite plain: Illinois has declared that
the aim of the Juvenile Court Act is to protect "the moral, emotional, mental, and
physical welfare of the minor and the best interests of the community" and to
"strengthen the minor's family ties whenever possible, removing him from the

Published by University of Missouri School of Law Scholarship Repository, 1975

55

Missouri Law Review, Vol. 40, Iss. 2 [1975], Art. 5

MISSOURI LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 40

istrative inconvenience. 9 However, the Court pointed out that the
state's interest in promoting child welfare would actually be damaged if, due to the absence of a hearing, a fit parent were separated
from his child.2" Thus the state's primary interest in the promotion
of child welfare was promoted by a hearing. In view of this conclusion, the Court, in effect, weighed the interests of the father and the
interests of the child 2 against the state's remaining interest in administrative convenience, and found the state's interest to be insuf22
ficient to justify denying the father a hearing.
The reasoning in Stanley should be equally applicable to the
termination of the legal custody of prospective adoptive parents.23
Stanley indicates that the question of the existence of due process
hearing rights is to be decided by balancing the competing interests.
custody of his parents only when his welfare or safety or the protection of the public
cannot be adequately safeguarded without removal. . . ." Ill.
Rev. Stat., c. 37,
§701-2.
Id. at 652.
19. "The establishment of prompt efficacious procedures to achieve legitimate state
ends is a proper state interest worthy of cognizance in constitutional adjudication." Id. at
656.
20. The Court said:
We observe that the State registers no gain towards its declared goals when it
separates children from the custody of fit parents. Indeed if Stanley is a fit father,
the State spites its own articulated goals when it needlessly separates him from his
family.
Id. at 652-53.
21. It is important to note that the Court does consider the interests of the child in its
balancing of interests process, although it is the due process rights of the parent, apparently,
that are being adjudicated. For example, at one point the Court makes the following statement:
Procedure by presumption is always cheaper and easier than individualized
determination. But when, as here, the procedure forecloses the determinative issues
of competence and care, when it explicitly disdains present realities in deference
to past formalities, it needlessly risks running roughshod over the important interests of both parent and child. It therefore cannot stand.
Id. at 656-57 (emphasis added).
22. Id. at 658.
23. It is important to note that this discussion is limited to the procedural due process
rights of prospective adoptive parents and does not attempt to deal with the rights of foster
parents. The foster parent program in Missouri (sections 453.300 et seq., RSMo 1975 Supp.)
is substantially different in terms of procedures and goals than adoption. The basic idea
behind the foster parent program is to provide temporary, short-term care for children. In
many cases, children who have been placed in foster homes are later returned to the care and
custody of their natural parents. Before receiving a child, foster parents must sign a written
agreement describing the temporary nature of their status with the child. Legal custody is
almost never transferred to the foster parents, but remains with the natural parents or the
placement agency. The agreement also provides that the foster parents cannot be considered
for adoption of their foster child without the agency's consent. Section 453.070, RSMo 1969,
does, however, grant foster parents who have had their foster child for 18 months or more a
statutory preference for adoption placement if they so desire.
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In the preadoptive custody situation, the interests to be balanced,
those of the state and those of the parents, are quite similar to those
involved in Stanley.
Missouri cases clearly state that the state's primary interest in
adoption or custody proceedings is promoting the interests and welfare of the child 24 Although psychological literature relevant to the
kind of brief separation that would result from a child's unnecessary
removal from the prospective parents' home is scarce, the literature
that is available indicates that this type of separation is a traumatic
experience for the child. 25 In view of these data, the Stanley rationale would indicate that Missouri's avowed primary interest in protecting the welfare of children is not advanced if the prospective
adoptive parents are fit parents and yet are deprived of custody as
a result of the absence of a hearing to determine fitness. Hence,
Missouri's interest in promoting child welfare would favor the holding of a hearing.
24. See, e.g., In re Brooks v. Division of Children's Services, 411 S.W.2d 276, 281 (St.
L. Mo. App. 1967); In re Adoption of McKinzie, 275 S.W. 2d 365, 372 (Spr. Mo. App. 1955).
25. For example, in V. BERNARD, ADOPUON 75 (1964) the statement is made that even
as early as the age of six months,
the infant has learned to recognize his mother as a unique individual. He therefore
reacts with anxiety to separation from her, and to being with a stranger. If intense
and prolonged, this separation anxiety may be psychologically injurious to the older
infant.
Also, in C. HEiNICKE & I. WESTHEriER, BaEF SEPARAT1ONS (1965), a study by the Child

Development Research Unit of the Tavistock Institute of Human Relations and the Tavistock
Clinic is published. The study documents typical responses of two-year-olds to separations
of from two to twenty weeks from their parents, during which time the children were cared
for in a nursery. The initial uneasiness which the children experienced upon arriving at the
nursery became more pronounced as soon as their parents left them. Parental visits after two
weeks of separation produced unhappiness and resignation, excessive cheerfulness, and selfinjury in the children. While the children were less affectionate towards their parents, the
memory of the separation from them apparently remained painful as many reenacted the
initial separation. Attachment to parental substitutes was minimal even though the children
increasingly developed favorites among the nurses who cared for them. The children initially
suffered difficulty in sleeping and often refused to cooperate in the routine of the nursery.
Also eight of the ten children studied became ill during separation, and all but one experienced a breakdown in their toilet training. The children used fewer words than when they
had first entered the nursery.
Even after the children rejoined their parents, the difficulties continued. All of the
children initially displayed a lack of affection for their mothers. Five of the children displayed
ambivalence towards their mothers (being first hostile and defiant, then affectionate) for a
subsequent period of twelve weeks or more. While most of the children appeared to have
completely recovered from the separation after twenty weeks, a few continued to have difficulties. The study concluded that it was the loss of the specific relationship to the mother
and father that constitutes the essential and most significant aspect of the traumatic event.
Thus, although the children in the study eventually recovered from their experience, the
study strongly indicates that an unnecessary separation of a child from its prospective adoptive parents is not in the best interests of the child and should be avoided where possible.
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The interests of the prospective adoptive parents also favor the
holding of a hearing. Their interests are incomplete and imperfect
and, therefore, are less compelling than the interests of natural
parents in their natural children. Yet it should be noted that the
Supreme Court has recognized that an individual interest of a nature that normally would be protected by procedural due process
does not lose that protection simply because it is incomplete, imperfect, or lacks certain elements usually associated with it."s In effect,
the Court has recognized a sliding scale of due process rights. Pursuant to this sliding scale approach, the nature and extent of the
due process rights to which the individual is entitled varies depending upon the circumstances, the adverse interests, and the quality
and importance of the right being protected." Thus, the fact that
the prospective parent's interest is admittedly not as strong as the
natural parent's does not mean that the prospective parents are not

entitled to any due process protection, but only that they may not
2

be entitled to as great a degree of protection.

1

26. See, e.g., Morrissey v. Brewer, 408 U.S. 471, 480-82 (1972). In Morrissey, parolees
were held to be entitled to due process protections before their parole could be revoked. The
Court said:
the liberty of a parolee, although indeterminate, includes many of the core values
of unqualified liberty and its termination inflicts a "grievous loss" on the parolee
and often on others. . . . By whatever name, the liberty is valuable and must be
seen as within the protection of the Fourteenth Amendment. Its termination calls
for some orderly process, however informal.
Id. at 482.
27. For example, in Goss v. Lopez, U.S.-., 95 S.Ct. 729 at 740 (1975), the Court
held, in connection with a suspension of students for ten days or less, that due process requires
that the student be given notice of the charges against him and an opportunity for an informal
hearing to present his side of the story. However, the Court pointed out that longer suspensions or expulsions may require more formal procedures and that it is possible that in unusual
situations, although involving only a short suspension, something more than rudimentary
procedures will be required. Id. at 741.
In Morrissey v. Brewer, 408 U.S. 471 (1972), the Court held that, although a parolee in a
parole revocation proceeding is not entitled to "the full panoply of [due process] rights" due
a defendant in a criminal prosecution, 408 U.S. at 480, he is entitled to certain less formal
due process protections including a hearing. 408 U.S. at 482-90. See note 25 supra.
In Goldberg v. Kelly, 397 U.S. 254 (1970), the Court held that the due process rights of
a welfare recipient did not require such formalities as a "judicial or quasi-judicial trial" before
his welfare payments could be terminated, but did require notice and an opportunity to
defend by confronting adverse witnesses and presenting his own arguments and evidence
orally. 397 U.S. at 266-68.
28. See, for example, the quote from Morrissey v. Brewer note 25 supra. As applied
to the Beste-type child custody situation, the reasoning of Morrissey would indicate that since
the interests of prospective parents include many of the "core values" of unqualified and
complete parenthood, they should, therefore, receive due process protection. The parents'
emotional and economic expenditures have already begun although the relationship is subject
to closer control and observation than legal parenthood. The interests of prospective parents
were described by one court as follows:
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Competing against these two interests which favor a hearing is
the state's interest in procedural convenience which favors summary termination of custody. This interest was similarly involved
in Stanley. It would seem, after balancing the competing interests
in the Beste situation, that the combined interests in favor of a
hearing, the interests of the prospective parents29 and of the state
in child welfare,30 will substantially outweigh the conflicting interest
of the state in procedural convenience. Thus the Stanley analysis
would dictate that notice and a hearing prior to termination of legal
custody are necessary to satisfy due process.' California has applied
this type of analysis and reached the same conclusion. 2
Gain of a child for adoption fulfills the prospective parents' most cherished hopes.
The event marks the onset of a close and meaningful relationship. The emotional
investment does not await the ultimate decree of adoption. Love and mutual dependence set in ahead of official cachets, administrative or judicial. The placement
initiates the "closest conceivable counterpart of the relationship of parent and
child."
C.V.C. v. Superior Court, 29 Cal. App. 3d 909, 916, 106 Cal. Rptr. 123, 128 (1973).
29. This is true even though the interests of prospective parents are less compelling than
those of natural parents.
30. The interest of the state in child welfare, is the state's admitted primary interest
in the matter.
31. There could, of course, be situations where, because of imminent danger to the
child's health or safety, the state's interest would require summary termination of physical
custody. But even in those situations where physical custody must be transferred summarily,
it would seem that the prospective adoptive parents should be entitled to a hearing before a
court order is issued terminating their legal (as distinguished from physical) custody. After
all, the child would be out of danger as soon as he is taken from the prospective parents'
physical custody. Hence, the state would then have no additional interest (other than procedural convenience) in the subsequent transfer of legal custody being entered without a hearing.
32. C.V.C. v. Superior Court, 29 Cal. App. 3d 909, 106 Cal. Rptr. 123 (1973). The facts
of this case are very similar to those in Beste and the relevant aspects of California's adoption law are similar to Missouri's. The few differences between C.V. C. and Beste would
seem to make Beste a stronger case for due process protection than C.V. C. For example,
in Beste, legal custody of the child had been transferred by a court order to the prospective
parents, while in C. V.C., the legal custody had never been transferred away from the placement agency.
The court in C. V.C. held that prospective adoptive parents have a status entitling them
to procedural due process protections. The court said:
The Fourteenth Amendment's guarantee of due process of law requires notice and
an opportunity to be heard before an individual suffers governmental deprivation
of a fundamental interest. Entitlement to procedural protections depends upon the
extent to which "grievous loss" is threatened; it requires the court to weigh the
individual's interest in avoiding the loss against the governmental interest in summary adjudication. . . . The formalities and procedural requisites for the hearing
may vary according to the quality of the governmental function, the character of
the private interest and the nature of the subsequent proceedings.
29 Cal. App. 3d at 915-16, 106 Cal. Rptr. at 127-28. After applying this analysis, the court
held that the combined interests of the child and of the prospective parents in having a
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Assuming that prospective adoptive parents are entitled to due
process notice and hearing protections33 before their legal custody
can be terminated, the next problem is to determine how that right
can be asserted in Missouri. The court in Beste states that the order
terminating the prospective parents' custody and transferring custody back to the placement agency is not a final order and hence

may not be appealed.3 Although this proposition is supported by

the precedent of the two cases cited in Beste, neither Beste nor the
two cited cases provide any analysis or reasoning in support of that
holding. It would certainly seem to be an illogical and unproductive

result.
To the extent relevant here, Missouri law provides that an aggrieved party may appeal from any "final judgment."3 A "final
judgment" has been held to be one that disposes of all parties and
all issues and leaves nothing for further determination.3 In view of

that test, the denial of custody to prospective adoptive parents
could arguably be considered a final order, and therefore appealable. Under section 453.080, RSMo 1969,u nine months legal custody is required before an adoption decree can be entered. 39
Thus, the transfer of custody back to the placement agency prior to
the completion of the nine month custody period has the effect of
making further adoption proceedings by these prospective parents
hearing outweighed the state's interests in summary termination of custody and interpreted
the due process requirements accordingly.
33. To say that prospective adoptive parents are entitled to a "hearing" raises other
important questions. These include such questions as what the nature of the hearing should
be, who should have the burden of proof, and what standard should be applied in making
the determination. No reported case has as yet considered these problems. This writer would
speculate that the hearing should be expedited since the welfare of a child is involved, and
could be fairly informal. The parties should be allowed to retain counsel at their own expense
to represent them if they wish. The burden of proof should be on the placement agency, the
party trying to change the status quo. The standard to be applied by the court in determining
whether custody is to be terminated probably should be the long-term best interests of the
child since that is frequently the standard in child custody and adoption cases.
34. 515 S.W.2d at 533.
35. The two cases cited in Beste are In re Adoption of L.L.V. and S.A.V., 457 S.W.2d 2
at 3 (Spr. Mo. App. 1970) and In re Smith, 331 S.W.2d 169 at 171 (St. L. Mo. App. 1960).
Neither of these cases provide anything more than the bare assertion that such orders are
not appealable because they are not final. There are no supportive reasoning or arguments
at all.
36. See § 512.020, RSMo 1969.
37. Elliott v. Harris, 423 S.W.2d 831, 832 (Mo. En Bane 1968); Scheid v. Pinkham, 395
S.W.2d 166, 168 (Mo. 1965); Bennett v. Wood, 239 S.W.2d 325, 327-28 (Mo. 1951).
38. § 453.080, RSMo 1969.
39. See, e.g., State ex rel. M.L.H. v. Carroll, 343 S.W.2d 622, 627 (St. L. Mo. App.
1961); State ex rel. Dorsey v. Kelly, 327 S.W.2d 160, 161 (Mo. En Banc 1959).
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a futile and unproductive waste of time in most cases." Hence, an
order terminating legal custody arguably disposes of all parties, all
issues, and leaves nothing for further determination.
The court in Beste suggests that prospective parents can appeal
under the Adoption Code after their petition for adoption has been
denied.4 This implies that once the adoption petition has been denied because of lack of the requisite nine month custody, the prospective parents would be able to challenge the validity of the summary custody termination in an appeal from the denial of their
adoption petition. However, it is possible that the appellate court
might decline to consider the due process issue and affirm merely
on the grounds that appellants did not have the nine months of
custody which section 453.080 establishes as a prerequisite for adoption." Judicial reluctance to reach constitutional issues if there is
any other ground for decision is well known. 3 Hence, the possibility
of challenging the summary nature of the custody termination in an
appeal of the denial of the adoption petition, which is the avenue
of appeal which Beste suggests, is at best unsure and timeconsuming.
It would appear necessary, therefore, to look for other remedies
by which the right to a due process hearing could be asserted in
Missouri courts at the appellate level. Although no case is directly
in point, several cases indicate that a writ of habeas corpus might
accomplish that result. In Missouri and many other states, habeas
corpus has been used to adjudicate whether someone holds custody
of a child wrongfully, and, if so, to obtain a transfer of custody to
the rightful custodian. In In re Lipschitz,41habeas corpus was used
by a natural parent to attack a court order changing a post-divorce
child custody decree which had been obtained by the other natural
parent without a court hearing. The court invalidated that order on
40. In view of the nine month requirement, the only thing that the court in its subsequent consideration of the adoption petition could possibly do in favor of the prospective
parents is to reinstate their custody of the child. This is not very likely since the court
considering the adoption petition is the same court that a short time earlier terminated their
custody. Even if the court did wish to reinstate the custody of these parents, the placement
agency may have already placed the child with other prospective parents. In any case, the
psychological harm to the child discussed in note 24 supra has already been done.
41. 515 S.W.2d at 533-34.
42. One Missouri case went so far as to describe the lack of nine month custody as a
"jurisdictional" defect which would indicate that the appellate court should affirm without
considering anything else if the nine months custody has not been satisfied. State ex rel.
Dorsey v. Kelly, 327 S.W.2d 160, 161 (Mo. En Banc 1959). It seems likely, however, that the
court would retreat from this position if it would otherwise be decisive in a case.
43. See, e.g., City of St. Joseph v. Roller, 363 S.W.2d 609, 612 (Mo. 1963).
44. 466 S.W.2d 183 (St. L. Mo. App. 1971).
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the grounds that the absence of a hearing violated the complaining
parent's due process rights.4 5 Habeas corpus has also been used in
several adoption cases by natural parents to attack adoption decrees
entered without the required consent" or notice." In another case,4"
habeas corpus was used by the legal custodian, a child care agency,
to attack an adoption decree entered without allowing the agency
to exercise certain preliminary rights granted it by statute. This
case is significant in that it indicates that habeas corpus in child
custody cases is not an exclusive remedy of natural parents, but
may also be used by other custodians to attack orders affecting child
custody on the grounds that the orders were entered without
complying with the custodian's legal rights.
Another possible remedy is the writ of prohibition. Prohibition
is used to prevent, in advance, a judicial officer from acting in excess
of his jurisdiction. It has been held49 that prohibition may be used
by a natural parent to prohibit a transfer of custody to the other
natural parent without a hearing in a post-divorce custody modification situation. The court said that in transferring custody without
a hearing, the lower court exceeded its jurisdiction," and prohibition was therefore appropriate.51 Prohibition would have the added
advantage that it could be used to block the
termination of custody
52
before it occurs rather than after the fact.
In conclusion, Beste raises questions to which Missouri law
gives no definitive answers. However, it seems likely from the foregoing cases and analysis that prospective adoptive parents should
be entitled, pursuant to procedural due process, to notice and a
hearing before their legal custody of a child can be terminated by a
judicial transfer of custody. The assertion of these rights was made
more difficult by the holding in Beste that the termination of custody is not a final, appealable order. This holding seems illogical
and unproductive and probably should be reconsidered. In the interim, habeas corpus and prohibition are possible remedies for the
assertion of those rights by prospective adoptive parents.
DUANE G. HENRY
45. See also Fernbaugh v. Clark, 236 Mo. App. 1200, 163 S.W.2d 999 (K.C. Mo. App.
1942).
46. See, e.g., State ex rel. Renner v. Alford, 343 Mo. 576, 122 S.W.2d 905 (1938);
Rochford v. Bailey, 322 Mo. 1155, 17 S.W.2d 941 (En Banc 1929).
47. See,'e.g., In re Adams v. Brown, 237 S.W.2d 232 (St. L. Mo. App. 1951).
48. Child Saving Institute v. Knobel, 327 Mo. 609, 37 S.W.2d 920 (En Banc 1931).
49. State ex rel. Tatum v. Ramey, 134 Mo. App. 722, 115 S.W. 458 (K.C. Ct. App. 1909).
50. See also Foster v. Foster, 300 S.W.2d 857, 868 (St. L. Mo. App. 1957).
51. 134 Mo. App. at 725-26, 115 S.W. at 459. See also In re Lipschitz, 466 S.W.2d 183,
185 (St. L. Mo. App. 1971).
52. Thus preventing the psychological damage to the child discussed in note 24 supra.
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REAL PROPERTY-PRE-EMPTIVE RIGHT OR RIGHT
OF FIRST REFUSAL-VIOLATIVE OF THE RULE
AGAINST PERPETUITIES?
Gilmore v. Letcher
Plaintiffs, owners of a lot in Lake Tapawingo subdivision, Jackson County, Missouri, sought specific performance of a pre-emptive
right to purchase three and a half lots owned by defendent Letcher.
Letcher owned Lot 62, which was adjacent to plaintiffs' Lot 61, and
two and a half other lots which adjoined Lot 62 but were not adjacent to plaintiffs' lot. Letcher's house was located partly on Lot 62
and partly on her other lots.2 All lots in the subdivision were subject
to the following restrictive covenant of record:
No sale of said lot shall be consummated without giving at least
15 days written notice to Grantor, and the owners of the two lots
adjoining said lot on the sides, of the terms thereof; and any of
them shall have the right to buy said land on such terms .... I
On May 29, 1970, Letcher contracted to sell all of her lots to
the Spaldings for $13,000, and on July 10, 1970, notified plaintiffs
of the proposed sale and asked for a waiver of their right to purchase
the land. Plaintiffs notified Letcher on July 14, 1970, that they
wished to exercise their pre-emptive right, and enclosed a deposit
of $300. On July 20, 1970, Letcher returned the $300 check to plaintiffs, rejecting their offer to purchase because the sale to the Spaldings had been abandoned. The following day, Letcher entered into
a new agreement with the Spaldings omitting Lot 62, but at the
same price and on the same terms as the original sale.'
The trial court denied relief to plaintiffs, finding that Letcher
had the right to withdraw from the original sale, and that plaintiffs'
right of pre-emption was limited to Lot 62. Plaintiffs appealed asserting that their pre-emptive right extended to the entire three and
a half lots. DefendantLetcher asserted, inter alia, that the covenant
was an unreasonable restraint on alienation. The Kansas City District of the Missouri Court of Appeals reversed the judgment on the
grounds that the covenant was not an unreasonable restraint on
alienation. The court held that the plaintiffs' pre-emptive right was
operative when they were notified of the pending sale, 5 and that this
1.
2.

508 S.W.2d 257 (Mo. App., D.K.C. 1974).
Id. at 258.

3. Id.
4. Id. at 261.
5. Id. at 257. The court cites Kershner v. Hurlburt, 277 S.W.2d 619, 623 (Mo. 1955),

389
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pre-emptive right extended to all three and a half lots.
The covenant involved in Gilmore v. Letcher was part of the
contract between the subdivider and the defendant. Plaintiffs and
defendant had each contracted with the subdivider, but not with
each other. If the plaintiffs possessed a pre-emptive right, it was
because they were beneficiaries of a third party beneficiary contract,
or because the covenant between Letcher and the subdivider was of
a type that runs with the land, and was therefore enforceable by
prior or subsequent grantees of the subdivider.
The English courts do not allow a plaintiff to enforce a contract
to which he is not a party,' and the English courts also refuse to
enforce at law or in equity an affirmative covenant running with the
land against an assignee of the covenantor.7 The majority of American jurisdictions permit third party beneficiaries to enforce a contract.8 Furthermore, the majority of American courts enforce affirmative covenants running with the land9 if: (1) there is privity of
estate; (2) the promise touches and concerns the land; and (3) the
parties intend that the covenant run with the land."0 Since Shelley
when the owner reached a decision to sell, the offeree "had a short-lived option to purchase
in accordance with the terms of his agreement." When the holder of the pre-emption exercises
his option, the contract becomes complete and enforceable. Barling v. Horn, 296 S.W.2d 94,
98 (Mo. 1956); 5A CoRIaN, CoNmcS § 1197, at 377 (1964).
6. 4 CORBIN, CONTRACTS § 836 (1951).
7. Tulk v. Moxhay, [1848 2 Phill. Ch. 774, 41 Eng. Rep. 1143; Haywood v. Brunswick
Permanent Ben. Bldg. Soc., [1881] L.R., 8 Q.B. 403. In Tulk, an affirmative covenant running with the land was enforced in equity against an assignee of the covenantor. The Haywood
case subsequently limited Tulk by holding that an assignee of the covenantee could not
enforce an affirmative covenant against the assignee of the covenantor.
8. RESTATEMENT (SEcoND) OF CONTRACTS, Ch. 6, Intr. Note at 284 (1973); RESTATEMENT
OF PROPERTY, Ch. 46, Intr. Note at 3244 (1944) which states:
By virtue of the third party beneficiary doctrine, the law of covenants running with
the land has now so expanded as to include among the successors who may enforce
the promise. . . the successors of third parties who were beneficiaries of the promise . .
9. The weight of authority favors enforcement in equity against purchasers with notice.
See 2 AMERICAN LAw OF PROPERTY § 9.36 (Casner ed. 1952); Annot., 68 A.L.R.2d 1022 (1959);
20 Am. Jun. 2d Covenants § 37 (1965). New Jersey had refused to enforce such covenants
but has recently adopted the majority position. Petersen v. Beekmere, Inc., 117 N.J. Super.
155, 283 A.2d 911 (Ch. Div. 1971).
10. For equitable relief, privity of estate is generally not required. Privity of estate in
Missouri is defined as a mutual or successive relationship to the same rights of property. Cook
v. Tide Water Assoc. Oil Co., 281 S.W.2d 415 (Spr. Mo. App. 1955). See 2 AiERICAN LAW OF
PROPERTY § 9.27 (Casner ed. 1952).
For a discussion of intent, and whether the covenant "touches and concerns the land,"
see Neponsit Property Owners' Ass'n, Inc. v. Emigrant Industrial Savings Bank, 278 N.Y.
248, 15 N.E.2d 793 (1938); C. CLARK, REAL COVENANTS AND OTHER INTERESTS WHICH RUN WITH
THE LAND (1929). It apparently makes no difference whether the person seeking to enforce the
covenant is a prior or subsequent grantee of the subdivision developer. Berger, A Policy
Analysis of Promises Respecting the Use of Land, 55 MINN. L. REV. 167, 196 (1970).
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v. Kraemer," however, American courts have lacked the power to
enforce covenants, conditions or equitable use restrictions designed
to prevent purchase or occupancy of land by members of minority
races. A pre-emptive scheme of the type involved in Gilmore v.
Letcher, imposed as part of a general plan of subdivision development, is likely to be so designed. The opinion does not discuss this
point.
Gilmore v. Letcher is consistent with the view of the
Restatement of Property that a pre-emption provision is not an
invalid restraint on alienation if conditioned on paying the price at
which the obligor is willing to sell to another. 2 The Restatement
deems such a provision to be a restraint on alienation, void if applicable to an estate in fee simple, if sale at a fixed or lower price is
required.13 Beets v. Tyler,"4 upon which the court relied, held valid
a pre-emptive provision limited in duration to twenty years and-to
a price at which the obligor would sell to another. The Missouri
courts apparently will enforce even a fixed price provision if it is
reasonable and will not operate beyond the period of the Rule
Against Perpetuities. 5
The pre-emptive provision involved in Gilmore was unlimited
in duration. A pre-emptive provision is an option exercisable on the
condition precedent of the owner's willingness to sell.1" Options to
11.

334 U.S. 1 (1948). See also Barrows v. Jackson, 346 U.S. 249 (1953); Annot., 3

A.L.R.2d 441 (1948).
Where the provision was in the forfeiture form and the time period limited, the Missouri
Supreme Court held them valid and enforced the forfeiture. Koehler v. Rowland, 275 Mo.
573, 205 S.W. 217 (1918).

12. RESTATEMENT OF PROPERTY § 413(1) (1944) which states:
(1) A promissory restraint or forfeiture restraint on the alienation of a legal estate
in land which is in the form of a provision that the owner of the estate shall not
sell the same without first offering to a designated person the opportunity to meet,
with reasonable expedition, any offer received, is valid, unless it violates the rule
against perpetuities.
13. RESTATEMENT OF PROPERTY § 413(2). However, a majority of the courts have upheld
such provisions, Mercer v. Lemmens, 230 Cal. App. 2d 167, 40 Cal. Rptr. 803 (1964); Blair v.
Kingsley, 128 So. 2d 889 (Fla. App. 1961); Dodd v. Rotterman, 330 Ill. 362, 161 N.E. 756
(1928); Lantis v. Cook, 342 Mich. 347, 69 N.W.2d 849 (1955) (the court refused to accept the
Restatement position on fixed price, and followed Windiate v. Leland, 246 Mich. 659, 225
N.W. 620 (1929)); Hall v. Crocker, 192 Tenn. 506, 241 S.W.2d 548 (1951); Kamas State Bank
v. Bourgeois, 14 Utah 2d 188, 380 P.2d 931 (1963) (the court cites Restatement § 406 as
allowing fixed price, but Restatement § 413(2) seems to control as § 406 applies to conditions). See also Schnebly, Restraint Upon the Alienation of Property,.6 ANIMCAN LAW OF
PROPERTY § 24.56 (Casner ed. 1952).
14. 365 Mo. 895, 290 S.W.2d 76 (1956).
15. Kershner v. Hurlburt, 277 S.W.2d 619 (Mo. 1955). The court in Kershner refused
to accept the Restatement position that a fixed price should always invalidate the agreement,
choosing instead to consider whether the price is reasonable under the circumstances.
16. L. SIMm & A. SMITH, THE LAW OF FuTuRE IwrERFsTs § 1154 (1956); Boyer & Spiegal,
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sell land, being specifically enforceable, give the optionee an equitable interest in the nature of a springing executory interest. The Rule
Against Perpetuities was developed to invalidate executory interests
which may spring up or shift at a time beyond lives in being plus
twenty-one years. 7 It is clear that an ordinary option is void if it is
exercisable beyond the period of the Rule Against Perpetuities.'S An
ordinary option is conditioned only on the optionee's decision to
buy; a pre-emptive option is conditioned on both the optionee's
decision to buy and the optionor's willingness to sell. There is no
reason why a pre-emptive option should be exempt from the Rule
Against Perpetuities unless it falls within one of the recognized
exceptions to that Rule. Conditions subsequent are excepted from
the Rule in this country,19 but, as such conditions may enure only

to the benefit of the grantor, the plaintiff Gilmore would not have
been aided by this exception to the Rule. It is arguable that the preemptive provision involved in Gilmore was exempt from the Rule
Against Perpetuities as a covenant running with the land.' This
exception, however, is probably limited to negative covenants and
covenants to pay money. Numerous decisions have held that preemptive provisions which may operate beyond the period of the Rule
Against Perpetuities violate that Rule.21 The opinion in the princiLand Use Control: Pre-emptions, Perpetuities,and Similar Restraints, 20 U. MIAMI L. REV.
148, 155 (1965).
17. The Rule Against Perpetuities is in force in Missouri, Lockridge v. Mace, 109 Mo.
162, 18 S.W. 1145 (1891), and is clearly stated in St. Louis Union Trust Co. v. Kelly, 355 Mo.
924, 935, 199 S.W.2d 344, 350 (1947):
The rule against perpetuities is that no interest within its scope is good unless it
must vest, if at all, not later than twenty-one years after some life or lives in being
at the creation of the interest, to which period is added the period of gestation, if
gestation exists.
See Eckhardt, Rule Against PerpetuitiesIn Missouri, 30 Mo. L. REv. 27 (1965). The Rule
has been modified by statute. See statute quoted note 23 infra; Eckhardt, PerpetuitiesReform By Legislation, 31 Mo. L. Ray. 56 (1966).
18. Schnebly, Restraint Upon the Alienation of Property,6 AMERIcAN LAW OF PROPERTY
§ 24.56 (Casner ed. 1952); L. SIMEs & A. SMrrH, supra note 16, § 1244.
19.

L. SIMEs & A. SMrrH, supra note 16, § 1238.

20. A covenant running with the land may be enforced in equity absent a showing of
privity of estate as long as the requirements of intent and that the covenant touch and concern
the land are met. See note 10 supra. It is questionable whether an affirmative covenant of a
personal nature touches and concerns the land. Neponsit Property Owners' Ass'n, Inc. v.
Emigrant Industrial Savings Bank, 278 N.Y. 248, 15 N.E.2d 793 (1938); C. CLARK, supra note
10; L. SIMEs & A. SMrrH, supra note 16, § 1244.

21. H. J. Lewis Oyster Co. v. West, 93 Conn. 518, 107 A. 138 (1919) (repurchase agreement for a fixed price plus value of any improvements was void as against the Rule Against
Perpetuities); Missouri State Highway Comm'n v. Stone, 311 S.W.2d 588 (Spr. Mo. App.
1958) (the court looked at the duration and purpose for which it was imposed, and indicated
the Rule Against Perpetuities would apply, but chose to invalidate it as a restraint on aliena-
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pal case does not mention the perpetuities problem, which should
have been the main basis of the decision.
If, as seems probable, the pre-emptive provision involved in
Gilmore violated the Rule Against Perpetuities, it would be wholly
void under that Rule in absence of statutory change.2 A 1965 Missouri statute, however, empowers the court to reform a limitation
which violates the Rule Against Perpetuities to the extent necessary
to avoid violation of the Rule and, as so reformed, to enforce the
limitation.23 The opinion in Gilmore does not reveal whether the
pre-emptive provision was entered into before or after the effective
date of this statute. If it was after the effective date, the court
should have reformed the pre-emptive provision to limit its duration
to the life of one of the original parties plus twenty-one years.
REx V. GUMP

tion); Ross v. Ponemon, 109 N.J. Super. 363, 263 A.2d 195 (1970) (repurchase agreement was
held void under both rules); McGaffey v. Walker, 379 S.W.2d 390 (Tex. Civ. App. 1964)
(repurchase agreement void as a restraint on alienation). Contra,Rountree v. Richardson, 268
Ala. 448, 108 So. 2d 152 (1959) (repurchase agreement was treated as a condition subsequent,
and not within the Rule Against Perpetuities). See Annot., 40 A.L.R.3d 920 (1971).
22. Atchison v. City of Englewood, 170 Colo. 295, 493 P.2d 297 (1970); Neustadt v.
Pearce, 145 Conn. 403, 143 A.2d 437 (1958); Saulsberry v. Saulsberry, 290 Ky. 132, 160 S.W.2d
654 (1942); Melcher v. Camp, 435 P.2d 107 (Okla. 1967).
However, some courts have construed the agreement so as to avoid the Rule Against
Perpetuities altogether. Campbell v. Campbell, 313 Ky. 249, 230 S.W.2d 918 (1950) (the court
preferred to interpret the agreement so as to avoid the Rule Against Perpetuities); Peters v.
Hoover, 31 Pa. D. & C.2d 641 (1963) (no mention of heirs and assigns in agreement, so court
considered it personal).
23. Section 442.555, RSMo 1969 reads in part:
2. When any limitation or provision violates the rule against perpetuities or a rule
or policy corollary thereto and reformation would more closely approximate the
primary purpose or scheme of the grantor, settlor or testator than total invalidity
of the limitation or provision. . . the limitation or provisions shall be reformed, if
possible, to the extent necessary to avoid violation of the rule or policy and, as so
reformed, shall be valid and effective. ...
See Eckhardt, PerpetuitiesReform By Legislation, 31 Mo. L. REv. 56 (1966).
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SCHOOL DESEGREGATION-THE INTERDISTRICT
REMEDY FOR METROPOLITAN SEGREGATION
GREATLY LIMITED
Milliken v. Bradley1
The Detroit branch of the NAACP and certain individual parents and students brought a class action in federal district court
against the Governor and Attorney General of Michigan, the State
and the Detroit Boards of Education, and others. It was alleged that
these public officials and their predecessors in office had caused the
Detroit public school system to be segregated on the basis of race.
It was also alleged that a state statute' unconstitutionally interfered
with a voluntary Detroit School Board plan3 for high school desegregation. After a lengthy trial,' the district court found that the Detroit School District's conduct had contributed to establishing and
maintaining racial segregation within the Detroit school system.
The court also found that the state of Michigan had committed
several constitutional violations in its responsibility for general supervision of public education.' In addition the court imposed vicarious liability upon the state for the acts of the Detroit Board of
Education based upon the Michigan Constitution,7 Michigan Su1.
2.

U.S. -, 94 S. Ct. 3112 (1974).
Act No. 48, § 12, PUBLIC ACTS OF MICHIGAN, 1970; MICHIGAN CONMED LAWS § 388.182.

This statute was designed to delay the Detroit School Board's desegregation plan until elections could be held to oust the Board members who voted in favor of the plan. See, Bradley
v. Milliken, 433 F.2d 897, 900-01 (6th Cir. 1970).
3. This was called the April 7, 1970 plan and had been adopted by the Detroit Board
of Education. For details of this plan, see Bradley v. Milliken, 433 F.2d 897, 898 (6th Cir.
1970).
4. Plaintiffs initially asked for a preliminary injunction to restrain the enforcement of
Act No. 48, supra note 2. The district court denied the injunction on the grounds that there
was no proof that Detroit had a dual segregation school system. 94 S. Ct. at 3116-17. The
court of appeals reversed and remanded to the district court for trial on the merits.
5. Bradley v. Milliken, 338 F. Supp. 582 (E.D. Mich. 1971). Among specific acts of de
jure segregation found to have been engaged in by the Detroit Board of Education were the
following: (1) creation and maintenance of optional attendance zones which allowed white
pupils to escape identifiably Negro schools; (2) failure to draw attendance zones which would
enhance desegregation; (3) busing of Negro pupils to predominantly Negro schools instead of
the closer white schools to relieve overcrowded classroom situations; and (4) constuction of
new schools in either all-Negro or all-white neighborhoods so that the new schools opened as
one-race schools. Id. at 587-89.
6. Id. at 589.
7. MICH. CONST., art. VIII, § 2 provides in relevant part: "The legislature shall maintain
and support a system of free public elementary and secondary schools as defined by law."
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preme Court decisions holding that a school district is a state
agency8 not inherently a part of local government,9 and Michigan
statutes regulating school construction."0 The district court ordered
the Detroit Board of Education to submit desegregation plans limited to the city of Detroit. The state defendants were ordered to
submit desegregation plans encompassing the three-county Detroit
metropolitan area. The 85 school districts in these outlying counties
were not parties to the lawsuit." There was no allegation that these
districts had committed any constitutional violations.
After considering the plans submitted, the district court found
that the Detroit-only desegregation plans "would not accomplish
desegregation within the corporate geographical limits of the city"' 2
and that "it must look beyond the limits of the Detroit school district for a solution to the problem."'" Consequently the court combined 53 suburban school districts and Detroit into a single "desegregation area" and appointed a panel to submit a desegregation
plan encompassing the entire desegregation area. The court held
that it was not necessary to find that the outlying districts have
committed acts of de jure segregation. 4 "School district lines are
simply matters of political convenience and may not be used to deny
constitutional rights."15
The Sixth Circuit Court of Appeals affirmed the finding of de
jure segregation on the part of the Detroit Board of Education 8 and
the state defendants. It also agreed that a comprehensive metropolitan area plan was required. 8 The court noted that a plan limited
to the city of Detroit "would result in an all black school system
immediately surrounded by practically all white suburban school
systems .
8.

.

.

."I

Furthermore, a metropolitan remedy was held to

Attorney General v. Lowrey, 131 Mich. 639, 644, 92 N.W. 289, 290 (1902).

9. Attorney General v. Detroit Board of Educ., 154 Mich. 584, 590, 118 N.W. 606, 609
(1908).
10. MICH. STAT. ANN. § 15 (1961) requires the State Board of Education to appove all
school building construction plans.
11. The outlying school districts were permitted to intervene after the court began
considering a metropolitan area desegregation plan.
12. 94 S.Ct. at 3121. The district court was concerned with the problem of "white flight"
from the Detroit school system.
13. Id.

14. Id.
15. Id.
16. Bradley v. Milliken, 484 F.2d 215, 221-38 (6th Cir. 1973). See also Note, Segregative
Intent and the Single Governmental Entity in School Desegregation,1973 DuKE L.J. 1111.
17. Bradley v. Milliken, 484 F.2d 215, 239-41 (6th Cir. 1973).
18. Id. at 249.
19. Id. at 245.
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be within the equity powers of the district court because "the State
controls the instrumentalities whose action is necessary to remedy
the harmful effects of the State acts."2 The United States Supreme
Court reversed and remanded for the prompt formulation of a
Detroit-only desegregation plan.21 The Court held that "before the
boundaries of separate and autonomous school districts may be set
aside by consolidating the separate units for remedial purposes or
by imposing a cross-district remedy, it must first be shown that
there has been a constitutional violation within one district that
22
produces a significant segregative effect in another district.
In the landmark case of Brown v. Board of Education[Brown
/, 3 the United States Supreme Court stated that "in the field of
public education, the doctrine of 'separate but equal' has no
place. '24 State-imposed segregation of public schools was held to
deny fourteenth amendment equal protection,a as well as violate
fifth amendment due process. 2 A subsequent related case, Brown
i,27 made it clear that dual systemsa were to be ended with all
deliberate speed.29 The Court also imposed on the district courts the
duty of assuring good faith compliance with Brown I by state and
school officials." The lower federal courts were allowed flexibility in
shaping their remedies, including the power to revise school districts.3 '
20. Id. at 249. In reaching this result, the court sought to distinguish Bradley v. School
Bd., 382 U.S. 103 (1965), on the grounds that in Virginia local boards have exclusive power
to operate public schools. 484 F.2d at 251. See text accompanying note 52 infra.
21. 94 S.Ct. at 3131.
22. Id. at 3127.
23. Brown v. Board of Educ., 347 U.S. 483 (1954).
24. 347 U.S. at 495. The Court in Brown I overruled Plessy v. Ferguson, 163 U.S. 537
(1896). Plessy had upheld racial segregation on railroad cars where the facilities involved were
"equal but separate." This doctrine was subsequently applied in many other contexts.
Annot., 94 L.Ed. 1121, 1123 (1950).
25. Brown v. Board of Educ., 347 U.S. 483 (1954).
26. Boiling v. Sharpe, 347 U.S. 497, 500 (1954). Here, the Court extended Brown I to
the District of Columbia through the due process clause of the fifth amendment.
27. Brown v. Board of Educ., 349 U.S. 294 (1955).
28. The term "dual system" refers to a system providing separate educational facilities
for black and white students,
29. Brown v. Board of Educ., 349 U.S. 294, 301 (1955). For other cases where the Court
has rejected efforts to halt prompt desegregation, see Northcross v. Board of Educ., 397 U.S.
232 (1970); Alexander v. Holmes Bd. of Educ., 396 U.S. 19 (1969); Carter v. West Feliciana
Parish School Bd., 396 U.S. 226 (1969); Bradley v. School Bd., 382 U.S. 103, 105 (1965);
Griffin v. County School Bd., 377 U.S. 218, 229 (1964).
30. Brown v. Board of Educ., 349 U.S. 294, 300 (1955).
31. . . . courts may consider problems related to administration, arising from the
physical condition of the school plant, the school transportation system, personnel,
revision of school districts and attendance areas into compact units to achieve a
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The Court later unanimously reaffirmed Brown I but left unanswered the question of how far the state had to go to meet its Brown
I obligation. 2 This question was partially answered by the Court in
3 and Monroe v. Board of
Green v. County School Board"
Commissioners.4 Green struck down a "freedom of choice" plan35
and held that the state must not only eliminate race as a criteria
for school attendance but must also take affirmative action to eliminate pure de jure 5 segregation "root and branch." 7 Monroe reiterated the Court's position in Green and invalidated a "free transfer"
provision. 8 The net result of these two cases was to place upon pure
de jure states an affirmative duty to establish unitary school systems. 9 Swann v. Charlotte-MecklenburgBoard of Education0 gave
a district court a large amount of discretion in remedying pure de
jure segregation. While the Court in Swann did not prohibit
predominantly one-race schools, it cautioned the district judge to
scrutinize such schools closely to insure that they were not the product of state-imposed segregation.41 The Court vested district judges
system of determining admission to the public schools on a nonracial basis, and
revision of local laws and regulations which may be necessary in solving the foregoing problems.
Brown v. Board of Educ., 349 U.S. 294, 300-01 (1955).
32. Cooper v. Aaron, 358 U.S. 1, 17-18 (1958). The Court denied a request to stay a plan
of integration in Little Rock, Arkansas, despite violence generated to a large extent by the
Governor's unsolicited dispatching of National Guard units to keep Negro students from
entering a high school and by the legislature's opposition to desegregation. "[Tihe Constitutional rights of [the Negro children] are not to be . ..yielded to the violence .. .
which[has] followed upon the actions of the Governor and Legislature." Id. at 17-18.
33. 391 U.S. 430 (1968).
34. 391 U.S. 450 (1968).
35. This plan gave the student the choice of attending his neighborhood school or being
bused to another school to achieve desegregation.
36. De jure segregation can be divided into two categories, pure de jure and indirect de
jure. Pure de jure segregation results from statutory or constitutional provisions which either
require or permit racial segregation of public schools. See Brown v. Board of Educ., 347 U.S.
483 (1954). Indirect de jure segregation refers to segregative actions taken by the school board
(and arguably other agencies of the state) with the intent to segregate. Examples of indirect
de jure segregation include gerrymandering of school attendance zones and construction of
new schools in predominantly one-race neighborhoods. See Keyes v. School District No. 1,
413 U.S. 189 (1973). See also Shannon, Present Direction of Court Decisions Regarding
MetropolitanArea Desegregation,1 J.L.E. 587, 588 (1972).
37. Green v. County School Bd., 391 U.S. 430, 438 (1968).
38. Monroe v. Board of Comm'rs, 391 U.S. 450, 459 (1968). The invalidated provision
permitted any pupil to transfer to a school outside his attendance zone if space was available.
Id. at 453-54. For a discussion of other types of desegregation plans held invalid by the Court,
see Note, Fifth Circuit Relies on Administrative Standardsin School Desegregation Cases,
64 MICH. L. REv. 340, 341 (1965).

39. This is the opposite of a dual system. See note 28 supra.
40. 402 U.S. 1 (1971).
41. Id. at 26.
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with power to alter attendance zones as one remedy for pure de jure
segregation42 and implied that in some circumstances busing of students may be required. 3 Keyes v. School DistrictNo. 1"1 involved
no constitutional or statutory provisions which required or permitted segregation.45 However, the school board had taken certain actions which had the effect of segregating part of the school district.48
The Court found that these actions were taken with the intent to
segregate suburban schools. The Court held that proof of indirect
de jure segregation47 in one part of a school system makes a prima
facie case that the state intended to segregate elsewhere in the
sytem. 5 Unless the state can prove that its conduct with respect to
other parts of the segregated district was not racially motivated, a
finding of indirect de jure segregation in one part of a district means
that the whole district must be desegregated in compliance with
Swann.
Since 1972 the Court has been faced with segregation cases
involving more than one school district. In that year, the Court
upheld district court injunctions preventing the subdivision of
existing school districts," but denied a request to redraw district
lines to alleviate alleged de facto metropolitan segregation. 0 One
year later, the Court denied certiorari of a district court order requiring the State of Indiana to either reorganize Indianapolis school
districts or implement an interdistrict transfer program to correct
indirect de jure segregation." In Bradley v. School Board,52 an
evenly divided Court53 upheld an appeals court decision that a met42.

Id. at 28.

43. Id. at 30. "Desegregation cannot be limited to the walk-in school."
44.
45.
46.

413 U.S. 189 (1973).
Id. at 191.
The board's actions involved construction policies and the drawing of attendance

zones. Id.
47. This form of segregation-intent to segregate plus segregative effect-will be referred to as indirect de jure segregation. A third type of segregation is de facto segregation.
In a de facto situation, pupils attend schools of predominantly racial sameness simply because they live in neighborhoods characterized by the racial sameness reflected in student
enrollment of the local public schools. See Shannon, Present Direction of Court Decisions
Regarding MetropolitanArea Desegregation,1 J.L.E. 587, 588 (1972).
48. Keyes v. School District No. 1, 413 U.S. 189, 213 (1973).
49. United States v. Scotland Neck City Bd. of Educ., 407 U.S. 484 (1972); Wright v.
Council of City of Emporia, 407 U.S. 451 (1972).
50. Spencer v. Kugler, 454 F.2d 839 (3d Cir. 1972), afl'd, 404 U.S. 1027 (1972). For a

definition of de facto segregation, see note 47 supra.
51. United States v. Board of School Comm'rs, 474 F.2d 81 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 413
U.S. 920 (1973).
52. 412 U.S. 92 (1973).
53. Mr. Justice Powell took no part in the decision. Justice Powell disqualified himself
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ropolitan desegregation plan involving three school districts was
improper because the state-imposed segregation had been eliminated within the individual school districts. 4
The addition of Justice Powell to the majority in Milliken gives
it the precedential value lacking in Bradley v. School Board.- The
Court's decision in Milliken may have been dictated as much by
policy considerations as by constitutional principles. The constitutional reason for reversal was the complete absence of proof that the

outlying school districts had violated any fourteenth amendment
equal protection guarantees. There was no showing that the outlying
districts had, in any way, contributed to the segregation existing
within the Detroit School District.5 Thus, the Court stated that the
"constitutional right of the Negro respondents residing in Detroit is
to attend a unitary school system in that district."5 7 The major
policy consideration underlying the Court's decision was the impracticability of a multi-district consolidation. 5 Other policy considerations were the desirability of local control over education,"

equitable principles of fault," a reluctance to have courts engage in
legislative functions,6" and the Court's awareness of public disbecause of his prior membership on the Richmond School Board, one of the petitioners, and
on the Virginia State Board of Education, one of the defendants. Note, Consolidation For
Desegregation:The Unsolved Issue of the Inevitable Sequel, 82 YALE L.J. 1681 (1973).
54. 412 U.S. 92 (1973).
55. See Note, ConsolidationFor Desegregation:The Unsolved Issue of the Inevitable
Sequel, 82 YALE L.J. 1681, 1684 (1973). This authority deals with Bradley v. School Bd., supra
note 52, taking the position that it and the appellate court holding in Milliken v. Bradley
are directly contradictory.
56. 94 S.Ct. at 3128.
57. Id.
58. Id. at 3126. The Court raised seven practical problems associated with the metropolitan plan: (1) What happens to popularly elected school boards? (2) What board or boards
would levy taxes for school operations? (3) How would equality in tax levies be assured? (4)
What provisions would be made for financing? (5) Would the validity of long term bonds be
jeopardized? (6) Who would determine the curricula? and (7) Who would set up attendance
zones, purchase equipment, locate and construct new schools, etc.?
59. No single tradition in public education is more deeply rooted than local
control over the operation of schools . .

.

.[It] affords citizens an opportunity to

participate in decision-making, [and] permits the structuring of school programs
to fit local needs ....
Id. at 3125-26.
60. Id. at 3128. "Disparate treatment of White and Negro students occured within the
Detroit school system, and not elsewhere, and on this record the remedy must be limited to
that system."
61. Id. at 3126-27.
.. .absent a complete restructuring of the laws of Michigan relating to school
districts the District Court will become first, a de facto "legislative authority" to
resolve these complex questions, and then the "school superintendent" for the
entire area. This is a task which few, if any, judges are qualified to perform. . ..
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satisfaction with current desegregation policies. 2
Although the Court did not categorically reject multi-district
remedies as a cure for metropolitan segregation, the likelihood of
such solutions being upheld has been greatly diminished. According
to the Court, before separate school districts may be consolidated
or a cross-district remedy imposed, it must first be shown that
"there has been a constitutional violation within one district that
produces a significant segregative effect in another district." 3 What
constitutes "a significant segregative effect in another district" is
unclear because the Court in Milliken chose not to decide that issue.
What is clear, however, is that the state must act in a highly segregative manner before an inter-district remedy is permissible. One
example the Court offered is the intentional drawing of school district lines on the basis of race. 4 Actions with lesser segregative impact (e.g. state construction policies and the legislative rescinding
of Detroit's voluntary desegregation plan) are not sufficient to give
rise to a multi-district remedy. 5 Despite the fact that the concentration of Negro school-aged children is very high in the large metropolitan cities66 and is projected to go even higher, 7 desegregation remedies must be confined to the particular school district absent proof
of the limited criteria set out above. Furthermore, it might be
argued that based on Keyes, not only must a certain quantum of
"segregative effect" be found, but an intent to segregate must also
be shown. The Court expressly reaffirmed its position in Swann that
desegregation in the sense of dismantling a dual school system does
not require any particular racial balance in each school, grade, or
classroom.
The four dissenting justices noted the practical effect of the
Court's decision and argued that: (1) the State of Michigan through
its constitution and laws has great control over local school districts
and should be made to answer for de jure segregation policies; (2)
it would be impossible for the Detroit School District to achieve an
62. Though the Court does not denominate this as a factor in its decision, its presence
is certainly apparent. See Annot., 16 A.L.R. FED. 950 (1973).
63. 94 S.Ct. at 3127.
64. 94 S.Ct. at 3128.
65. The Court reasoned that because the only impact of the state's segregative acts was
on the Detroit School District, no cause for a multi-district remedy was shown. This rationale may cast doubt on the holding of Keyes v. School District, supra note 44, that proof of
de jure segregation is one part of a school system raises prima facie the intent to segregate
elsewhere in the system.
66. See Hauser, DemographicFactors in the Integrationof the Negro, DAEDALUS, Fall
1965 at 847-77.
67. See James S. Coleman, et aL., EQUALrrY OF EDUCATIONAL OPPORTUNITY 39-40 (1966).

https://scholarship.law.missouri.edu/mlr/vol40/iss2/5

74

et al.: Recent Cases
19751

RECENT CASES

equitable racial balance;"8 (3) the transportation costs would be
greatly increased by a Detroit-only remedy; (4) a multi-district plan
would more effectively prevent resegregation; (5) the reasoning used
by the Court with respect to legislative reapportionment should
apply with equal force to school desegregation" and should not be
confined by political or administrative boundaries; and (6) the social, economic and political advantages of a desegregated school
system will be denied to children within the Detroit School District
because of the Court's decision.
The Court's decision turned upon a single vote. A new face on
the Court could theoretically alter Milliken's result. Given the current judicial, social and political sentiment, however, a reversal of
Milliken seems unlikely in the near future. Based in large part upon
policy considerations, the net result of Milliken v. Bradley will be
to shelter further suburbs from the inner cities' minority group population. Absent the intentional segregative redrawing of school district lines or the commission of unconstitutional acts having a significant segregative effect in another district, the Supreme Court
has for all practical purposes laid to rest the remedy of interschool
district consolidation for the achievement of metropolitan desegregation." The Court's holding in Swann that the scope of the remedy
is to be determined by the nature of the constitutional violation has
been given a more restrictive interpretation."
M. MICHAEL GILL

68. 94 S.Ct. at 3137. Although the overall Detroit School District ratio was 63.6% Negro
and 34.8% white, many schools under the Detroit-only desegregation plans would be 75% to
90% Negro.
69. See Reynolds v. Sims, 377 U.S. 533 (1964); Gomillion v. Lightfoot, 364 U.S. 339
(1960).
70. See, e.g., United States v. Board of School Comm'rs, 474 F.2d 81 (7th Cir.), cert.
denied, 413 U.S. 920 (1973); Calhoun v. Cook, 469 F.2d 1067 (5th Cir. 1972).
71. Swann v. Charlotte-Mecklenburg Bd. of Educ., 402 U.S. 1, 16 (1971).
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